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Or, here’s another possibility: If we knew the complete laws of physics (or perhaps just invented some self-consistent laws) we could simulate light hitting in

Or, here’s another possibility: If we knew the complete laws of physics (or perhaps just invented some self-consistent laws) we could simulate light hitting in a mirror in complete detail; and within the simulation it would be indistinguishable from reality. But we can’t actually do that because it would take a ludicrous amount of computing power. And the structure of the laws of physics might be such that it’s never possible. That’s very different from your strict model/causal distinction. I don’t know of any evidence to suggest which view is correct. I think your claims are overblown. You might be right but you might be wrong.

mjburgess 9y ago
Saying "within the simulation", begs the question and rather makes a mess of the issue. The question is, at the outset, whether simulations are actual instances (eg., of thinking). My claim is that they are not. Only when a human being looks at a simulation does it inform them of the target. The simulation isnt the same thing as its target. There is no "within the simulation". A simulation is just an abbacus. A digital computer is just a fancy abbacus with a wood-to-LCD converter attached. There is no "within the wood". It's just wood.
- iainmerrick 9y ago
  My claim is kind of orthogonal, that “actual instances” is a red herring and that the only thing that matters is observational equivalence.
  - mjburgess 9y ago
    Yes, but you're defining "observation" as some weird intra-wood process (, intra-silicon in the case of digital machines). Observation means, for example, reflecting some light off the thing. Does a piece of silicon become transparent if I program it to model glass? No. So, trivially, it is observed immediately not to be equivalent. What you mean by "observation" is: can a person using the model system inform themselves of the target. Do I get the message "lets visible light through: 98%" from the machine when I have correctly modelled the glass. That message isn't observation, it's calculation. Calculation is what happens when I use a tool to inform myself about something. That the machine emits the right symbols in a way that it is programmed to, so that I acquire accurate beliefs about the world, says nothing of the machine. The machine does not become transparent.
- insulanus 9y ago
  I like how you put that. The abacus and the computer are the same in that the consume external power, and adhere to a set of rules. But there is a large difference between an abacus and a computer. A computer can modify the program that is running. It can change its own rules. An abacus cannot do that.
- Dylan16807 9y ago
  Please do explain how you would test whether you are being simulated or if you're an "actual" instance. As in, perhaps there's an outer universe where our hairiest quantum physics are trivially solved. They are simulating a very simplified universe model, and everything we see is already simplified. If you can prove it, you're far more clever than me. If you can't, then being "actual" seems to have no practical use.

mjburgess 9y ago

Saying "within the simulation", begs the question and rather makes a mess of the issue. The question is, at the outset, whether simulations are actual instances (eg., of thinking). My claim is that they are not. Only when a human being looks at a simulation does it inform them of the target. The simulation isnt the same thing as its target. There is no "within the simulation". A simulation is just an abbacus. A digital computer is just a fancy abbacus with a wood-to-LCD converter attached. There is no "within the wood". It's just wood.

iainmerrick 9y ago
My claim is kind of orthogonal, that “actual instances” is a red herring and that the only thing that matters is observational equivalence.
- mjburgess 9y ago
  Yes, but you're defining "observation" as some weird intra-wood process (, intra-silicon in the case of digital machines). Observation means, for example, reflecting some light off the thing. Does a piece of silicon become transparent if I program it to model glass? No. So, trivially, it is observed immediately not to be equivalent. What you mean by "observation" is: can a person using the model system inform themselves of the target. Do I get the message "lets visible light through: 98%" from the machine when I have correctly modelled the glass. That message isn't observation, it's calculation. Calculation is what happens when I use a tool to inform myself about something. That the machine emits the right symbols in a way that it is programmed to, so that I acquire accurate beliefs about the world, says nothing of the machine. The machine does not become transparent.
insulanus 9y ago
I like how you put that. The abacus and the computer are the same in that the consume external power, and adhere to a set of rules. But there is a large difference between an abacus and a computer. A computer can modify the program that is running. It can change its own rules. An abacus cannot do that.
Dylan16807 9y ago
Please do explain how you would test whether you are being simulated or if you're an "actual" instance. As in, perhaps there's an outer universe where our hairiest quantum physics are trivially solved. They are simulating a very simplified universe model, and everything we see is already simplified. If you can prove it, you're far more clever than me. If you can't, then being "actual" seems to have no practical use.