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Australia Wants to Take Government Surveillance to the Next Level
- NoPicklez 8y agoFor those that would like more reading here is the explanatory bill: https://bit.ly/2NR4tTh https://bit.ly/2NR4tTh Three important things to note technical assistance requests, technical assistance notice and technical capability notice.
- lucb1e 8y agoNo need to use URL shorteners on HN, it's not as if there is a character limit... Here is the full URL: https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/consultations/Documents/explanatory-document.pdf https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/consultations/Documents/expla... Protip for those playing along at home: add a + to a bitly URL to view info, such as the target URL without having to go there.
- coretx 8y agoAnd this is the culprit. ""Should governments continue to encounter impediments to lawful access to information ... we may pursue technological, enforcement, legislative or other(!) measures" Translation: Fuck your sovereignty, we'll use violence to get what we want.
- BLKNSLVR 8y agoI strongly doubt any tactical military response. They'd use pressure from the other countries, most likely the US given the country-of-origin of the biggest tech companies. Australia doesn't interfere with sovereignty to a fault. Julian Assange, The Bali 9, Peter Greste. So it'll be interesting if there's any Australian response to the James Ricketson situation in Cambodia.
- steve_taylor 8y agoThey keep insisting they're not asking for backdoors. Here's what the explanatory bill says: The type of assistance that may be requested or required under the above powers include (amongst other things): * Removing a form of electronic protection applied by the provider, if the provider has an existing capability to remove this protection. * Providing technical information like the design specifications of a device or the characteristics of a service. * Installing, maintaining, testing or using software or equipment given to a provider by an agency. * Formatting information obtained under a warrant. * Facilitating access to devices or services. * Helping agencies test or develop their own systems and capabilities. * Notifying agencies of major changes to their systems, productions or services that are relevant to the effective execution of a warrant or authorisation. * Modifying or substituting a target service. * Concealing the fact that agencies have undertaken a covert operation
- lsh 8y agothe bill is so brazen, I keep wondering if they mean for it to not pass. Like they put it out there just to appease some organisation that they are 'at least trying'. Hopefully it doesn't backfire a'la Brexit
- adrian_mrd 8y agoI wonder if the bureaucrat(s) or technocrat(s) who originally wrote or co-wrote this bill, has a technology background or is a white label lawyer from one of the big legal firms who often write legislation for the Australian Parliament on an expensive consulting basis? Or just an in-house lawyer from the A-G's office - whose expertise is purely legal rather than technological? Many of these clauses are so vague ("Providing technical information like the design specifications...") that they show either a fundamental lack of practical technology knowledge, or, are deliberately vague so that the arms of the Orwellian Australian federal government octopus can create the intended backdoor without explicitly calling it a backdoor. Maybe both are true? Was it William Shakespeare who once proffered: is a backdoor by another, obfuscated name, still a backdoor?
- tananaev 8y agoIt seems like they are just making it more explicit that companies must cooperate with the police. Isn't it already the case anyway if there is an appropriate court order? At least they are not suggesting to compromise or limit encryption in any way. What I fail to understand is how all this would help fighting crime. Criminals and terrorists can easily use end-to-end encryption for the communication. There is plenty of software for that and it's really easy to do nowadays.
- ThrustVectoring 8y ago>At least they are not suggesting to compromise or limit encryption in any way. No, instead they're compromising trust in signed updates from vendors. That's far worse.
