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TLS 1.3 Is an Opportunity for Amazon, Google and Microsoft to End Censorship
- vbezhenar 8y agoI'm sure that many countries will block Amazon, Google and whatever else if needed. It won't end censorship, it would make life of ordinary people there even harder.
- alexandernst 8y agoThe first reasonable thing I read on this subject.
- matt4077 8y agoThe idea here is, quite obviously, that blocking these services, plus everything that runs on their cloud infrastructure, is too high a price to pay. That mechanism is well established, if only by these governments previously being unable to just ban internet access outright, even though it was universally perceived as a threat to their control on the flow of information.
- pimmen 8y agoBut, if they do, they have a tougher sell. They might get away with ”we’re just protecting you from certain sites we deem harmful, and we’re thorough with your best interests in mind” when they block specific sites. It requires a far more gullible public to pull that off if it’s more than half the Internet.
- majewsky 8y agoThey'll just spin it as "supporting local businesses" who could not compete with FANG otherwise.
- rqs 8y ago> Currently, SNI in TLS 1.2 has a flaw that allows censors to differentiate between a “real” service and a “fake” service if they are savvy enough to figure it out. Interestingly, SNI in TLS 1.3 fixes this problem by hiding all of the information about the service behind encryption. Isn't this (Encrypted SNI) was the one been extensively discussed here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17538390 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17538390 ? This is great. I hope CDNs like Cloudflare etc deploy it ASAP. Also, deprecate previous TLS versions as ASAP so it can be more effective.
- TheCycoONE 8y agoThat was my thought reading the article. https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-03 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-03 indicates this is not a solved problem for TLS 1.3, and the key in DNS solution is still in the experimental phase (though compatible with TLS 1.3) This article is premature?
- Boulth 8y ago> The problem is that Amazon Web Services and Google Cloud currently do not allow domain fronting. Only Microsoft Azure does. Is there an official word from Microsoft that they allow it or just "they didn't ban it yet"?
- ishitatsuyuki 8y ago> If Google Cloud, Amazon Web Services, and Microsoft Azure allow domain fronting with TLS 1.3, censorship countries like China are faced with a binary choice. This sounds inaccurate to me. If encrypted SNI is applied, the middleman should not be able to figure out which domain you are connecting to, without interrupting the connection. Domain fronting is a technique for prior TLS which you had to disguise the hostname.
- tialaramex 8y agoEncrypted SNI isn't a feature of TLS 1.3. The article never outright says that it is, but it manages to give that impression. It was a desirable feature, but it wasn't delivered even for the final drafts at the top of this year, let alone back in 2016 when TLS 1.3 was originally thought to be finished. The TLS Working Group is going to adopt it (consensus at IETF 102 and on the mailing list was to adopt) but there's a LOT of work needed before Rescorla's rough sketch turns into something you'd want to actually deploy to millions of users. Here's the email about adopting (Joe is one of the WG chairs) Rescorla's draft. https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26842.html https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26842.h... Note that this is nowhere close to a finished feature. They're not sure whether to do DNS TXT records, whether this should live in a SRV record, some new DNS record (DNS Ops doesn't like TXT, but real world DNS services often don't have fancy new records for years because they're crap). They're not even sure if this should be two documents (one about DNS, one about how you use the keys which you presumably got from DNS) or just one. Because TLS 1.3 doesn't always (today never) encrypt SNI, a middleman could just insist on refusing connections with encrypted SNI. This becomes a staring contest - do the browsers deploy this anyway, and risk losing customers in places where governments have deployed a technology to prohibit it, or do they blink and hide it in some "Privacy" feature no ordinary users will ever enable.
- ctz 8y agoThis article is unfortunately inaccurate. TLS1.3 does not include encrypted SNI. Encrypted SNI is still being worked on by the TLS working group, and isn't in a deployable state.
- remoteorbust 8y agoThanks for the heads up. I've made some proxy software that routes on SNI. If TLS1.3 drops SNI then I feel like that will accelerate ipv6 adoption because we're going to need a shitload more IP addresses.
- bogomipz 8y agoI'm not following the connection between how IPv6 would accelerate in the absence of SNI. Could you elaborate?
- tialaramex 8y agoWithout SNI the only way for a client to talk to this.example rather than that.example over TLS and thus HTTPS is to give this.example and that.example different IP addresses. There aren't enough addresses to plausibly do this in IPv4, but in IPv6 there are plenty (except in some unusual corner cases)
- bogomipz 8y agoIndeed and I remember the bad old days of burning /24s for IP based virtual hosts in order to provide TLS. our current IPv4 exhaustion was the part I was missing. Cheers.
