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Any reasonable definition of consciousness should IMO be a continuum, so your laptop has some consciousness (not very much). I don't think concepts of like or
by ppod 8y ago
Any reasonable definition of consciousness should IMO be a continuum, so your laptop has some consciousness (not very much).
I don't think concepts of like or hate are meaningful for the consciousness of your laptop. These kinds of responses probably arise from the kinds of goals that are created for agents by processes of natural selection.
We evolve them. We already have, they're called dogs.
- amelius 8y ago> These kinds of responses probably arise from the kinds of goals that are created for agents by processes of natural selection. You're speaking of "response", but it is supposed to be a concept internal to the laptop. Please be more clear, as the topic demands it. Anyway, how do I create a laptop that finds pleasure in its work? Do I throw away the ones that don't work, and keep the ones that work? Is that enough selection? And once I have a laptop that experiences some pleasure, why does it experience that amount of pleasure and not, say, ten times that amount?
- ppod 8y agoI meant that the internal state of like/hate would be a response to something that the laptop experienced. >Please be more clear, as the topic demands it. You are using terms like 'pleasure' and 'experience' that have no scientific definition. I find your entire line of thinking unclear, but it doesn't help the tone of the argument to demand clarity. >Anyway, how do I create a laptop that finds pleasure in its work? Do I throw away the ones that don't work, and keep the ones that work? Is that enough selection? As with dogs, the internal state of the laptop would need to be malleable per generation, with generations of reproduction under adaptive pressures that favour the human owner. We currently don't have laptops of this kind.
- amelius 8y ago> You are using terms like 'pleasure' and 'experience' that have no scientific definition. We are not in the domain of science, but in the domain of philosophy ... Also, don't you understand what I mean by "pleasure" or "experience"? Are you a bot? :) > As with dogs, the internal state of the laptop would need to be malleable per generation, with generations of reproduction under adaptive pressures that favour the human owner. We currently don't have laptops of this kind. We have genetic algorithms, so I'm sure we could come up with such laptops.
- asfasgasg 8y ago> We have genetic algorithms, so I'm sure we could come up with such laptops. It is almost certain that we someday will. I doubt I'll still be alive to see it, though.
- goatlover 8y ago> Any reasonable definition of consciousness should IMO be a continuum, so your laptop has some consciousness (not very much). That doesn't seem much different from the theory of consciousness Chalmers put forward in the second part of his 1996 book, where some law of nature connects consciousness to rich streams of information. That way, any physical system which creates a complex enough flow of information would be conscious to some degree. The difference is that Chalmers recognizes that information and subjective experience are not equivalent, and thus you need a law of nature connecting the too. That was his proposal for expanding science. I'm not saying whether he's write or wrong, only that Chalmers recognizes the hard problem can't be waved away by making an equivalence claim.
- lomnakkus 8y ago> The difference is that Chalmers recognizes that information and subjective experience are not equivalent, "recognizes" seems to assume that he's right. AFAICT there's absolutely no reason a priori to think that it's true, so I think the burden of proof is on those making the claim that the subjective is somehow not just the result of physical processes -- which is what the claim seems to amount to, at least to me.