3 ms·
Impagliazzo and Rudich proved that one can't construct PKE from one way functions in a black box manner: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Russell_Impagliaz
by Ar-Curunir 9y ago
Impagliazzo and Rudich proved that one can't construct PKE from one way functions in a black box manner:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Russell_Impagliazzo/publication/2477849_Limits_on_the_Provable_Consequences_of_One-way_Permutations/links/09e41511133b689298000000/Limits-on-the-Provable-Consequences-of-One-way-Permutations.pdf https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Russell_Impagliazzo/pub...
- DoctorOetker 9y agothanks a lot!
- DoctorOetker 9y agoI am reading the paper now, and had a weird thought, but probably it is a brainfart: Keep in mind Monte Carlo algorithms versus Las Vegas algorithmms. Keep also in mind that since cryptographic one way permutations are available, both Alice and Bob can sign their messages on the public channel, and Eve can only read them (for injecting a message would require forging a signature). Consider the following (absurd) Las Vegas algorithm: both Alice and Bob seperately generate a random secret key. Then they sign the hash of the secret key and inform each other with this <Hash(secret),Signature(Hash(secret))> message. The Las Vegas secret key exchange protocol succesfully finishes if they read the same hash as they generated, and returns the bottom element or failure if they don't match. So provably with a (very) low probability they can establish a common secret in a Las Vegas protocol, which begs the question if a dual (necessarily interactive) Monte Carlo protocol can slowly grow an n-bit common secret. I suspect you can confirm that this is just a brainfart indeed?
- Ar-Curunir 9y agoIf by the hashing operation you mean application of the OWP, keep in mind that inverting the OWP is supposed to be hard, and furthermore, since it's a OWP, if Alice and Bob start with different secret keys, they won't hit the same "hash" as the output of the OWP. For this to work, they'd have to start off with the same secret key already, which makes the key exchange pointless. You mention using this approach to slowly grow a secret key, by performing many iterations of this protocol, but if you do it bit-by-bit, the adversary can easily brute force invert the OWP over {0, 1}, and thereby learn the secret key