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There is a strong argument that in the financial-institution case you should be just blocking web-bound TLS traffic, instead of lobbying internet standards to b
by fulafel 9y ago
There is a strong argument that in the financial-institution case you should be just blocking web-bound TLS traffic, instead of lobbying internet standards to break TLS. The applications that want to route their traffic through inspection proxies can then do so explicitly.
- koliber 9y agoOne of the issues is that, due to poorly constructed legislation or private contracts, there is may be a requirement to provide "industry-standard" protection to various network connections. TLS 1.3 will, in due time, be the industry standard. This needs to be reconciled with the conflicting requirement to log, record, and or block connections based on content. Perhaps TLS 1.3 is not the solution here, as it can not reconcile this conflict. Perhaps something else needs to be developed that will provide a solution that meets these two requirements.
- pas 9y agoCould you cite the exact statute that requires logging mere connections? I thought most of these compliance frameworks don't really specify how, just compile, archive and produce the data periodically (or on demand). And make the system tamper-proof (or tamper-evident), and get it audited from time to time.
- wglb 9y agoI am not aware of legislation, but there are many industries where there are compliance requirements that require monitoring, for example financial institutions, possibly FISMA.
- semi-extrinsic 9y agoWhere I work, the company has a TLS 1.2 proxy as discussed in the article. The stated purpose is to intercept malware. It frequently fails, as the fine article states, and people then either use their personal phone and 4G to wifi, or proxy traffic over ssh to a server they have at home. I can't imagine it's anything but "something must be done, we're doing something." Furthermore, as most large companies install these, won't malware authors just start proxying C&C traffic over ssh on port 80? Or use other non-interceptable secure channels?
- wolfgke 9y ago> This needs to be reconciled with the conflicting requirement to log, record, and or block connections based on content. If there is something to reconcile, the bug is in the law and should be fixed there.
- espadrine 9y ago> There is a strong argument that in the financial-institution case you should be just blocking web-bound TLS traffic There is a simpler solution to let users still access the Web: let them do so unencrypted. They won't have the "Secure" symbol on their browser, which is extremely reasonable considering that, indeed, their access is not really secure: their employer can read all communications. The employer simply sets up a proxy that receives unencrypted communications and encrypts them on the fly; a TLS/HTTP client.
- icebraining 9y agoI think that would probably break a lot of web apps, which will use URLs with "https://" https://" in them. Also e.g. HTTP2 doesn't work without TLS (the spec technically allows, but no major browser actually does).
- espadrine 9y agoThe proxy would redirect HTTPS requests to HTTP, and use HTTP 1.1 between the client and the proxy. The bigger issue is HSTS; the proxy can remove the header, but if the origin comes preloaded in the browser, that won't do, which means the browser would need to be customized to not have or enforce HSTS.
- icebraining 9y agoI guess that would be possible, although HTTP2 has some extra features like Server Push, which might be hard to "backport" cleanly.
- kevin_b_er 9y agoThen you'll have no web bound traffic. It'll all soon be encrypted anyways, forced MITM attacks or not. And client boxes will continue to require investment in order to de-secure them. The corporate world can transition to being fundamentally insecure while the rest of the world will secure its traffic.