5 ms·
If the adversary has the level of physical access required to pull this off you've already lost.
by dsfyu404ed 8y ago
If the adversary has the level of physical access required to pull this off you've already lost.
- Uberphallus 8y agoOne can easily attach a long tele lens to one of these cameras, so one could capture passwords through windows. Specialized IR lenses are expensive, but regular lenses can do a good enough job. Edit: my bad IR doesn't go through most glass material. Still, laptops are commonly used in public, and through lenses or otherwise, your password can be leaked. That's worrying enough to stop the "physical access means total access" adagio in this thread.
- dharma1 8y agoThermal cameras don't really work through glass
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- _trampeltier 8y agoGood IR tele lenses are not just expensive, the don't even have prices, they have "phone numbers". So you would have to get money from really a lot of people just to pay they IR camera and the lenses.
- Uberphallus 8y agohttps://www.amazon.com/Fluke-FLK-LENS-4XTELE2-4X-Telephoto-TiX560/dp/B00Z9Z84WW https://www.amazon.com/Fluke-FLK-LENS-4XTELE2-4X-Telephoto-T... Basically double that of high end SLR lenses.
- protonimitate 8y agoWhat's that saying, 'physical access is total access'?
- _verandaguy 8y agoPhysical access is often considered total access in the infosec community. It implies the ability to, with enough prep time ahead of the actual physical access, inject malware through a physical interface (USB flash drive, rogue peripheral/HID, directly interfacing with an existing HID device), among others. Edit: and in this case it includes planting cameras and other recording devices which can be assumed to have effectively limitless video/audio resolution.
- Uberphallus 8y agoIt implies using your laptop in public, or typing in a keypad. And keypads tend to be used to separate public and private areas (and even worse, people leave the scene immediately after using it, making the attack even more inconspicuous).
- DylanBohlender 8y agoExactly. If the adversary has a camera pointed at your keyboard, they can even possibly attempt the more radical (and indefensible) “I literally recorded what you typed” attack. Scary stuff.
- _verandaguy 8y agoIndefensible is debatable. It can be defeated using any of the major 2FA mechanisms (FIDO U2F, HOTP/TOTP come to mind).
- stevekemp 8y agoIt seems like a limitation of this attack is that you must have the camera pointed at the keys ~1 minute from the last time it was used. (Presumably because the heat dissipates quite quickly.) With that in mind a TOTP solution probably won't help, most systems that use 2FA will allow two adjacent codes to be considered valid to cope with "minor" clock-drift. If you're already using the computer 1 minute after the real owner has left it is possible you could reuse any valid code - if you captured it.
- _verandaguy 8y ago>It seems like a limitation of this attack is that you must have the camera pointed at the keys ~1 minute from the last time it was used. (Presumably because the heat dissipates quite quickly.) An attacker could just stick a camera into a dark corner of a room and have it run perpetually. Video exfiltration might be an issue but certainly not insurmountable. RE: your second point: that's true, but the point of TOTPs is that they expire before they can realistically be guessed (assuming rate limiting on the TOTP server).
- leni536 8y agoAllowing adjacent codes and accepting the same code twice is not the same. I would be surprised if TOTP allowed for accepting the same code twice.
- 8y ago