- Kostchei 8y agoUnfortunately it gives them the legal capability to require your startup/IT company/multinational to put development time in at their request to enable your software to give them the access they want. For example- get chats in real time log IP addresses and pass them to gov open containers stored on your infrastructure get into the phone or device you have sold to a client previously These are not interpretations of the legislation- these are the use cases they wrote it to solve. As ex LEO I get it but the burden on organisations is going to bad for business, not to mention the insecure solutions that are going to get drummed up/coded on the fly to comply with these requests- security nightmare. There is some reasonable paranoia that this might be a Trojan to enable access in the US. Can't pass legislation in the US? Easy, get your vassal state (AU) to pass it, then ask them to investigate your target and then force people to comply with your vassals state's request. "yeh I know you can't do that in Texas but you can in Western Australia and we, the US, has a treaty with Australia so you're just going to hand over that data. We'll deliver it to the Aussies for you" I may be paranoid, but I'm not the only one seeing this angle on it. Big conspiracies- count me out. Gov is lazy and disorganised. Little conspiracies between gov-buddies ? Absolutely.
- peteretep 8y ago... sounds like asking a phone company to tap a phone, which is pretty well established?
- davidklemke 8y agoThe article mentions that Australia has no bill of rights which, whilst technically true, doesn't mean we don't have equivalent protections. Some are enshrined in our constitution whilst others are parts of common law and other legislation. The conclusion they draw from that is right however; a lot of laws can be introduced to our parliament that might not get off the ground elsewhere. It's why we've fervently fought against many other, similar laws that would impinge on our rights and freedoms in the past. I spent a good part of my youth fighting against the Clean Feed legislation (it was a great big Internet filter for Australia, a terrible idea) which was thankfully defeated before it got off the ground. We'll have to do the same for this.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- skissane 8y ago> The article mentions that Australia has no bill of rights which, whilst technically true, doesn't mean we don't have equivalent protections. Some are enshrined in our constitution The protections provided by the Australian constitution (as interpreted by the High Court) are quite weak in comparison to those included in the US Bill of Rights, it isn't really a fair comparison. > whilst others are parts of common law and other legislation. Anything in common law or legislation isn't worth much, since a single ordinary Act of Parliament is all it takes to cancel them out.
- basicplus2 8y agoTrue, but once you introduce a bill of rights all your commom law protections go out the window.. including stuff you didnt know you had
- geggam 8y agoThe US bill of rights doesnt define the rights. The bill of rights calls out special rights that the govt shall not touch. The rights are granted to us by our creator aka natural law. The same law used to declare our independence from the crown and an inherent part of the fabric of the US. Not sure if this is clearly stated yet.
- worik 8y agoI cannot read that article in Firefox. Ironic
- mrmondo 8y agoDigital Rights Watch has more information and a submission system to help people write their feedback to the government: https://digitalrightswatch.org.au/2018/08/19/defend-encryption/ https://digitalrightswatch.org.au/2018/08/19/defend-encrypti...
- femto 8y agoWhat the parent doesn't explicitly mention is that there is a government inquiry open RIGHT NOW. You have to get your submissions in by 10th of September (5 days time). Every Australian here needs to make a submission (please). The parent's link, allows you to post a boilerplate submission with a single click. Far better to write and email your own submission, as form letters tend to get aggregated into one during evaluation. Your own submission only has to be a few lines, even if it just paraphrases a form submission. Uniqueness counts over bulk submissions. The page for the inquiry is: https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/consultations/assistance-and-access-bill-2018 https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/consultations/assistanc... The email address for submissions is: AssistanceBill.Consultation@homeaffairs.gov.au Less time critically, you also need to write to or call your federal MP, but I'd suggest that a personal submission to the inquiry is the most "bang for buck".
- ObsoleteNerd 8y agoThis video they made is absolutely hilarious, and shows just how un-hilarious and fucked up these proposed changes are: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eW-OMR-iWOE https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eW-OMR-iWOE
- saagarjha 8y ago> The government has been quick to claim that this is not a back door, and the bill prohibits requests to companies to create “systemic” weaknesses. Claiming that you're not backdooring something doesn't stop it from being a backdoor.
- throw2016 8y agoIts interesting to think back when Saudi Arabia and the UAE tried to force Blackberry to fall in line there was global outrage including here about the 'backwardness' of these countries and values of democracy and freedom. Now just a decade later this 'backward' behavior is now 'normalized'. This is evidence things are moving too fast for us to fully comprehend or contemplate how far down the slippery slope we may be at the current time and how 'values' and definitions change in just a decade.
