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Oblivious DNS: Plugging the Internet’s Biggest Privacy Hole
- mattnewport 9y agoI must be missing something here: "The ODNS server can thus return the answer to the client’s stub resolver directly, possibly over a confidential channel such as D-TLS." How does this not just move the trust problem to the ODNS server? Doesn't it now know both the requesting IP and the requested domain?
- sshine 9y agoSo is my thought. Surely they have yet to come up with something akin to an onion routing layer where the machine performing the lookup is not owned by the same entity as those who know its origin? How is the middle path between current DNS and Tor-level anonymity defined, exactly?
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- Asdfbla 9y agoYeah, the figure[1] on the side in the article seems to show something different, because there the response goes over the recursive resolver again. Maybe the text is wrong? All seems to hinge on the recursive resolver acting as a proxy, so a direct response from ODNS server to the client stub doesn't seem safe. [1] https://s3.amazonaws.com/ftt-uploads/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/02004802/protocol-600x406.png https://s3.amazonaws.com/ftt-uploads/wp-content/uploads/2018...
- codebudo 9y ago> How does this not just move the trust problem to the ODNS server? That's how I read this as well. It does appear that a simple DNS proxy would accomplish the same goal without all the encryption. Are we missing something?
- Digit-Al 9y agoMy reading of it is that the DNS request gets encrypted on the client and sent to ODNS. ODNS doesn't know how to decrypt the request so it can't see what you are looking for, just that it is you that is looking. The ODNS resolver then sends the encrypted request to the DNS resolver on your behalf, and the DNS resolver decrypts the request and services it. This meanst that the DNS resolver knows what website you are looking for, but doesn't know that it is you that is looking for it. The DNS resolver then encrypts the result and returns it to the ODNS, which then returns it to you. It is basically decoupling the identity of the requester from the domain being requested.
- the8472 9y agoIf authoritative servers supported DNS over (D)TLS then running your own recursive resolver would plug most holes. The biggest remaining information leakage would be to the TLD NS operators, which could further be mitigated by spreading it to some sort of authoritative mirrors, maybe secured by dnssec?
- arca_vorago 9y agoDon't forget DNSCurve (thanks again djb!)
- pcnix 9y agoI've been reading up on this recently, and I've seen a few articles on DNSSEC vs DNSCurve, how would you weigh in?
- akvadrako 9y agoBoth are irrelevant in practice, but DNSSEC is de facto standard; it's what the root servers implement.
- sybercecurity 9y agoDNSSEC (IETF standard) only provides authentication and integrity protection. DNSCurve can also provide confidentiality. DNSCurve does require the authoritative server to do crypto on the fly, so may require a lot more work for the root/TLD servers. DNSSEC is just signed DNS data, so the work can be done offline. So operators just do DNSSEC, very few operators deploy DNSCurve. Actually, most places do neither. There is the possibility to mix the two - use DNSSEC for root/TLD servers and then DNSCurve on the lower level or leaf zones. It would be hard to know when to switch over from DNSSEC to DNSCurve(other than try at the 2nd level and below). Query minimization may help in privacy protection at the root/TLD level.
- y0ghur7_xxx 9y agoIf the root servers and major .tlds would support dns-over-tls every home router could just run a full recursive dns resolver by itself, and we could be done with it. There would be no need for complicated architectures with proxies and stub resolvers, and nobody could see your queries. The root server would just see your NS lookup for .com, the .com would just see your NS query for google.com and the google.com NS would see your query for maps.google.com - but here you are in googles domain anyway, so it does not matter. dns-over-tls would prevent your isp from snooping your queries to the .com/.org/.net/.club/... nameservers and we could close the case.
- kbenson 9y agoWouldn't that quickly overload all the root servers?
- anon892375 9y agoResolvers should aggressively cache the root zone. And the traffic shouldn't be any worse than what google or cloudflare resolvers are seeing.
- kbenson 9y ago> the traffic shouldn't be any worse than what google or cloudflare resolvers are seeing. What are you basing that on? How many people do you think are really using Google DNS or Cloudfare DNS? I think even if just Comcast changed their defaults, the root servers would see a order of magnitude more traffic than Google or Cloudfare see. One of the reasons DNS is hierarchical is for load distribution (and performance). Taking this design principle and all of a sudden throwing it out the window would likely have major consequences for a system that was originally designed and scaled with it in mind.
- JdeBP 9y agoNo. The volume of traffic to the . content DNS servers would be largely unchanged. In the existing system, each cache miss at a caching resolving proxy DNS server begins with a transaction with the . content DNS servers (and thence with each content DNS server for further domains as a series of delegations is followed). In the proposed system, each cache miss is still only one transation to the . content DNS servers, the difference being that that transaction is encrypted.
- forapurpose 9y ago> DNS: The Internet's Biggest Privacy Hole Almost every packet on the Internet identifies the user's IP and the server to which they are connecting (with the exception of VPN traffic and Tor). DNS does not reveal much more than that. I do agree that Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 does almost nothing to improve end user confidentiality - there are so many other ways users are tracked, and in much greater detail than DNS can provide; and if your ISP is your DNS vendor, 1.1.1.1 only adds to the number of organizations that can monitor you. But 1.1.1.1 is an important piece of a much larger puzzle that could, if completed, provide greater confidentiality.
