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I found that Dan Dennett's "Consciousness Explained" really resonated with me. His thesis is (as best I can condense a whole book to fit in an HN comment) that
by lisper 8y ago
I found that Dan Dennett's "Consciousness Explained" really resonated with me. His thesis is (as best I can condense a whole book to fit in an HN comment) that consciousness is essentially an illusion produced by the brain as the best model it can construct of the sensory input it receives. But the model actually lags behind the present, and its history can be rewritten when new information comes in. Dennett describes it much better than I do, and provides a lot of experimental evidence. If nothing else, the experiments he describes will make you see your own consciousness in a new light. I recommend reading the book.
- lifthearth 8y agoIf you like Dennett check out Julian Jayne's "the origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind" which was highly influential for Dennett. Jayne does a fantastic job pinning down what consciousness is and what it isn't.
- Florin_Andrei 8y agoJayne is a fascinating character. He's so wrong, and yet you can't put the book down.
- Nav_Panel 8y agoWhy is he wrong?
- mrfusion 8y agoAn illusion to whom though?
- lisper 8y agoTo you, obviously. That's kind of the point: your own consciousness isn't really what you think it is. Yes, I know that sounds really weird to the point of being a logical impossibility, but trust me: there's experimental data to back it up.
- arbitrage 8y ago"Trust me" pretty much always means "don't".
- lisper 8y agoIn this case it's just a figure of speech. You don't actually have to trust me. You can read Dennett's book and see for yourself.
- Florin_Andrei 8y agoDennett is becoming more and more part of the "old guard". Things are shifting towards other approaches. Of course, popularity doesn't necessarily mean anything, but keep that in mind when referring to him as an authority.
- pokemongoaway 8y agoEveryone without much direct experience of what consciousness is will continuously become the "old guard."
- Florin_Andrei 8y agoEveryone who is not brain dead has direct experience of what consciousness is. It's the only thing that is directly experienced, in fact. Everything else is second-hand.
- pokemongoaway 8y agoEveryone who has a computer has the same level of understanding about what a computer is? Mental.
- Florin_Andrei 8y agoYou're missing the point so badly, I'm not even sure where to begin.
- naasking 8y agoYour question presupposes the existence of a subject and is therefore circular. An "illusion" does not need a subject, it's merely a fact that, taken naively at face value, entails a false conclusion.
- michaelscott 8y agoWhat is your definition of "illusion" here, as I see you've used quotes? Even your description of it is as a fact that is taken naively at face value; who takes the fact naively, and at face value? Only a subject could do that. Information can only be knowledge when there's a "knower".
- naasking 8y ago> Even your description of it is as a fact that is taken naively at face value; who takes the fact naively, and at face value. Only a subject could do that. Information can only be knowledge when there's a "knower". That's incorrect, unless you consider machine learning algorithms to suddenly be subjects/"knowers". They suffer from some of the same perceptive illusions that plague our optical processing. So to answer your question directly, there is no "who", there need only be a "what", at which point any problem with calling qualia an illusion evaporates. There is no irreducible subject involved, there is only an information processing automoton that integrates facts acquired from perceptions. When a perception is taken to be accurate but it entails a conclusion that is false, that's an illusion.
- kolpa 8y ago"Information processing" doesn't create the internal feelings I feel, just as information processing can never create and apple for me to eat, even if it can perfectly simulate an apple and eating.
- naasking 8y ago> "Information processing" doesn't create the internal feelings I feel, Pure speculation, and almost certainly false. If you hadn't evolved the pleasurable feeling of eating an apple, or any other food, you would have died and your inability to feel would have gone with it. Feelings provide drive and motivation, they are functional.
- incadenza 8y agoI've always felt that Dennett has side stepped the question here. The 'hard problem' here is to explain how a set of physical processes give rise to consciousness or sensory experience at all. In other words, why the lights are on. As far as I can tell, consciousness is literally the one thing in the universe that can't be an illusion. Even if, in the extreme case, we're brains in a vat, etc.
