This certainly is a usability issue with security implications. But it's salted, so if can have 60-96 bits of entropy in your master password - that should be m

This certainly is a usability issue with security implications. But it's salted, so if can have 60-96 bits of entropy in your master password - that should be maintained - and a reasonable level of security maintained. There's a reason the master password was removed for a while while rolling out the new synchronisation infrastructure; the assumption is that the data is protected by the key stored and generated locally - and that that key is protected by full disk encryption. If you can read the key, it is assumed you already can read everything the key protects. I do agree with the poster that this isn't always a great set of assumptions. But still; one strong master passphrase generated through diceware or similar will allow you to use the password manager; and then you can use secure, high entropy "pass keys" for everything else (random passwords with ~128 bit entropy).