- Buge 9y agoThe article claims that 1.1.1.1 is a joint project between CloudFlare and Mozilla. But the source it links to for that never mentions Mozilla.
- sohkamyung 9y agoIs this article better [1]? Mozilla has partnered with Cloudflare to provide direct DNS resolution from within the Firefox browser using the Cloudflare Resolver for Firefox. What this means is that whenever you click on or type a web address in the Firefox browser your DNS lookup request will be sent over a secure channel to the Cloudflare Resolver for Firefox rather than to an unknown DNS resolver, significantly decreasing the odds of any unwanted spying or man in the middle attacks. [1] https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/commitment-to-privacy/privacy-policy/firefox/ https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/commitment-to-priv...
- Buge 9y agoThat just says that Firefox is going to use 1.1.1.1 . But this Freedom to Tinker article is saying Mozilla helps operate 1.1.1.1 and that Mozilla has partial ownership. >Mozilla and Cloudflare are deploying their own DNS recursive resolver >Mozilla/Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1 operate such open DNS recursive resolvers
- isostatic 9y agoGreat, so all my internal DNS names just fail? Some of those override external names (e.g. dailymail.co.uk at home points to a holding page in case I accidentally click a link to that vile piece of trash) And on my isolated network, which has no routed access to the internet?
- antocv 9y agoNot a good name. This is not an implementation of Oblivious Transfer, as one would asssume, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oblivious_transfer https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oblivious_transfer Also, this is just using asymetric encryption for the communication between client to authorative servers, which would also overload the servers as they could not be distributed or cached as is done today.
- Ar-Curunir 9y agoObliviousness is a property not just of OT; ORAM protocols are other "oblivious" protocols, for example. In this case, as long as the ODNS root server is not colluding with the recursive server, the DNS system is "oblivious" to the identity of the user.
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- solarkraft 9y agoConsider me confused.
- jlgaddis 9y agoSee also "spam".
- nailer 9y ago> Clients that you operate—including your browser, your smartphone, and any IoT device in your home—sends a DNS query for each domain name to a so-called “recursive DNS resolver”.On a typical home network, the default recursive DNS resolver may be operated by your Internet service provider (ISP) (e.g., Comcast, Verizon). Nobody says 'recursive DNS resolver' - it's just a DNS resolver. See `man resolv.conf`. DNS is inherently recursive. Saying 'recursive DNS resolver' is like saying 'ATM machine' or similar.
- isostatic 9y ago>Nobody says 'recursive DNS resolver' >Saying 'recursive DNS resolver' is like saying 'ATM machine' or similar Yes, because I never use my PIN Number Nobody is a very small set, and a very powerful word -- use it carefully, like Never, Always and Everyone
- xori 9y agoNobody should* say...
- nailer 9y ago> Yes, because I never use my PIN Number I get the point you're making, but that doesn't change anything: Unix people (and devops people) don't say 'recursive DNS resolver'. I've met 0 people who do this in the last 20+ years. I'm using the term 'nobody' very deliberately. I guess technical people are more specific - or like to keep things shorter - than the general public.
- hoytech 9y agoIt means as distinct from a "stub" resolver. resolv.conf configures a stub (non-recursive) resolver.
- NoGravitas 9y agoI believe that they are making the distinction between a recursive DNS resolver and an authoritative DNS resolver.
- guelo 9y agoHow about running your own TLD DNS server? According to [1] the gtld zone files are 1.5GB so it would fit even on a phone. The problem is getting access to the zone files. Services like domainlists.io will sell you the data, or maybe you could figure out how to crawl for it yourself. [1]https://domainlists.io/gtld-domains/ https://domainlists.io/gtld-domains/
- drdaeman 9y agoIt's not only about getting the data, but also about ensuring the source is trustworthy as well as staying up-to-date.
- d33 9y agoSurprised there are no free data sets like this available - it seems to fit scans.io's idea. Are there projects that would help me crawl it with minimal effort?
- sli 9y agoI would also love to contribute to this if it exists.
- _bxg1 9y agoIt's worth noting that privacy against ISPs, at least today, is hugely more important than privacy against DNS resolvers, and not just because first-world ISPs have a reputation of being less trustworthy than companies like Cloudflare (Google is more debatable). You always have a choice of DNS resolver; you often don't have a choice of ISP. Especially outside of the first world, where the ISPs might be in the pocket of the government, like in the example from Turkey mentioned in Cloudflare's blog post, or in China. The ISP is the physical pipes, and if you can't get through the physical pipes, you're dead in the water. You can always change DNS resolvers. This is still an interesting idea that's worth looking at. They just shouldn't minimize the significance of what Cloudflare is doing.
- jiveturkey 9y ago> You can always change DNS resolvers. But you can't. First, it's technically hard for many or even most users. Some important platforms (mobile) may make this exceptionally hard even for savvy users. Even if it's built in to the browser, the ISP can require you to use their proxy (some regimes already do this today) and then they can filter and/or alter DNS, even DNS-over-https.
- ManishKrishna 9y agoWill website name in certificate shared by server during handshake kill the DNS over https purpose?
- algo646464 9y agoThis is perhaps a stupid question. But, even if we had a real oblivious DNS, can't the ISP figure out what website I am connecting to by a reverse-dns lookup on the IP-address ?
- zeroimpl 9y agoYes unless the websites are using a CDN with shared IP addresses. I wonder what % of the web that covers nowadays.