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Elections should also not allow someone to verify how they voted after the fact. I'm not sure how blockchains allow for that.
by monocasa 8y ago
Elections should also not allow someone to verify how they voted after the fact.
I'm not sure how blockchains allow for that.
- kenhwang 8y agoI think a way around this is: everyone gets randomly generated keys every election, like how everyone gets randomly numbered paper ballots. Currently, you can check if your numbered ballot was counted after you voted, but you can't verify the ballot wasn't tampered with. With keys, you can verify your vote was counted and not tampered with. If you don't want people to know how you voted, destroy your key. I'll admit that this still has the some of the same flaws as paper ballots: government doesn't track which key/ballot is assigned to you, and effectively centralized issuing of keys/ballots. But the advantage is: it's harder to forge or tamper with a ballot
- amelius 8y agoSomeone could still force you (physically, blackmail, etc) to give them your key.
- monocasa 8y agoOr just pay you. A huge portion of the populace would vote "the correct way" for a remarkably tiny kickback. We saw rampant vote buying during the gilded age.
- kenhwang 8y agoSure, just like how you can just steal physical absentee ballots out of mailboxes and mail them in. There's no such thing as perfect security. The problem of secure elections is how secure is secure enough? How many keys/ballots can you feasibly steal before getting caught? Is that number significant enough to change an election? Historically, it hasn't been.
- amelius 8y agoBut it's a fundamental requirement of elections that nobody should be able to force/bribe someone else to vote for a specific candidate.
- dragonwriter 8y ago> With keys, you can verify your vote was counted and not tampered with. If you don't want people to know how you voted, destroy your key If you can prove how you voted, this will be the subject of vote buying (or negative retaliation for failure to prove “correct” votes.) History has demonstrated that over and over again, which is why secret ballots for normal public elections and recorded votes in representative bodies where you want voters to be held accountable are norms.
- kenhwang 8y agoCompletely forgot about vote buying for a moment. Secret, but verifiable is a hard problem.
- SilasX 8y ago>Elections should also not allow someone to verify how they voted after the fact. Why not? I'd like to know that my ballot was counted properly. And that everyone whose vote was counted was a valid voter. And that everyone whose vote was counted, was counted how they intended (but not the content). You're right if you mean that some of those desirable properties might be irreconcilable, but that's not the same as saying I shouldn't be able to validate correct counting outright; that's exactly what allows votes to be changed after the fact. IIRC, it is possible to use homomorphic encryption to get all of that and have an end-to-end auditable system that maintains differential privacy (impossibility of detecting a change in the outcome by removing one vote). But I don't know the details of such a system.
- monocasa 8y agoBecause you open yourself to vote buying and voter intimidation attacks. Imagine a sketchy untraceable site on tor that'll give $20 for every public key that voted "the correct" way. During the gilded age, voter buying was a particularly bad problem, so we have a history of this attack in the united states.
- SilasX 8y agoYes, I understand the concept of selling votes. That wasn't in dispute. But in that case, your objection is to "being able to prove to others that you voted one way". Not to "being able to prove to yourself that you were counted as voting one way". Equating the two makes to harder to evaluate what is and isn't possible with different schemes like e.g. homomorphic systems.
- monocasa 8y agoIf you can prove to yourself, you can prove to others. They just ask for your key in exchange for the kickback.
- SilasX 8y agoThat does not follow at all: there are deniable encryption schemes that can decrypt to one or another message depending on which key is used. There are zero-knowledge proof systems that can convince exactly one person of a claim but not others (because the one person chose random challenges that others' can't trust not to have been revealed in advance) Be careful what assumptions you're depending on!