- remoteorbust 8y agoSure. If you are a CDN right now you can host multiple customers on one ip. If you are using TLS there are 2 ways to do this: 1. Have a big SAN cert with lots of names. 2. Use SNI to select the correct certificate for that client and route to the correct customer config (and therefore correct origin) If SNI didn't exist we'd be back to the bad old days of every TLS site requiring a dedicated IP. As ipv4 exhaustion has gotten worse this has gotten more expensive. However if we're using ipv6 then hosting N listeners for N ip addresses, each with their own dedicated cert, is much more scalable.
- Crontab 8y agoSeeing how search results are being censored in “free countries” due to things like the DMCA and The Right To Be Forgotten, maybe we shouldn’t look to private companies to fix this issue.
- gnode 8y agoAs far as I know, there is no law in Western countries prohibiting domain fronting, so it's not really comparable. What's probably more relevant is Google changing its mind, and deciding it wants to run a censored mainland Chinese service.
- exabrial 8y agoThis is such a great point. Plenty of censorship here and there laws were written all they could be really abused with impunity (ex: DMCA takedown notices in the court cases facing Cox/Comcast).
- IshKebab 8y agoThat is a totally different issue. This is about ISPs and governments snooping on your browsing, not taking sites down or removing them from search results.
- thomasfoster96 8y agoCorrect me if I’m misreading, but the link is to a blog post entitled “...an Opportunity ... to End Censorship”. ISPs and governments snooping on your browsing is surveillance, not censorship. Taking down sites and removing them from search results certainly is censorship.
- IshKebab 8y agoIt is talking about a particular type of censorship where connections are blocked. Think the Great Firewall of China. It is nothing to do with censorship where the actual source is removed, as with the right to be forgotten and DMCA takedowns.
- yardstick 8y agoEncrypted SNI is great for individual privacy but terrible for business/corporate security. At the moment it is possible to MITM proxy (without the possibility decryption) to inspect the SNI and determine if the host is allowed, and if so the proxy does its own IP resolution and transparently proxies/forwards the TCP traffic. Ie it never engages in the TLS session. This is useful for restricting access from a LAN to services hosted on large cloud provides like AWS, GCP, etc where fixed IPs are not available (well, the third party service/website elects to use a CDN/load balancer/etc without regard to the full security impact). A good example is PCI DSS and the payment card LAN. You should firewall and lock down so devices can only communicate with necessary services. Along with actual payment services, these LANs often need to allow access out to third party loyalty systems, digital receipt systems, etc that are cloud based. With Encrypted SNI this won’t be possible to do securely anymore. A full MITM TLS decrypting proxy with explicitly configure clients will be required to ensure the encrypted SNI isn’t changed to a malicous host to eg upload captured payment data to. That’s a lot more overhead both in: 1. Configuring clients to use a proxy and custom CA (let’s hope all the various third parties apps support proxy setup and custom CAs, and no cert pinning!) 2. Running a proxy that now it has to do full decryption and encryption (to make sure you aren’t messing with the SNI and going to a host you shouldn’t). Of course I don’t expect businesses to these lengths until there has been a serious breach exploiting encrypted SNI. Even then I don’t know which side will take action (or if neither side will)— merchants installing MITM proxies (unlikely), or third party service providers ditching load balancers and sticking to fixed IPs on their cloud hosts (less unlikely).
- growse 8y agoAren't businesses that are serious about meeting their legal/regulatory obligations for controlling internet access already using full MITM TLS interception with their own CAs? Given a malicious actor can register any old domain and get a cert for it very easily, I'm not sure what particular threat blocking TLS connections based just on the SNI is actually protecting you from.
- tialaramex 8y agoBackside covering at the cheapest possible price is the goal. It's not about whether it achieves the regulatory goal, just whether it gets a check on the list. The previous iteration of backside covering pondered the unencrypted server certificate, on the rationale that if this is a bad guy why do they have a good guy's certificate. If you know any cryptography, you are now thinking "But, wait, how does that secure anything?" but you aren't the target customer. The target customer verifies that this blocks them from accessing a "Bad" site in Internet Explorer and they're happy to part with $$ instead of the $$$ it would cost to do full blown HTTPS proxy for every connection. In TLS 1.3 this server certificate is encrypted. So the (perhaps slightly more untrustworthy) client SNI is pondered instead. What middlebox vendors would prefer not to mention is that in many cases they also figured TLS re-connections are always safe and can be allowed through. After all, if they didn't let bad guys make the original connection, how could those bad guys re-connect? TLS 1.3 exploited this to be "backward compatible" with such crapware, it says all its connections are "reconnections" so they pass through unmolested...