- joe_the_user 8y agoThe 'hard problem' here is to explain how a set of physical processes give rise to consciousness or sensory experience at all. In other words, why the lights are on. But subjective experience isn't the light being "on" or "off". Subjective experience is a messy, fuzzy collection of stuff. People do things without intending to, people believe things they've automatically were intentional and reverse. The zone between waking and sleeping isn't set, etc. etc. If one does the "blind spot" experiment, one realizes one's vision is constantly confabulating to make for vision's imperfections. And so-forth. So there's no reason no to expect that our experience and memory of consciousness isn't a incomplete reflection of what's actually happening. Lots of people strongly believe they have a soul. That's clearly anti-materialist and has no basis in reality but it seems like a quite natural illusion (one that the "hard problem" ideology resembles). The "subjective experience exists" statement, if it's taken to mean a single, uniform fabric of experience exists, seems unjustified given the overall messiness I mentioned and if the hard-problem claim isn't this, what is it?
- incadenza 8y agoI'd take your argument further even. We could be mistaken about every experience we've ever had. Let's take the brain in a vat example, in which none of our sensory experiences accurately model reality. This has no bearing on the hard problem of describing consciousness or how organic material (maybe silicon some day) gives rise to it. It also doesn't indicate how a physicalist picture of the mind could, in principle, capture the phenomena.
- rosser 8y ago
- SteveJS 8y agoI found Metzinger’s ‘The ego tunnel’ immensely helpful in identifying the constituent parts that we mean by consciousness. Everything the physicist Sean Carroll says about consciousness rings true to me. It is only an illusion in the same way the 2nd law of thermodynamics is an illusion built from particle interaction and statistics.
- lisper 8y ago> the 2nd law of thermodynamics is an illusion That is an excellent analogy. Perhaps "emergent property" would be a better term for both, but even that phrase doesn't quite capture the true spirit of Dennett's argument. It's not just the consciousness is emergent, it's that its true nature is actually very different from what we think it is.
- naasking 8y agoIt's an illusion in a similar way that multitasking on a single CPU is an illusion.
- hackinthebochs 8y agoAnd yet, given some time interval, all threads do make progress within that interval (assuming its not too small of course). So if by multitasking we mean that execution of multiple threads progresses over time, then multitasking on a single CPU is real. The point is that one's perspective is relevant to what's correctly taken as real. But what is the perspective of neural circuitry's acquaintance with neural circuitry? I don't know, but I know its not like our third person acquaintance with neural circuitry. And so saying phenomenal experience is an illusion of neural circuitry (and thus not real) is a mistake. It's like saying heat isn't real, only energetic particles are real, despite the fact that I just got burned by my hot pan.
- naasking 8y agoYou're correct, it's more correct to say it's an illusion of parallelism. On human timescales the parallelism appears real but it's really not. > It's like saying heat isn't real, only energetic particles are real, despite the fact that I just got burned by my hot pan Which is true, heat isn't real, just like my car isn't real. These are labels we apply to loose macroscopic phenomena. And so it is with consciousness. At some level of abstraction, we can certainly talk about consciousness as something real since it's clearly a phenomenon requiring explication, but the "real" we're talking about in this sort of debate is some irreducible metaphysical existence, such as that posited by dualism.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- throwaway37585 8y ago> consciousness is essentially an illusion This sounds like a contradiction. What is being illuded? If there is no subject, there can't be an illusion.
- taurine 8y agoWhen people imagine their consciousness/free will faculty as its own object, they sometimes see a theatre/stage, where they are in the audience and can observe the central point where consciousness ends up forming, or a deamon sitting in front of a bunch of levers and pulling one to make a conscious free will decision. Yet, Dennett shows that there is no such single centralized point where consciousness emerges, just a brain creating that illusion to make a higher-level lossy sense of things (consequence of modeling your own cognitive processes using Descartes-era philosophy is that you have to place an artificial cut-off somewhere). Cognitive science has experiments like the Stroop Test [1], which proof that different cognitive faculties operate at different speeds and in parallel. They may even compete for attention. Consciousness is thus distributed and a "multi-agent" system, you may not even become "consciously" aware of what the fast operating faculties are processing and feeding up to more complex faculties. Other cognitive science reaction speed experiments have shown that data is processed (helping you make decisions) before it enters conscious thought (so all "behind the stage"). [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stroop_effect https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stroop_effect
- throwaway37585 8y ago> When people imagine their consciousness/free will faculty as its own object, they sometimes see a theatre/stage, where they are in the audience and can observe the central point where consciousness ends up forming, or a deamon sitting in front of a bunch of levers and pulling one to make a conscious free will decision. I don't know anyone who sees consciousness this way, but perhaps we've met different sorts of people. Your second paragraph seems like a red herring. I don't see how any of this addresses the issue of conscious experience in the first place.
- taurine 8y ago