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If the application code is responsible for checking the signatures, what stops the attacker to just ship an older, vulnerable application together with his bad
by spockz 8y ago
If the application code is responsible for checking the signatures, what stops the attacker to just ship an older, vulnerable application together with his bad binary? I would dare to say that macOS should do the validation before executing any binary.
- ralfd 8y agoRead the article. The headline is misleading.
- shawnz 8y agoThe bug isn't in mac OS's signature validation though, which works fine. The bug lies in the additional validation performed by certain third-party security products. It has nothing to do with any of Apple's code whatsoever. Although as another commenter has pointed out, Apple could maybe have designed the API better to avoid it being used wrongly.
- spockz 8y agoAh. I misinterpreted this as bugs in applications scanning their own bundle. But it is about security tools not properly verifying other binaries. Got it.
- eridius 8y agoThe application code isn't responsible for checking the signatures. That wouldn't make any sense because a malicious app would simply not check its signature.