- DanielGee 8y agoWhy is the assumption always that AMZN, GOOG and MSFT doesn't want censorship? Especially when they have taken to censorship like duck to water. Why is the assumption that when given a "binary choice", entities like China, EU, etc would give in to tech companies? Especially when these companies so easily succumbed to US government/media pressure at home where we have a strong tradition of free speech? When a binary choice is created, it's the companies that have given in, not the state. Why are these tech companies being portrayed as being on the side of "good", while nations are portrayed as being on the side of "bad". The idea that AMZN, GOOG and MSFT have chinese, european or anyone else's best interest at heart while the PRC, EU or any other state doesn't. Did the british east india company have india's best interest at heart compared to mughal india? Considering how suspiciously we view foreign companies ( especially chinese tech companies ), it's odd that we view our own so highly.
- duckerude 8y agoI don't like Google as a whole. But I don't think Google is evil, in the sense of doing bad things because they're bad. At a low resolution, I think it responds to incentives and tries to make as much money as it can get away with. At a higher resolution, it's made up of a lot of people and smaller groups that each have their own incentives to follow, and whose goals don't exactly line up with Google's. Fighting censorship is nice for PR, supporting censorship is bad for PR. Some (not all!) ways of supporting censorship might help make more money, but good PR also helps make more money, so it's a trade-off. Drawing attention to Google's ability to fight censorship slightly shifts that trade-off. But not all of Google's decisions are made centrally. Many (almost all, I would guess) people in Google are well-meaning, and I expect they can get away with making good decisions a lot of the time. The people working on TLS probably aren't individually pro-censorship just because they work for Google, which means they may not make pro-censorship decisions unless specifically pressured to.
- RRRA 8y agoESNI is sadly not in the final standard, only in a seperate RFC. Hopefully it'll be ready soon...
- phobosdeimos 8y agoSure if these companies want to lose market share. And whats censorship? Who decides, the US? No thanks.
- anticensor 8y agoThe article is ironically censored for me.
- exabrial 8y agoI have a few thoughts that come to mind. One mistake we make frequently as tech people is trying to solve human relationship problems with a technology fixes. Censorship has existed for 10,000+ years; encrypted s night isn't going to magically fix it. There isn't an easy answer, just the hard path educate everyone. Requiring encrypted sni will only mean the little influence thought leaders have in censored countries will be blotted our and replaced with state-run companies. MITM proxies are a necessary evil, unfortunately, but the internet giants aren't doing a good job letting clients know when their TLS is being intercepted, so we're failing hard on education right now. Also the makers of the commercial MITM proxies do a terrible job of staying current on TLS specs. This is likely in part due to customers being unwilling to install patches that cause a service interruption, so that should be taken into the design of said devices.
- Eridrus 8y agoYeah, I think the recent death of domain fronting and the collateral damage from Russia blocking Telegram are pretty indicative. Regimes are completely willing to block large chunks of the internet if they can't do targeted blocks. And cloud providers aren't particularly interested in using their customers as collateral. I expect surveillance prone regimes to just block anything with encrypted SNI.
- ufmace 8y agoWhy would anybody think that Amazon, Google, or Microsoft are against censorship? Recent events have demonstrated that they love them some censorship, when they do it. Witness the case of gab.ai - Google was happy to pull their app from the Play store. Microsoft didn't mind at all threatening to shut down their Azure account unless they censored a post. The Azure case is particularly amazing. I can't believe the tech press isn't picking up on a supposed cloud provider threatening to shut down someone's account unless they make their website behave in a particular way. I will say I haven't heard of Amazon censoring anything yet, at least not at a level I would consider massively inappropriate for a cloud services provider. Not selling something on their normal store is one thing, but pulling the plug on an AWS account for website behavior would be something entirely different.
