8 ms·
Enforcing TLS protocol invariants by rolling versions every six weeks
- tlb 8y agoInteresting idea, but why inflict this churn on all Chrome users? Just make a standalone client that runs through all possible variations so that server developers can test against it.
- dsr_ 8y agoI believe the point is to make it sufficiently widespread that an ignorant server developer can't ignore it. (edit: or at least will start getting bug reports as soon as a Chrome/Chromium user enters the population)
- kkirsche 8y agoCompanies like Symantec implementing devices like Bluecoat proxies are notorious for not doing their due diligence on their network stack. This ensures that it’s actually tested against devices and has the support of users to be fixed rather than a few developers who won’t be able to move the needle. At least that’s how I read this
- gsnedders 8y agoWe had tools for years that supported TLS 1.1 and 1.2 while large amounts of the web broke with them; merely having such tools doesn't make server developers care.
- manigandham 8y agoIt's not about tooling or clients, it's about creating widespread usage by real users so that proper support can no longer be avoided or mishandled.
- niftich 8y agoThis is part of Chrome's scheme to avoid protocol ossification -- where you realize you can't deploy any enhancements because of widespread non-standards-compliant (but likely, for the original implementer, "good enough") behavior. The idea is to catch them early by simulating future versions now, which in their belief is best done by perpetuating traffic that contains bullshit versions on the wire. It's fairly clever, in that any implementer who doesn't want to break significant portions of web traffic now must code their implementation in a way that anticipates Chrome's future versions, which is most sanely done by coding their implementation in a way that happens to match what's in the spec. Meanwhile, noncompliant implementations will likely break for a huge amount of users, causing widespread uproar and, presumably, pressure to fix the problem. Google's clients (e.g. Chrome, Android) and servers originate and receive a high enough portion of traffic that they could pull this off on their own without anyone else's buy-in, and still achieve the intended effect, but they're reaching out to the community to build consensus. It's a hacky idea, but one that backs noncompliant implementations into a corner now, instead of them sticking around forever and causing incompatible changes later down the road.
- trinskies 8y agowhat happened to the ietf bakeoffs that I remember being a highlight of my younger network programming years? I kind of see the internet as pre and post Sandy & Leonard's Cisco [0]/ the John Chambers age, when the proposal for a draft virtually signalled the inventors acquisition, only to be bolted to IOS like second hand cheap aluminum siding. I lumped Cisco and Microsoft together, so far as client comfort concern was concerned: break down each history into two twenty years stages, skipping the first decade of amazing history I figured both had deliberately forgotten, and if you mark about half way to be a fulcrum upon which is weighed one side money & talent and the other money* 1/(a slow hockey stick to exponentiation*legal liability) [1], you approximate recent corporate gentrification. Maturity doesn't match, and I hope actual human middle age never is closely mimicked by any important tech firm. Charles Handy, famous in my time but under appreciated even at his height, proposed retirement at forty and returning to work at sixty, to avert many ills. Handy didn't fully appreciate what afflicts SV high tech firms, or i think he'd have become Messianic preacher.[2] I've been thinking about taking a DBA / PhD in business, on the effect of Handy's plan if applied to or impacting high tech; I have hypothesized countless advantages. Just consider ageism. In the developing world, consider fertility and supporting the elderly. I equally posit that trch firms of real consequence ought to be at least by minimum mandate, accept outside directors from the standards bodies and major user constituencies. I know this could be unfair especially during the initial learning process. But I am convinced that already we're past the juncture at which the entirety of civilisation depends on the best outcomes for broad society being regularly, consistently achieved. Corporations usually, almost invariably, do discover the hard truths before academia. in this case, I believe the significant networking players all abandoned organised bakeoffs for fairly easily understood reasons. I am not certain i could begin to specify your kind of process required today, or even the actual purposes served. Protocol testing has been moved to product LOB. But how very much better than this present blind and non optional faith in the purported (by impotent ebd users, the most famous claim of innocence recently forsaken with barely a wake) benevolence, can we very quickly indeed imagine serving enormous network effect level positives, if only we could have the influence? I beg forgiveness for my footnote length, rather than seek permission, because they convey for me, hopefully to you as well, the aspirational, idealistic and even