- gumby 8y agoI don't know why the Five Eyes countries issued a joint statement the other day (tellingly, via the Aussie government's web site). Modus Operandi for each Five Eyes country since forever is to ship their secrets to another partner so they could claim not to be spying on their own people. All they need is for AUS to have the backdoor and then all data could be channeled that way. I appreciate that the author mentioned the gross incompetence of our intelligence operation which I presume doesn't get much mention outside the country. PS: nice original Mac illustration for that article!
- valtism 8y agoI feel like the linked article on ABC has a much more detailed and balanced description of the bill [1]. The Government says that "systemic" weaknesses cannot be demanded. That said, the third part of the demands that can be made, the "technical capability notice", seems ripe for abuse. At the very least, the acceptance of a bill like this will erode trust in app stores. I would expect to see some sort of checksum verification by users becoming commonplace as people become wary of potential targeted attacks. [1] http://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2018-08-20/tech-surveillance-laws-labelled-aggressive-by-critics/10128166 http://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2018-08-20/tech-surveilla...
- dane-pgp 8y agoBy "some sort of checksum verification by users", I guess you mean some sort of informal alternative / addition to this: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Binary_Transparency https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Binary_Transparency
- rstuart4133 8y ago> The Government says that "systemic" weaknesses cannot be demanded. That's because they already have a pre-existing "systemic" weakness that's better than any encryption back door: automatic software updates. If you can replace the software so it gives you the unencrypted data why on earth bother with a breaking the encryption? All they need is a hammer that forces the software companies to write undetectable bugs and silently install them for them, and that's what this legislation provides. We handed this systemic weakness to them on a platter, and it's been there for years now. Even through it was many years ago, I still recall the horror I felt when my daughter has her phone stolen, and I discovered I could press a button on Google play that would install some spy software to report on the whereabouts of the thief. I'm sort of surprised it took them this long to wake up to it. It isn't impossible to fix, so I suspect in the long term this loophole will be closed. The key to the fix is in the word "systemic", which translated means someone other than them can't exploit the weakness. As an aside, they are apparently operating under the assumption they will be able to control who has access to it. Which is to say they believe they can control access to something that will be highly automated thus ultimately controlled by only a few people. They are after all subject to the same attack they are using on us - they will be asking programmers to update their software, software that they undoubtedly will never see because it's "company proprietary". As the saying goes every human has their price. The price the attackers can afford in this case is extraordinary: this system is the key that unlocks every banking password, every bank SWIFT password, every GPG key, every X509 secret key, every email, every boardroom discussion on billion dollar takeovers. They are kidding themselves if they think that can protect this - which is why it is a terrible proposal. Worse, they don't have the defence we do, which is that the "normal" unmonitored population must be running strong, secure software. We get this unbugged software now from public servers we call app stores. So all you need is something that will compute the hash of the software you downloaded so you can compare it to publicly available one, and won't lie about the result. "Won't lie about the result" translates to "a device that can't be corrupted" which in turn translates to "can't have it's software upgraded". We already have such devices: they are called TPM's. We already know how to use them. Sort of. They work real well in 2FA dongles for example. Nevertheless it has to be said the primary application of TPM's, secure boot, hasn't been a raging success. But then we haven't had a good reason to make it a success: how many people do you know have been victims of evil maid's? Well, that was nice while it lasted, but now we all about to come face to face with an evil maid from our worst nightmares: someone who can install software updates while your phone is sitting in the safety of your coat pocket without leaving a trace. So the incentive is now here, the engineering task is well defined. Unfortunately the problem remains hard. We have to surround drivers, IPC, network stack with same high Chinese walls we currently put around apps, and somehow tie this all back to an all seeing TPM. So it's going to take a while. Maybe se4L will get it's day in the sun.
