4 ms·

I never understood how falsificationism is supposed to workaround the shortcoming of inductivism. Say I have coin that I predict will always flip heads. The f

by yters 8y ago

I never understood how falsificationism is supposed to workaround the shortcoming of inductivism. Say I have coin that I predict will always flip heads. The first flip is tails. Hypothesis falsified! But, that still tells me nothing about the future if the coin is fair. For falsification to work, we have to assume a priori there is not a uniform distribution over events. In which case, we can do something like Solmonoff induction anyways. So, it looks like falsification is only useful if induction is also useful. In which case, falsification is not a workaround for induction's problems.

lisper 8y ago
Falsification is only a small part of the story. The other part, the much more important part, is explanatory power. David Deutsch does an excellent job of explaining this in his book The Fabric of Reality, mainly in chapter 7. Highly recommended. Induction, BTW, is completely invalid as a mode of reasoning (speaking here of logical induction, not mathematical induction). You can flip a coin 10,000 times and have it come up heads every time and still not be able to validly conclude that it will come up heads every time (there are a lot of ancillary assumptions that go into the deductive inference, none of which are justified). On the other hand, you can examine the coin, see that there are heads on both sides, and immediately conclude (soundly) that it will come up heads every time because you can provide an explanation: one of the two sides must come up, and they are both heads!
- yters 8y ago
  That's just pushing the problem up a level. Adding an explanation is proposing a model for the coin's behavior. Regardless of the model proposed, and whether it is confirmed or refuted, if the coin is fair you learn nothing. On the other hand, if the coin is not fair, Solomonoff induction works.
  - lisper 8y ago
    > if the coin is fair you learn nothing. But that is simply because the theory that a coin is fair cannot be falsified with one data point. (Well, that's actually not quite true. It can't be falsified with a single data point which is "heads" or "tails". It could be falsified if the coin lands and breaks into two pieces revealing some internal mechanism that makes it unfair.) > if the coin is not fair, Solomonoff induction works. No, it doesn't. It is possible (given sufficient technology) to produce a coin that generates a sequence of flips that is indistinguishable from fair for any finite number N of flips, but which then produces HEADS forever after the Nth flip. Moreover, it is possible to know that this will happen without even flipping the coin!
    - yters 8y ago
      The problem is how do you gain these explanations in the first place without appealing to inductivism? The process of examining a thing to propose a theory about its operation seems indistinguishable in my mind from the inductivist approach of deriving general theories from particular observations. Both approaches make the same assumption of a consistent underlying order behind the observations we make.
      - lisper 8y ago
        This is the unsolved problem of "hypothesis formation." It's something that brains do that we do not yet fully understand. It's an active area of research. But the process of explanatory hypothesis formation is distinct from induction. Induction says, e.g. "Every crow I have ever seen has been black, therefore I conclude that all crows are black." (They aren't, BTW. http://www.birds.cornell.edu/crows/whitecrows.htm http://www.birds.cornell.edu/crows/whitecrows.htm https://www.quora.com/Are-all-crows-black https://www.quora.com/Are-all-crows-black)
        yters 8y ago
        Yes, so it seems like falsificationism just pushes the fundamental problem elsewhere and renames it. The basic problem of distinguishing between patterns and luck undermines both falsification and induction. As far as I know, there is no resolution to the problem. We just irrationally assume there is no problem out of habit, as Hume states in his original work. A leap of faith, if you will.