romantic context of much that has been, for me most sorely, deprecated. I don't believe such "romantic" ideology is without value. I think it holds immense value. Difficult to unlock value. But because so much is evidentiary being enormously positive and innovative upon such dizzy dreaming of past warm SoCal winter evenings (and vicariously I imagined when young,from my easterly longitude, I wasn'talone dreaming first of warm sunny winters, within which dreams i dreamed of such fancies as a parallel Symbolics made ADA machine, on a card removable for degaussing.....] [0] that Cisco was a internetworking love story, Leonard Bosack building and installing Stanford's first router to email the subject of his sudden ardent inventiveness, Sandy Lerner, is the most deserving of rarely repeated stories of the Valley. That both exited, graciously well after IPO, seeing through everyone's vesting for the immense pre roadshow efforts, with what still today looks like a full and fair but not ridiculous degree of equity return - not least because it was a clean exeunt, no backseat driving to spoil memories or belittle later work - is not hesrd repeated often enough for my satisfaction, either, I think it ought to be B School staple fayre. "How To Win In Tech With Grace." I worry about SoCal's gender imbalance only when I think how much I nearly drove my company into the landfill, fifteen years later only belatedly realising (or accepting?) how much this was due to my fraught and hopeless long distance relationship we both, flying do high, considered rock solid. Normal marriage and family or just homes and the in-laws, temper the restless spirit in countless positive ways. [1] I didn't pick my pseudo math to pun on the new Cisco Tetratrion product, but I have speculated at length of all networking players, Cisco must truly understand it's own legacy, else I believe they would have failed time past some. I recall so clearly Fortune magazine trumpeting Chamber's "T+0 Close" of the company accounts. I also suspected at the time, this was long range planning to dissipate anyone's developing worries about channel stuffing. That was a short impossible to trade, as a result of Chamber's accounting forced march. Naturally, the supply chain not in-house wasn't up to scratch... [2] I think the idea of mandatory retirement at forty, or during typical family centered years, was published in The Future Of Work,1984. Sadly I no longer have my copy. I was considering college then, and my father brought me first a biography of Bill Gates, then The Future Of Work. I devoured both in the same week and had ordered Gods Of Management by the store closing Saturday midday. Anything of philosophy or especially theology ws my ticket to what the library system couldn't supply. My father was convinced that the European religious refugees from persecution whose last waves settled in nineteenth century America, at least outwardly translated faith into a derivative Protestant work ethic. That Robert Noyce attended college in Grinnel Iowa, where the portrait of pitchfork guarding couple eas immortalized in oil as "American Gothic" by Grant Wood (and I believe despite the incongruity with the score, necessarily should have completed Ferris Bueller's museum visit, portending his own possible fate.) isn't remarkable on its own, but remarkable for how little attention is granted to early exposure to religious ethics, by so many Silicon Valley pioneers. In Japan, the most revealing comment by a retired board member of a leading integrated circuit maker, I think is the remark that"Americans didn't believe what they couldn't see [below one micron] whereas our technicians had faith they were being well guided, if they were receptive". I have the quote very very close to verbatim of the translation i remember, the meaning I relate accurately I'm positive: the Japanese did first operate reliabily in sub micron wafer cutting, as a result. Apocryphal or not, I am reminded of this today but a documentary about the Saturn rocket. Surfers were the first recruits to master a critical complex composite honeycomb baking technique, not the technical staff. Simplified to Concentration And The Art Of Motorcycle Maintenance, it's not as inspirational - I know which impression I want my kids to imagine.
- Analemma_ 8y agoI think that middleware boxes will still find some way to make our lives miserable next time we try to upgrade— this seems like another instance of "build an idiot-proof system, and the universe will just supply a better idiot"— but this is still a great idea. This is so good I want to start doing it with my company's internal stuff.
- schoen 8y agoA fun example (apparently inspired by a related TLS proposal): https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/adding-random-entries-to-the-directory/33417 https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/adding-random-entries-to... (Let's Encrypt creates random protocol extensions on every connection in order to ensure that clients are tolerant of protocol extensions that they don't understand. Breaking changes to the protocol, on the other hand, will be served from a separate API endpoint.)
- Boulth 8y agoThey also insert random entries to returned JSON, this is documented in the ACME spec.