- freedomben 8y agoThe headline is a little misleading. It's much more terrifying than that. It isn't just Australia. It is the US, Australia, Canada, UK, and New Zealand all together (known as the "Five Eyes")[1]. Australia is just the country that put the memo together. > The "Five Eyes", often abbreviated as "FVEY", refer to an intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. [1] [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UKUSA_Agreement https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UKUSA_Agreement
- anonymous5133 8y agoFor those that don't know about the FVEY, here is a good documentary about it: https://ispydoc.com https://ispydoc.com
- jonnybgood 8y agoI skimmed it and that site seems highly sensationalist. I don’t know if that a good documentary. A couple of things from the site: “Operating independently from its governments...” Are the agencies involved not part of their governments? Am I missing something? “Hackers Can Disable a Sniper Rifle—Or Change Its Target...” It wants me to post this to social media. What’s the context of this quote? It gives none. It seems like it wants me to post clickbait. If you want to learn about FVEY you’re probably better off just reading Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Eyes https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Eyes
- dx87 8y agoI didn't go to the site, but the part about being able to hack sniper rifles is correct. It wasn't some complex nation-state level hack, it was just standard IoT device with poor security integrated into a rifle. The hack was done on the consumer version of one brand of rifle, thought the Army had ordered some for evaluation purposes. Here's an article about it: https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-can-disable-sniper-rifleor-change-target/ https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-can-disable-sniper-rif...
- nereus 8y agoDo they think that is this law is introduced that criminals will be using Facebook and Australian hosted communications providers to communicate with one another?
- acutesoftware 8y agoI came across this video that shows the potential issues with this bill https://youtu.be/eW-OMR-iWOE https://youtu.be/eW-OMR-iWOE What is concerning is I am building a information management system that focuses on privacy and this sort of bill makes a mockery of the entire concept.
- mrschwabe 8y agoThe message is to entrepreneurs: don't build companies - build protocols.
- jacques_chester 8y agoThere are many things to admire about Australia and many reasons that I am grateful that I grew up in Australia. But the ongoing ritual humiliation of Australian technologists over the past several decades is really tiresome.
- BLKNSLVR 8y agoIt's also a confusing situation given the cyclical nature of headlines and government concern with Australia's brain drain (all the smart ones leave for better opportunities overseas), and the recent-ish pronouncements of Innovation! through having a specific Department and Minister for Innovation (which has now been decommissioned by the new Prime Minister). ... and the NBN debacle is another nail in Australia's "ability to compete on the world stage" coffin. ... and any lead Australia had in regards to renewable energy projects, investment, and research has been very effectively and efficiently squandered.
- mirimir 8y agoThis is mostly about "terrorism", right? And for Australia, about immigration from flooding areas in Southeast Asia, right? Which arguably has follow-on roles in "terrorism". [I use scare quotes because the definition of "terrorism" is so politicized.]
- siruncledrew 8y agoIt’s interesting these are all common law Anglosphere countries which declared independence from Great Britain. The UK still has a lot of soft power.
- geowwy 8y agoSince WWII the UK is definitely the junior power.
