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Gorsuch dissent is interesting. His position seems to be that the court's decision is not strong enough in its defense against these searches, not that he disag
by icebraining 8y ago
Gorsuch dissent is interesting. His position seems to be that the court's decision is not strong enough in its defense against these searches, not that he disagrees that a warrant is needed.
- SauciestGNU 8y agoThat makes me wonder why he didn't sign on and write a concurring opinion then.
- icebraining 8y agoI'm no laywer, let alone qualified to interpret the SCOTUS, but from what I can tell he disagrees with the whole approach taken, which relies on the "expectation of privacy" test defined in the Katz case, whereas he believes that the court should go back to the Fourth Amendment text itself and review the data (such as the phone's location) under it. Specifically, he seems to be saying that just because the data is currently held by a third-party, that doesn't mean it's not the person's "papers" and as such fully defended from unreasonable searches.
- ajross 8y agoThat's true, but it fails to mention that there is a very specific partisan reason republican justices won't get behind a privacy finding. Gorsuch isn't standing for abstract principle here, he's refusing to stand on the same ground the found for Roe.
- zaroth 8y agoRoe standing on expectation of privacy seems to be a similarly poor analogy. The real missing piece goes back to the same fear the framers had when enacting the Bill of Rights in the first place — namely that by enumerating some rights it would inadvertantly serve to exclude those unenumerated but equally inalienable rights, such as right to self-determination and ownership of one’s own body.
- Zimahl 8y agoWith respect to Roe v Wade, the expectation of privacy has already been established with your doctor. Since there are legitimate, non-trivial reasons for abortion, and that's a decision between a person and their doctor, the gov't can't ask why someone may need that abortion. Therefore, the gov't is unable to discern between reasons for an abortion, and therefore can't restrict them (up to a reasonable point, which was set non-arbitrarily around 24 weeks). You have a right to patient confidentiality. The gov't has no more of a say in whether you should have appendix surgery than whether you should have an abortion. However, this doesn't establish a right to abortion. The justices clearly state that it is not a right by saying it's not covered under the 9th.
- zaroth 8y agoThank you for that. Not to get too off topic, but I will need to read more about the reasoning behind the RvW decision. It sounds to be threading one hell of a needle as a justification to keep government out of elective abortion. I mean, we have databases which track every narcotic prescription written which law enforcement (including the DEA) can access without a warrant.
- Zimahl 8y agoIt's really not a fine line. Narcotic dissemination is a major problem and there are justifiable reasons for tracking them, but I don't believe that tracking forces an individual to justify a decision between their doctor and themselves to the gov't. The justices did say there could be justifiable reasons limitations on abortions as well, just that it is very difficult to enumerate because politicians are not doctors.
- zaroth 8y ago> I don't believe that tracking forces an individual to justify a decision between their doctor and themselves to the gov't. That appears to be exactly what it’s doing though!
- perpetualpatzer 8y agoThat's one possible explanation. A more charitable, and frankly, reasonable explanation would be that Gorsuch places high priority on limiting government power through to take private property and thinks of many problems through that lens. That's a view he expressed at oral argument in this case[0], in other privacy-related cases [1][2], and in cases in other contexts[3][4]. Virtually all non-unanimous supreme court decisions are ultimately trade-offs between conflicting rights and values. Congress's power to regulate drugs vs a citizen's right to use drugs in religious ceremonies (Smith). The documentary-maker's right to free speech vs the population's right to ensure free and fair elections by limiting corporate spending on elections (Citizens United). A citizen's right not to be searched for incriminating evidence without a warrant vs. a police officer's need to prevent destruction of evidence and ensure their own safety (Robinson). Different justices place different weight on different rights. Kennedy is a famously protective of free speech, so whenever Free Speech is implicated, he tends to side on the defense of it. Alito places a lot of value in ensuring police have workable rules that can be applied in the field. Those priorities determine where they land on tough issues and how they think issues should be resolved. I think there's a lot of evidence to suggest Gorsuch cares about protecting property rights and that idea is entirely consistent with his reasoning here (without his harboring a secret anti-Roe agenda). [0]https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-402 https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-402 [1] http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/01/argument-analysis-rental-cars-reasonable-expectations-privacy-property-rights/ http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/01/argument-analysis-rental-c... [2] https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-7082.pdf https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-7082.pdf [3] https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-712_87ad.pdf https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-712_87ad.pdf [4] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/28/neil-gorsuch-opposes-the-kelo-decision-a-terrible-supreme-court-property-rights-ruling-that-trump-supports/?utm_term=.f98377f16a06 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/201...
- bmelton 8y agoAgreed, and in a hypothetical universe where Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion and 4 justices signed on to his take, we would have even better protections against _Smith_ type privacy infringements than what this current decision might offer. There's still a lot of gray area though -- it's easy to say that the money in my bank is my property, even where it is in the care and custody of a third party, so by that argument, Gorsuch's property argument gives me more privacy protections for non-warranted searches to my banking data, but on the other hand, it's not clear that my Google Map data is 'mine', since Google provides it as a service to me for free, and uses that data for other purposes.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- jeffdavis 8y agoHow does his opinion undermine Roe, specifically?