- tialaramex 8y agoCompany internal stuff generally isn't facing as hostile an environment as HTTPS. The famous "Alice and Bob After Dinner Speech" mentions "Now most people in Alice's position would give up. Not Alice. She has courage which can only be described as awesome. Against all odds, over a noisy telephone line, tapped by the tax authorities and the secret police, Alice will happily attempt, with someone she doesn't trust, whom she cannot hear clearly, and who is probably someone else, to fiddle her tax returns and to organize a coup d'etat, while at the same time minimizing the cost of the phone call. A coding theorist is someone who doesn't think Alice is crazy." HTTPS is like Alice. In cryptography a theoretical attacker is often given seemingly outrageous abilities, like they can send you huge numbers of arbitrary messages to see what happens, they can time everything, they can see messages you were sending and try sending other messages that are just a tiny bit different, they can collect your messages and re-send them later, and so on. In many systems a real attacker would struggle to pull these things off, but in HTTPS thanks to things like cookies and Javascript it's actually not difficult at all. Your internal stuff almost certainly doesn't have arbitrary clients running code from arbitrary other participants like the Web does. It also almost certainly doesn't have a dedicated reliability team who can go change everything every six weeks to keep up. If you do such changes every six weeks for a few months, then get bored and stop, the last set rust shut and you've gained nothing. Google is essentially promising their teams would undertake to carry on indefinitely. Google essentially proposes an artificial Red Queen's Race, with the goal being to tire out middlebox vendors and/or their customers and have them choose to exit the race.
- peterwwillis 8y agoThe problem is that every vendor is not supporting every new feature of your client. Dang. Who'd have thought vendors of middleware might not play well with new versions of protocols? The reasonable solution should be apparent, as this is what you need to do with most other middleware-compatible protocols that use encryption: 1) Tunnel everything, 2) Don't make your protocol backwards compatible, 3) Add a proxy feature. The last seems straightforward enough. And so they intended to add something like that to 1.3. (https://www.imperialviolet.org/2018/03/10/tls13.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2018/03/10/tls13.html) But of course, they chose a backwards-compatible (read: complicated) way to do it, and so it's not working. So the solution is basically to throw out versions. Why does this not sound like a great idea to me? Also: points again for the standard mirroring whatever Google feels, including its release schedule. I think we should come up with a new name for The Web that reflects those that control it. The Gooweb? Webgoo? Gweb? Gleb? Soup? We can even rename HTTP to GATP, for Google Advertising Transfer Protocol. It's easier to pronounce phonetically, anyway.
- tptacek 8y agoThis isn't "the standard mirroring whatever Google feels".
- peterwwillis 8y ago"In short, we plan to regularly mint new TLS versions (and likely other sensitive parameters such as extensions), roughly every six weeks matching Chrome’s release cycle."
- tptacek 8y agoThose are internal TLS versions used only by Chrome; they're not being promoted as a "standard". I don't know if this is an instance of it, but there's an annoying phenomenon where people on message boards like to pretend that standards have near-statutory authority; that once a standard is issued, every vendor has to adhere to it no matter what their purpose. Were that to be your argument here, you'd in effect be arguing that Google can't deviate from the TLS 1.3 standard even to help TLS standardization efforts.
- marshray 8y agoNever expect old code to handle new protocol elements. If it's not exercised regularly, it's not going to work. Very few developers (outside of Google) are going to write randomized fuzzers to test for compatibility with theoretical future extensions. They're going to test that it works with existing stuff and then ship it. So, the fuzzing has got to become part of the public ecosystem.
- Narkov 8y agoWhy can't you code you implementation to safely ignore new protocol elements? They aren't asking you to support the new elements, just ignore them.
- namibj 8y agoYou can. But who is going to make sure you don't skip this part and make more profit than your competitor?
- saghm 8y agoGoogle, apparently
- pdkl95 8y agoAnybody that doesn't want to introduce crashing/fatal bugs that disrupt productivity? Skipping checks[1] and making assumptions about input[2] is an irresponsible disregard for basic security. This is about basic programmer competence, not time a consuming feature that might impact your development costs relative to your competitor. You are not going to make more profit by leaving out the "default:" case to your switch/case statements that skips parsing for unrecognized elements. [1] https://archive.org/details/The_Science_of_Insecurity_ https://archive.org/details/The_Science_of_Insecurity_ [2] https://media.ccc.de/v/31c3_-_5930_-_en_-_saal_6_-_201412291400_-_funky_file_formats_-_ange_albertini https://media.ccc.de/v/31c3_-_5930_-_en_-_saal_6_-_201412291...
- gcb0 8y agoor; how google will push TLS around like it pushes W3C.