- BLKNSLVR 8y agoThis method won't work for most 'after the event' scenarios, such as the San Bernadino case, because the subjects are often deceased, and so unlikely to be updating the software on their phones or computers, so it can only possibly apply "upon suspicion". ie. pre-crime... This opens up questions as to how someone becomes 'suspicious' if their communication is already encrypted. And if they're already a person of interest, how many myriad other ways do they have of surveilling them or checking out their activities? Terrorist attacks require non-electronic items that have to be purchased, stored, and constructed in non-electronic places. There are existing ways to surveil people, under warrant. GPS trackers, phone records, bank statements, listening devices, watching devices, IMSI catchers, metadata (which Australia has legislated must be kept by ISP's for a couple of years). This new legislation feels like a LOT of effort for a very small percentage return over and above those things I've already listed, especially considering: - How long would it take to develop and deploy a targetted version of a program? - What's the likelihood of the target updating their program during the useful window of time? - Is this timeframe going to be of use to law enforcement? - If the timeframe is justified, what's the time limit? Is 'suspect' going to have their comms intercepted for the foreseeable future? At what point is the well deemed to be dry? - At what point does warranted surveillance become government harassment? What this looks like from the outside is more psychology than technology: - Hey Terrorists, we can do these things so, you know, re-think your life's direction - Chilling effects: encourage paranoia, discourage dissent, even discourage disagreement
- ThrustVectoring 8y ago>How long would it take to develop and deploy a targetted version of a program? Not particularly relevant - they can require a targeted version of the program be developed before someone comes under suspicion. >What's the likelihood of the target updating their program during the useful window of time? Doesn't matter - they can require a force-push update system be built to silently update a specific customer's app version. The law is broadly enough worded that they can order whatever software is in their way to become broken upon receipt of a court order. >Is this timeframe going to be of use to law enforcement? Yes, because the law will allow them to force commercial companies to build automated, scaled systems. >If the timeframe is justified, what's the time limit? Is 'suspect' going to have their comms intercepted for the foreseeable future? At what point is the well deemed to be dry? We'll never know, because it's designed to be used in secret.
- GreyZephyr 8y agoIs anyone actively organising against this bill? I feel that ever since the Iraq war protests failed ever time some thing like this happens, people complain a little bit, but don't actually manage to change anything. I was wondering if there are any groups out there that are actively protesting this that I could join, or if not, if any one is interested in forming one? It seems to be an issue that will affect the majority of the readers of HN in a negative way, regardless of your usual political affiliation.
- King-Aaron 8y agoPeople seem to just express their anger at news facebook pages these days, but are far too apathetic to actually go outside and do something about it. There also seems to be a growing "anti-complaining" feeling around people's interactions, where it at least appears that a large number of people find it amusing to actively attack those who are highlighting a problem.
- GW150914 8y agoAsk someone who was an environmentalist for a couple of decades if shooting the messenager is a new or growing phenomena. It definitely isn’t, and is always at its peak issue makes people feel powerless, and they know that it would take personal sacrifice to make a difference. Few people like being told that rough seas are ahead, and the only way to make it through is with extensive teamwork, compromise, and putting aside petty personal issues. Of course it’s often enhanced by orgsnizations which benefit from the status quo. For a long time being in favor of EV’s fell into the “tree hugger” category of ridicule and censure, and only when it became possible to adopt the tech without significant personal sacrifice did that change. The idea of organizing people and exercising mass political power is obviously hard, potentially risky, and involves more than making a 5 minute video or paragraph of posting. If people have already chosen not to do that, they tend to resent the people loudly reminding them that there is another way they simply chose to ignore.
- aussiethrow1234 8y ago40 years ago my parents emigrated from an authoritarian South-East Asian country with a dubious human rights record to come to Australia where their kids could enjoy freedom and opportunity away from all that. Today, I see this announcement in the news and I am wondering which country I can emigrate to with my own kids because I am disgusted with the increasing authoritarian bent of our government, as well as our plummeting human rights record...
- throwawayperson 8y agoI guess that's how market economy works.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- ehnto 8y agoI found the Assistance Bill to be relatively palatable although still disagreeable and I have emailed in to the forum saying I think it should not pass. I was just surprised that it had so much awareness of the concerns around what it was doing. The most worrying part for me was the enabling of remotely serving a warrant. In other words, if they had a warrant for your device they could hack your device instead of physically recovering it. This would mean their cybersecurity team will be broadening it's capabilities and weaponry in that area. That is worrying. Much in the same way I don't want police cruising town in armoured vehicles with a small arsenal, I am not too hot on investigators being able to sick the hounds on an unsuspecting network. Collateral is a real issue in the digital world too. What if my org network goes down because a warrant was being served remotely on an employee and their exploits were not precision enough?