        lisper 8y ago
        No. Falsification is necessary but not sufficient. The best theory is one that has two properties: 1) it is consistent with all the observed data (i.e. has not been falsified) and 2) it is a "good explanation". Explaining what is meant by "good explanation" is too long for an HN comment, but roughly speaking it means that it is concise and brittle -- any modification would cause it to become inconsistent with the data. (So for example, conspiracy theories fail as explanatory theories not because they are inconsistent with the data -- they generally aren't -- but rather because they are not concise and brittle.)
  - marcosdumay 8y ago
    > That's just pushing the problem up a level. No. That's inverting the order of the interaction. On the first case you are observing a phenomenon, and using it to construct a model; on the second case you are constructing a model, and then using your observation to check it. Induction is a great way to create useful models, but only failures on falsification can give you confidence that the model actually works.
    - lisper 8y ago
      > Induction is a great way to create useful models No, it isn't. Induction is a great way to create WRONG models. In fact, all of the interesting and useful stuff happens exactly where induction gets it wrong. Example: the sun has risen on earth every day for the last 10^11 days or so. But we know that in another 10^11 days the sun will stop rising (because it will become a red giant and engulf the earth). We know this despite the fact that we have never actually observed this happen even once.
Nasrudith 8y ago
Theoretically couldn't one obtain the exact result desired from a physical die or coin by rolling or flipping it with the proper degree of precision? Probability is nearly always heuristic technically due to lacking perfect knowledge. Quantum effects appear to involve some true randomness.
- cokernel 8y ago
  Yes. Diaconis, Holmes, and Montgomery demonstrate (but do not provide a full specification for) a coin-flipping machine which will yield heads 100%* of the time (as long as it starts on heads). "Dynamical bias in the coin toss". https://statweb.stanford.edu/~susan/papers/headswithJ.pdf https://statweb.stanford.edu/~susan/papers/headswithJ.pdf * Or at least every time the experiment is performed.
coldtea 8y ago
It's not supposed to workaround induction's problems.
- yters 8y ago
  Induction is the problem, so if falsification does not solve the problem it does not contribute anything.
  - coldtea 8y ago
    Induction might be the problem for you (and well, certain philosophers of science, like Bertrand Russell), but it's not the problem with the scientific method -- which doesn't pretend to arrive at the "absolute" truth anyway.
    - yters 8y ago
      It's not a matter of absolute truth. The question is why are we able to predict anything at all, even in a probabilistic sense? With maximum entropy, there is no way to distinguish between order and a really fortunate series of fair coin flips. Both inductivism and falsificationism need to assume prior order to justify the success of science, so they are both in the same boat.
AndrewKemendo 8y ago
Say I have coin that I predict will always flip heads. The first flip is tails. Hypothesis falsified! Your cycle of scientific inquiry is complete in this case. The test demonstrated that the coin will not always flip heads, and therefore the hypothesis was disproved. But, that still tells me nothing about the future if the coin is fair. This is now a new, albeit related, inquiry that can build upon the results of the first test. So your proposition is constructed in error unfortunately and falsification doesn't claim to address the problem of induction.
- yters 8y ago
  When I Google "karl popper problem of induction" the Wiki article says: Karl Popper, a philosopher of science, sought to solve the problem of induction. He argued that science does not use induction, and induction is in fact a myth. Instead, knowledge is created by conjecture and criticism. The main role of observations and experiments in science, he argued, is in attempts to criticize and refute existing theories.