- yuhong 8y agoPersonally, I understood when the ClientHello was changed to deal with TLS version intolerant servers, but disliked the middlebox changes in the ServerHello.
- forapurpose 8y agoI'm surprised that nobody is concerned that Google (or whoever) is spamming the Internet to make everyone do what Google / TLS devs want them to do. First, it's coercive. Second, it's in principle spam, even if the cost is affordable in this case. Third, it sets three bad precedents: * Google can do whatever they want * Hijacking user computers for ulterior purposes (by utilizing Chrome) is ok * Spam and coercion are ok. And if you argue it's ok in this instance, you aren't thinking past your nose. Imagine if Symantec or Microsoft tried it; how would people react? Well you don't have to wonder, because they will.
- geofft 8y agoIt doesn't set the precedent that Google can do whatever they want. Either they already could because of their size and that's already a problem the world should solve even if they haven't used the power yet, or they can only do this because people think it's a reasonable idea and don't object.
- tptacek 8y agoYou have to really want an anti-Google story to find it in this, the bit where Google is using its market position on the server and clientside to help make sure vendors don't break the TLS standard.
- forapurpose 8y agoWhat about the second precedent in the GP, and what about my point, if you argue it's ok in this instance ...?
- staticassertion 8y agoWould you argue against Chrome sending out random LLMNR requests at boot to detect attackers on the network? They aren't "hijacking" computers of users who voluntarily installed chrome - in part due to the promise of a safer browsing experience, which this is all about.
- tialaramex 8y agoContext: 1. So called "Security" companies (middlebox vendors) advise customers to write what are effectively firewall rules that bake ossification into their systems using, I kid you not, regular expressions https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2018/02/exposing-x509-vulnerabilities https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2018/02/exposing-... This type of nonsense is why one of the optional TLS 1.3 features is certificate compression. It seems like a no-brainer to offer this for earlier versions, but it turns out that middleboxes snoop the certificate and make decisions about it so compressing it causes them to freak out. Why can we (hopefully) fix that with an optional extension in TLS 1.3? Because in TLS 1.3 now the certificate is encrypted, so the middleboxes can't see it in the first place. 2. In about 2016 when it originally looked like TLS 1.3 was almost finished, the middlebox vendors finally noticed something was happening and began yelling about how their products had "legitimate" ‡ uses that would be blocked by these improvements and it all needed re-thinking. Fortunately (or perhaps inevitably) the middlebox vendors have no idea how the IETF works, so they spent a lot of effort on trying to "win votes" which should have anybody who was somehow unaware of this drama but involved with the IETF smiling since there are no votes and you can't win. They also, like typical business people, figured they could fly in to meetings in say, Singapore or London, and spin up at the meeting, but of course those meetings are just a temporary physical incarnation of the IETF, it exists all the time as mailing lists, so if you aren't following those lists you're basically always a kid who wandered into a room where people are having grown-up discussions you can't understand. 3. After a surprisingly long time the middlebox vendors got the hint and went to ETSI to make their own alternative. ETSI is a traditional SDO which is perfectly happy to work on a standard without any messy ethical considerations. It is also, like most traditional SDOs, closed door, so we have only limited visibility of what they're up to. So far it looks like TLS 1.2 (so, bad) but with the ability for an arbitrary number of middleboxes to interact with all the packets on path (so, worse). It's OK though because under their ETSI proposal the user will "Consent" to this. If you've spent the last month mindlessly clicking through GDPR-inspired boxes on US web sites you regularly visit, or indeed if you're the new hire who has just this moment realised why the big boss decided he needed her with him on this trip, and is now calculating whether to say "No" and risk losing everything or to close her eyes and pretend this is happening to somebody else you have a very good idea what "Consent" means in this context. ‡ "Legitimate" is a word you use when it's important for people to accept that what you're doing is OK, without them thinking about what you were actually doing because they might throw up. "Bribe officials to ignore flagrant safety violations" makes you angry but "Legitimate facilitation payment" sounds very respectable.
- _old_dude_ 8y agoYou have the same kind of idea in the JDK to be sure that a user code does not work if it relies on the iteration order of an immutable Set, the JDK use a SALT [1] so the iteration order of the Set is different each time you start a new VM allowing the code of the JDK to be changed in the future. [1] http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk/jdk/file/f36d08a3e700/src/java.base/share/classes/java/util/ImmutableCollections.java#l56 http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk/jdk/file/f36d08a3e700/src/jav...