5 ms·

> The real concern here is what this means for the future of warfare. I don't think Ebola is likely to play a role in the future of warfare. Based conversation

by sndean 8y ago

> The real concern here is what this means for the future of warfare. I don't think Ebola is likely to play a role in the future of warfare. Based conversations with Sergei Popov [0], in his experience making biological weapons, viruses generally make for poor weapons because they're difficult to deploy / release. Their work led to them to favor B. anthracis and other sporulating bacteria. You'd probably have to invent a new kind of platform for deployment if you want viral weapons to be targeted. I can see how viruses could be used in terrorism or something comparable to arson, but their use by a state seems unlikely. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Popov_(bioweaponeer) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Popov_(bioweaponeer)

mieseratte 8y ago
> but their use by a state seems unlikely. One would suspect there would be a certain appeal for clandestine purposes, assuming one can make them hard-to-attribute. Plausible deniability is a useful thing for nation-states. Just look at Russia.
- sndean 8y ago
  > assuming one can make them hard-to-attribute I think it'd be difficult to attribute. The release platform and preparation that's used would probably be the most identifying feature, rather than the organism. In the case of the 2001 anthrax attacks that was (some claimed) the silicon content, which the FBI thought suggested some expert weaponization knowledge and material. IIRC, Popov explained away that saying that you could just mix in some Gas-X [1]. So maybe even investigation into the preparation wouldn't really point to the source. And, yeah, rereading my comment, my concept of both "state" and "warfare" is probably too simple [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simeticone https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simeticone
- searine 8y ago
  > assuming one can make them hard-to-attribute Luckily bio-weapons come with their own tracking tags. From DNA we can reconstruct its origin. So it is not ideal for clandestine operations.
  - mieseratte 8y ago
    Could you extrapolate a bit on that? I'm ignorant on the topic, so I have no idea how a tracking tag would work for a living organism.
    - searine 8y ago
      DNA is inherited from parent to offspring. While new changes occur, a large amount of the DNA between the two are the same, compared to non-related organisms. This allows us to reconstruct the history, or in cases where there is less data, infer the history of two different organisms. We can roughly tell where, and when one population split from another. In the case of bio-weapons, we can tell if the organism came from a culture in a current laboratory, or if it was generated in secrete. If the latter, we can tell what part of the world the original sample came from. All of this are clues to discovering the culprits. A famous example is the 2001 Anthrax attack in DC. They were able to match the DNA from the anthrax to a US military strain located in Maryland. This led them to a former researcher who most law enforcement believe was the culprit in the attacks.
killjoywashere 8y ago
> Based conversations with Sergei Popov This guy seems like as close as possible to a real life Bond villian. How do you know him?

by sndean 8y ago

mieseratte 8y ago

> but their use by a state seems unlikely. One would suspect there would be a certain appeal for clandestine purposes, assuming one can make them hard-to-attribute. Plausible deniability is a useful thing for nation-states. Just look at Russia.

sndean 8y ago
> assuming one can make them hard-to-attribute I think it'd be difficult to attribute. The release platform and preparation that's used would probably be the most identifying feature, rather than the organism. In the case of the 2001 anthrax attacks that was (some claimed) the silicon content, which the FBI thought suggested some expert weaponization knowledge and material. IIRC, Popov explained away that saying that you could just mix in some Gas-X [1]. So maybe even investigation into the preparation wouldn't really point to the source. And, yeah, rereading my comment, my concept of both "state" and "warfare" is probably too simple [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simeticone https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simeticone
searine 8y ago
> assuming one can make them hard-to-attribute Luckily bio-weapons come with their own tracking tags. From DNA we can reconstruct its origin. So it is not ideal for clandestine operations.
- mieseratte 8y ago
  Could you extrapolate a bit on that? I'm ignorant on the topic, so I have no idea how a tracking tag would work for a living organism.
  - searine 8y ago
    DNA is inherited from parent to offspring. While new changes occur, a large amount of the DNA between the two are the same, compared to non-related organisms. This allows us to reconstruct the history, or in cases where there is less data, infer the history of two different organisms. We can roughly tell where, and when one population split from another. In the case of bio-weapons, we can tell if the organism came from a culture in a current laboratory, or if it was generated in secrete. If the latter, we can tell what part of the world the original sample came from. All of this are clues to discovering the culprits. A famous example is the 2001 Anthrax attack in DC. They were able to match the DNA from the anthrax to a US military strain located in Maryland. This led them to a former researcher who most law enforcement believe was the culprit in the attacks.

killjoywashere 8y ago

> Based conversations with Sergei Popov This guy seems like as close as possible to a real life Bond villian. How do you know him?