- dv_dt 8y agoI like that tact for user data, and have mentioned it in the past that our justice system doesn't recognize the modern digital nature of a persons "papers". There really should be a systematic extension of such an interpretation.
- erikpukinskis 8y agoI think you mean tack—“a method of dealing with a situation or problem; a course of action or policy.”
- dv_dt 8y agoyes I did, thank you
- wallace_f 8y agoThis along with Thomas's dissent shows how important it is that we need a bill of rights for the digital age. Especially by Thomas's dissent, we otherwise cant have an expectation of privacy because or "papers" are always stored or transmitted across someone else's property.
- DannyBee 8y agoNormally, that would be an opinion "concurring in the judgement" but not in all of the reasoning. Here 1. He disagrees with literally all of the reasoning. He doesn't want to affirm the judgement because he thinks it's just plain wrong. 2. It's not clear he would agree with the outcome on this record either. He basically says the record isn't well enough developed on any of his points to figure out what should happen, and that the arguments he would make were forfeited. That suggests he may actually be in the camp of "i think all of the reasoning here is nonsense and wrong, and you forfeited all other arguments, so you lose". As a result he's dissented and literally written down "for the love of god, the next time someone appeals a case like this, please make the following arguments"
- gbacon 8y agoNotable excerpts: What’s left of the Fourth Amendment? Today we use the Internet to do most everything. Smartphones make it easy to keep a calendar, correspond with friends, make calls, conduct banking, and even watch the game. Countless Internet companies maintain records about us and, increasingly, for* us. Even our most private documents—those that, in other eras, we would have locked safely in a desk drawer or destroyed—now reside on third party servers. Smith and Miller teach that the police can review all of this material, on the theory that no one reasonably expects any of it will be kept private. But no one believes that, if they ever did.* https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf#page=99 https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf#... Judges are supposed to decide cases based on “democratically legitimate sources of law”—like positive law or analogies to items protected by the enacted Constitution—rather than “their own biases or personal policy preferences.” Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26 J. L. & Pol. 123, 127 (2011). A Fourth Amendment model based on positive legal rights “carves out significant room for legislative participation in the Fourth Amendment context,” too, by asking judges to consult what the people’s representatives have to say about their rights. Baude & Stern, 129 Harv. L. Rev., at 1852. Nor is this approach hobbled by Smith* and Miller, for those cases are just limitations on Katz, addressing only the question whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in materials they share with third parties. Under this more traditional approach, Fourth Amendment protections for your papers and effects do not automatically disappear just because you share them with third parties.* https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf#page=111 https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf#...
- mtgx 8y agoNot a fan of Gorsuch, but I'm positively surprised at that comment, as this has been my thinking since the beginning on this issue, too. I think it's total BS to think that "users don't have an expectation of privacy" when a company offers a service to hold and process their data. I don't think in any other real-world situation that's similar you wouldn't have an expectation of privacy. It's just the government's twisted logic that's used to justify its mass surveillance actions. I also agree with Gorsuch's point that the standard should be much higher than "an expectation of privacy". If you have an industry that has "educated" its users to expect constant violations of their privacy and misuse of their data, it doesn't mean that now users should no longer benefit from privacy rights, because the companies and governments are so used to abusing users' data that they might as well be allowed to do it. I don't think that sort of logic makes sense.
- sbov 8y agoHis views on data ownership seem to roughly align with Europe (it's still "your data" even if other companies hold it), which might be his one bright spot for liberals on this forum.
- padobson 8y agoYeah. It's still early for him, but describing Gorsuch as a socially conservative, civil libertarian might be accurate.
- lotsofpulp 8y agoI would interpret social conservative as anti choice for abortion, anti non man-woman marriage, anti marijuana, etc. How is this also considered civil libertarian?
- adrianratnapala 8y agoData ownership is a tricky topic that humans will need decades of experience to figure out. In the mean-time, evolving the juripsrudence one precedent at a time is a lot saner than big-bang changes.
- icebraining 8y agoNobody is doing big-bang changes, though; some are slowing evolving jurisprudence, others are slowly evolving legislation.
- bmelton 8y agoIndeed. It's almost fairer to categorize this as a 5-3-1 decision. Gorsuch tricks you into nodding along with his dissent, which reads very much like a concurrence holding _Katz_ over _Smith_, etc, until bam, there's a dissent. To my reading, he's saying two things in his conclusion: * His dissent would be a concurrence if he could have found in Carpenter's favor on propertarian grounds, but Carpenter's lawyers didn't raise any 4A property arguments, so he couldn't * A finger-wag to future lawyers to please bring him some property arguments so that he can rule the way he wants to. On the whole though, I honestly think that if he didn't already know that the majority would carry the day with 5 justices, he might have been okay just offering a concurrence.
- antognini 8y agoYeah, his dissent was a really interesting read. I'd be curious if he would have changed it to a concurrence if there weren't already 5 justices on the other side.
- icelancer 8y agoAgreed. It's very sad to see people skewer Gorsuch in this decision - and in general. His opinions are consistently interesting and well-reasoned, and this is no exception.