4 ms·
But the secrets serve different purposes, they aren't the same. So why not keep them in the same place? I'll admit that it is less secure of course, since some
by jedberg 8y ago
But the secrets serve different purposes, they aren't the same. So why not keep them in the same place? I'll admit that it is less secure of course, since someone could compromise your 1Password. But it is still more secure that not using TPOP at all, is not?
Again, is there no attack vector that exists that makes TPOP worthwhile when you're already using a password manager that makes it not worthwhile if it's in your password manager?
- tptacek 8y agoI'm not really sure I see how storing TOTP secrets in 1Password is materially any more secure than not using TOTP secrets and just letting 1Password generate a random password for that site.
- jedberg 8y agoOk, so you don't see any use for TPOP when using 1Password then?
- subway 8y agoThe issue is with storing your TOTP secret in the same store as your password. The idea of using MFA is that multiple secret stores must be compromised in order to grant access to a service. If you put your TOTP secret on your phone (or Yubikey), then both your TOTP secret store (that is your phone or keychain) and 1Password store must be compromised in order to gain access to your account. TOTP is useful in this scenario. If you put your TOTP secret in 1Password along with your site password, then only your 1Password store needs to be compromised. This is the scenario where TOTP becomes pointless.
- ubercore 8y agoIsn't that a less likely scenario? Or at least, a subset of the possible compromises, meaning you have materially improved your security in _some but not all_ cases. I don't disagree that it's best to not have TOTP in 1password, but isn't it still _better_ than not having TOTP at all?
- jedberg 8y agoI understand that, but it isn't it still better to store it in 1Password than not have TPOP at all? At least you're still protected against other attacks, right?
- subway 8y agoMarginally sure, but what "other attacks" are you looking to protect against? Most MITM scenarios are going to result in giving up at least one TOTP code -- and that TOTP code will be used to obtain a long-lived HTTP session (I can't remember when Google last had me auth). I think it's common for folks to think that TOTP means it's safe to lose a code because it is short-lived and invalidated when a subsequent code is used (usually), but it just takes one code for a long-lived session cookie to be obtained. If an attacker is in the position to intercept your password via MITM, Phising, whatver, they're in position to intercept your TOTP code. They're not going to sit on that code -- they're going to immediately use it to obtain their long-lived session while reporting an error back to you.
- tptacek 8y agoNo, I use TOTP and I use 1Password. But my TOTP secrets live in Duo's iPhone application.
- jedberg 8y agoAnd I also store them separately. But don't you agree that storing them in 1Password is still better than nothing, as there are still some use cases that you are protected against that way?
- tptacek 8y agoNo, that's where you lose me. If you're using 1Password to generate passwords in the first place, then I really don't see how using it for TOTP accomplishes anything. To me, it looks like you could literally concatenate the TOTP secret to the 1Pw-generated password and have the same level of security.
- tialaramex 8y agoIn particular OTP codes are intended to be single use they're a ratchet. If a site does this properly then any OTP code you steal from me is not only worthless when it naturally expires, it's also worthless once I use that code or a subsequent code to authenticate. If you used a passive keylogger that may mean by the time you get the key events that OTP is already useless. Likewise for shoulder surfing attacks.
- fragmede 8y agoTOTP != HOTP
- tialaramex 8y agoNevertheless, RFC 6238 (TOTP) specifically tells implementers that: Note that a prover may send the same OTP inside a given time-step window multiple times to a verifier. The verifier MUST NOT accept the second attempt of the OTP after the successful validation has been issued for the first OTP, which ensures one-time only use of an OTP.
- zzzeek 8y agoa keylogger sniffs your password for site X, now they have your password for that site and can log in. If you also had a TOTP code, they can only log in for the next 30 seconds using that TOTP code, but they can't send out an email with your password in a CSV file to their friends and expect it to be usable. I know I'm wrong because you know everything but I can't get past this particular one. unless the argument is, attackers aren't that lame anymore, then sure.
- tialaramex 8y agoBest not to assume anyone is infallible. If you don't put people on pedestals you've got less cleaning up to do later when they inevitably fall off. Yes that includes you (and of course me). 2-3 minutes is more realistic for real sites than 30 seconds, because there is usually a margin allowed for clock skew. But yes each OTP expires and that's a difference for an attacker who doesn't know the underlying secret. TOTP is also not supposed to be re-usable. A passive keylogger gets the TOTP code, but only at the same moment it's used up by you successfully logging in with it. Implementations will vary in how effectively they enforce this, but in principle at least it could save you. Caveat: The system may issue a long-lived token (e.g. a session Cookie) in exchange for the TOTP code which bad guys _can_ trade unlike the token itself. I think there's also a difference with passwords on the other side of the equation. If I get read access to a credentials database (e.g. maybe a stolen backup tape) I get the OTP secret and so I can generate all the OTP codes I need, but in a halfway competently engineered system I do not get the password, only a hash. Since we're talking about 1Password, this password will genuinely be difficult to guess, and guessing is the only thing I can do because knowing the hash doesn't get me access to the live system. In this case 1Password is protecting you somewhat while my TOTP code made no difference. If you have a 10 character mixed case alphanumeric password (which is easy with 1Password), and the password hash used means I only get to try one billion passwords per second, you have many, many years to get around to changing that password. Still, FIDO tokens are very much a superior alternative, their two main disadvantages are fixable. Not enough people have FIDO tokens, and not enough sites accept them. [Edited to make the password stuff easier to follow]
- Dylan16807 8y agoThe scenario of "attacker has a key logger but doesn't steal the entire password database" sounds like enough of an edge case to ignore. If someone's stealing data from my password manager I'm going to assume full compromise.