- jonstokes 8y agoAWS has absolutely taken down websites because they didn't like what was on them, just recently, in fact: https://freebeacon.com/issues/gun-rights-activists-posted-gun-files-say-facebook-amazon-censored-site/ https://freebeacon.com/issues/gun-rights-activists-posted-gu... I'm a journalist and have seen a screencap of the takedown that Amazon issued to the Firearms Policy Coalition, which started and maintains the censored site (CodeIsFreeSpeech.com). The takedown erroneously cited a temporary restraining order issued against an entirely different site (defcad.com) as the reason for the sudden, no-warning booting of the site from AWS. And as you mentioned, Azure just now threatened to pull Gab.ai off its platform over a pair of anti-Semitic posts. https://www.businessinsider.com/microsoft-gab-azure-cloud-anti-semitism-2018-8 https://www.businessinsider.com/microsoft-gab-azure-cloud-an... So these infrastructure providers are absolutely involved in censorship right now.
- ufmace 8y agoInteresting, thanks! I hadn't heard of that.
- djsumdog 8y agoI wrote about this last year: https://fightthefuture.org/article/the-new-era-of-corporate-censorship/ https://fightthefuture.org/article/the-new-era-of-corporate-... It's easy to side with CloudFlair when they go against a site like The Daily Stormer (Which is so out there it might just fall into Poe's Law). The fact is that most decent hosting is only available in a handful of industries. Even the CF CEO has had misgivings of his decision and it gets us into a really questionable space. Platforms should be free to do what they want right? They should be able to deny customers .. just like an airplane company should be allowed to keep people who crazy political opinions from boarding plans right? .. oh and black people too. Oh wait..what? The freedom of speech in the US is pretty limited to government censorship. But we don't let businesses do whatever they want. They can't keep a certain ethnic group from eating at their restaurant, and in many states they can't choose if their venue allows smoking. The big question is, does speech need to fit into this same framework? With the recent child protection act that gutted craigslist and took down backpage (an act that is leading to more violence against sex workers in the US and an act that the EFF and ACLU are actively fighting as being unconstitutional), we see the US government holding content hosting companies liable for the criminal actions of their user base. That is disturbing and already a form of government control over what customers a business is allowed to have. It'd be one thing if censored sites could just go to another provider, but there are only a couple of big providers and their mass has the ability to crush anything they find questionable.
- bufferoverflow 8y agoThat assumes they want to end censorship. Google, for instance, outright participates in political censorship, especially on Youtube - I've seen many right and alt-right youtubers disappear or get strikes for something unimportant that the left does without any repercussions. They also fired Damore for quite mild comments about sex/gender.
- futurix 8y agoIf Chinese government was only censoring racists / misogynists / homophobes, I'm sure less people wouldn't have a problem with that.
- jquery 8y agoHow about we don't censor based on what is the most political palatable? Censorship via racism is especially slippery these days, should Sarah Jeong be censored or the NYT taken down for publishing articles written by a racist?
- bufferoverflow 8y agoBut that's not what Google is doing either.
- greatabel 8y agoIn fact, google cloud already be blocked by GFW. Many of AWS server's ip have been blocked by GFW. Only Azure can be used in China.
- ianlevesque 8y agoYeah the article writes “They can either block gigantic swaths of the Internet (and face enormous backlash) or allow SNI to work” but I think China shows that depressingly the enormous backlash is a myth.
- peterwwillis 8y agoTLS 1.3 is just a protocol for transporting encrypting communications. We have had such protocols for a long time. Censorship has continued unabated. There is no technical solution that can prevent censorship. Censorship is a social issue. If a government policy, or the policy of a privately held corporation, insists on censoring something, it will do so. Literally the only way a transport protocol could end censorship is if a law were enacted that specifically stated "This protocol may not be circumvented or obstructed by any party, private or public, by any means, for the purpose of censorship.".
- zeroisnowfour 8y agoEverytime I read stories from privateinternetaccess.com, I feel very sad and disgusted.
- mhkool 8y agoThe author does not consider that a filter can block TLS 1.3 and force apps to continue using TLS 1.2.
- judge2020 8y agoThe downgrade protection in 1.3 is supposedly much better than 1.2, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.1.3
- hotpotjunkie 8y agoUnless TLS 1.3 includes built-in stenography, it will do nothing for censhorship. Oppressive regions have historically used simple throttling/DoS to make encrypted protocols unusable.
- RcouF1uZ4gsC 8y agoThe issue with dealing with nation states, is that they actually have the power of physical coercion. Even if you have a technical solution to say domain front, the nation state depending on how big it is, may just make it a crime to domain front a censored site. They can levy civil penalties and possibly even criminal penalties against the company/employees. There is not much benefit to the company to go against a nation state actor.