by yters 8y ago

lisper 8y ago

Falsification is only a small part of the story. The other part, the much more important part, is explanatory power. David Deutsch does an excellent job of explaining this in his book The Fabric of Reality, mainly in chapter 7. Highly recommended. Induction, BTW, is completely invalid as a mode of reasoning (speaking here of logical induction, not mathematical induction). You can flip a coin 10,000 times and have it come up heads every time and still not be able to validly conclude that it will come up heads every time (there are a lot of ancillary assumptions that go into the deductive inference, none of which are justified). On the other hand, you can examine the coin, see that there are heads on both sides, and immediately conclude (soundly) that it will come up heads every time because you can provide an explanation: one of the two sides must come up, and they are both heads!

yters 8y ago
That's just pushing the problem up a level. Adding an explanation is proposing a model for the coin's behavior. Regardless of the model proposed, and whether it is confirmed or refuted, if the coin is fair you learn nothing. On the other hand, if the coin is not fair, Solomonoff induction works.
- lisper 8y ago
  > if the coin is fair you learn nothing. But that is simply because the theory that a coin is fair cannot be falsified with one data point. (Well, that's actually not quite true. It can't be falsified with a single data point which is "heads" or "tails". It could be falsified if the coin lands and breaks into two pieces revealing some internal mechanism that makes it unfair.) > if the coin is not fair, Solomonoff induction works. No, it doesn't. It is possible (given sufficient technology) to produce a coin that generates a sequence of flips that is indistinguishable from fair for any finite number N of flips, but which then produces HEADS forever after the Nth flip. Moreover, it is possible to know that this will happen without even flipping the coin!
  - yters 8y ago
    The problem is how do you gain these explanations in the first place without appealing to inductivism? The process of examining a thing to propose a theory about its operation seems indistinguishable in my mind from the inductivist approach of deriving general theories from particular observations. Both approaches make the same assumption of a consistent underlying order behind the observations we make.
    - lisper 8y ago
      This is the unsolved problem of "hypothesis formation." It's something that brains do that we do not yet fully understand. It's an active area of research. But the process of explanatory hypothesis formation is distinct from induction. Induction says, e.g. "Every crow I have ever seen has been black, therefore I conclude that all crows are black." (They aren't, BTW. http://www.birds.cornell.edu/crows/whitecrows.htm http://www.birds.cornell.edu/crows/whitecrows.htm https://www.quora.com/Are-all-crows-black https://www.quora.com/Are-all-crows-black)
      - yters 8y ago
        Yes, so it seems like falsificationism just pushes the fundamental problem elsewhere and renames it. The basic problem of distinguishing between patterns and luck undermines both falsification and induction. As far as I know, there is no resolution to the problem. We just irrationally assume there is no problem out of habit, as Hume states in his original work. A leap of faith, if you will.
        lisper 8y ago
        No. Falsification is necessary but not sufficient. The best theory is one that has two properties: 1) it is consistent with all the observed data (i.e. has not been falsified) and 2) it is a "good explanation". Explaining what is meant by "good explanation" is too long for an HN comment, but roughly speaking it means that it is concise and brittle -- any modification would cause it to become inconsistent with the data. (So for example, conspiracy theories fail as explanatory theories not because they are inconsistent with the data -- they generally aren't -- but rather because they are not concise and brittle.)
- marcosdumay 8y ago
  > That's just pushing the problem up a level. No. That's inverting the order of the interaction. On the first case you are observing a phenomenon, and using it to construct a model; on the second case you are constructing a model, and then using your observation to check it. Induction is a great way to create useful models, but only failures on falsification can give you confidence that the model actually works.
  - lisper 8y ago
    > Induction is a great way to create useful models No, it isn't. Induction is a great way to create WRONG models. In fact, all of the interesting and useful stuff happens exactly where induction gets it wrong. Example: the sun has risen on earth every day for the last 10^11 days or so. But we know that in another 10^11 days the sun will stop rising (because it will become a red giant and engulf the earth). We know this despite the fact that we have never actually observed this happen even once.

Nasrudith 8y ago

Theoretically couldn't one obtain the exact result desired from a physical die or coin by rolling or flipping it with the proper degree of precision? Probability is nearly always heuristic technically due to lacking perfect knowledge. Quantum effects appear to involve some true randomness.

cokernel 8y ago
Yes. Diaconis, Holmes, and Montgomery demonstrate (but do not provide a full specification for) a coin-flipping machine which will yield heads 100%* of the time (as long as it starts on heads). "Dynamical bias in the coin toss". https://statweb.stanford.edu/~susan/papers/headswithJ.pdf https://statweb.stanford.edu/~susan/papers/headswithJ.pdf * Or at least every time the experiment is performed.

coldtea 8y ago

It's not supposed to workaround induction's problems.

yters 8y ago
Induction is the problem, so if falsification does not solve the problem it does not contribute anything.
- coldtea 8y ago
  Induction might be the problem for you (and well, certain philosophers of science, like Bertrand Russell), but it's not the problem with the scientific method -- which doesn't pretend to arrive at the "absolute" truth anyway.
  - yters 8y ago
    It's not a matter of absolute truth. The question is why are we able to predict anything at all, even in a probabilistic sense? With maximum entropy, there is no way to distinguish between order and a really fortunate series of fair coin flips. Both inductivism and falsificationism need to assume prior order to justify the success of science, so they are both in the same boat.

AndrewKemendo 8y ago

Say I have coin that I predict will always flip heads. The first flip is tails. Hypothesis falsified! Your cycle of scientific inquiry is complete in this case. The test demonstrated that the coin will not always flip heads, and therefore the hypothesis was disproved. But, that still tells me nothing about the future if the coin is fair. This is now a new, albeit related, inquiry that can build upon the results of the first test. So your proposition is constructed in error unfortunately and falsification doesn't claim to address the problem of induction.

yters 8y ago
When I Google "karl popper problem of induction" the Wiki article says: Karl Popper, a philosopher of science, sought to solve the problem of induction. He argued that science does not use induction, and induction is in fact a myth. Instead, knowledge is created by conjecture and criticism. The main role of observations and experiments in science, he argued, is in attempts to criticize and refute existing theories.