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Why is it possible for a device that is basically a display to stop working because a certificate expired? This future worries me.
by StavrosK 9y ago
Why is it possible for a device that is basically a display to stop working because a certificate expired? This future worries me.
- aphextron 9y ago>Why is it possible for a device that is basically a display to stop working because a certificate expired? Because Mark Zuckerberg said so, that’s why.
- omegaworks 9y agoAh, what a world we've made... More relevant by the day: http://locusmag.com/2018/03/cory-doctorow-lets-get-better-at-demanding-better-from-tech/ http://locusmag.com/2018/03/cory-doctorow-lets-get-better-at...
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- ThatPlayer 9y agoBecause it was the certificate for the Windows driver, and Windows requires signed drivers.
- wtallis 9y agoThe problem isn't that Windows requires drivers to be signed. The problem is that Windows allows drivers to have an expiration date. If Windows verifies a driver's signature at the time the driver is installed, the driver should be considered trustworthy for as long as it remains installed on that system. There's no reason to re-verify the signature every time the driver is used.
- hesdeadjim 9y agoPerhaps as a malware defense?
- AnimalMuppet 9y agoPerhaps, but it would be better to trigger that with some knowledge of an attack, rather than at a fixed date. [Edit: It may not be this simple. See the top-level comment by r1ch about timestamp servers.]
- kbenson 9y agoI think that's better handled through a Certificate Revocation List (CRL), especially in this case where's it's fairly easy to enforce and keep up to date.
- jsmthrowaway 9y agoCRLs are pretty difficult to scale resiliently, though, for a number of applications. Same problem that led to OCSP stapling after OCSP became a thing. With CRLs you can at least take advantage of a CDN of some kind, but there are tradeoffs with your ability to operate a CRL securely doing that, too. CRL in the driver install flow implies being online (at some point) to install drivers too. As we move into the future it’s hard to imagine not having Internet access, but we also don’t design Windows. It’s definitely a case they’ve considered, though I did see mention of a timestamp server in this thread (I don’t know much about Windows signing, just X.509 PKI in general).
- wtallis 9y agoAre driver CRLs any more challenging than the virus definitions already distributed through Windows Update?
- gruez 9y agoif you by "malware defense" mean preventing stolen expired certificates from being used to sign code, then yes. if you mean by only allowing code to be "signed" for the duration of the certificate, then no.
- NateyJay 9y agoRecommended practice is to timestamp windows drivers (and software) when they are signed. Without a timestamp, the driver is not trusted after the signing cert expires, which I guess is what happened here. With a timestamp, as long as the signing date was within the signing cert's validity period, the signed driver continues to be trusted beyond the signing certificate expiration.
- phkahler 9y agoThat seems silly. Presumably a cert has an expiration date after which we might assume its been compromised. If it has been compromised then it could have been used to backdate a driver signed with it. In other words, if you don't trust the cert you should not trust anything signed by it. Or is there another layer in this somewhere?
- ScottEvtuch 9y agoThe timestamp server is a separate trusted entity that signs the signature asserting the date and time. It's not just metadata, it's effectively a separate signature.
- Retric 9y agoWhich just means the expiration date is meaningless. If the driver was valid when it was signed, then revoking it will break the system. Not installing it is another story.
- gruez 9y ago>Which just means the expiration date is meaningless. how so? it merely limits which dates you can sign code, after which the code you signed remain valid, but you can't sign any more code.
- wtallis 9y ago> it merely limits which dates you can sign code, after which the code you signed remain valid, The whole problem here is that the code that was signed is not being treated as valid code beyond the expiration date.
- 21 9y agoStuxnet used malicious drivers signed with a stolen Realtek certificate.
- tptacek 9y agoPart of what driver expiry does is to prevent attackers from trivially banking older vulnerable versions of drivers and using them to bypass kernel protections.
- tedunangst 9y agoBut that's only relevant/necessary to check at install time. Attackers aren't banking the drivers that I've already installed last year.
- MertsA 9y agoChecking at install time is effectively useless. The whole point of running signed code is that you can't just load some rootkit. Secure Boot only loads a signed bootloader which only loads a signed kernel which only loads signed kernel modules. You can't do what you're suggesting without fundamentally breaking this chain of trust. What's to stop a rootkit from just spoofing that it was installed months ago?
- wtallis 9y ago> What's to stop a rootkit from just spoofing that it was installed months ago? The fact that if a rootkit is in a position to performing that spoofing, it doesn't need to, because it already has the power to make arbitrary modifications to the system image.
- MertsA 9y agoThe whole point of signing everything from the bootloader on down is to make sure that even ring 0 control over the computer can't persist through a reboot. Allowing signatures to work the way it was suggested would break any hope of something like Secure Boot ever working. As it is you're already trusting timestamping certificates to effectively live forever.
- dannyw 9y agoThe signed kernel keeps track of when it first has seen a certificate. That is signed by a kernel, so a rootkit can’t spoof unless the system is already compromised.
- mulmen 9y agoIs that true though? Could a malicious driver be signed with a compromised key and distributed? Seems like a useful feature to be able to mark drivers as compromised.
- wtallis 9y ago> Seems like a useful feature to be able to mark drivers as compromised. Putting expiration dates on non-malicious drivers is not a particularly effective way to protect against malicious drivers.
- mulmen 9y ago> There's no reason to re-verify the signature every time the driver is used. I was replying to this part of your comment. It does seem worthwhile to validate the signature of the driver every time the driver is used if that check would reveal when a certificate has been revoked for having been compromised. Agreed that the expiration time is not particularly useful for this purpose.
- wtallis 9y ago> It does seem worthwhile to validate the signature of the driver every time the driver is used if that check would reveal when a certificate has been revoked for having been compromised. It would be much more efficient to scan the list of installed drivers every time a certificate revocation list is updated, because certificates are revoked much less often than operating systems are booted. And there's nothing gained by just checking timestamps if you don't have a new certificate revocation list. If the driver is already installed and was trusted and running yesterday, you gain no security by deciding to not load and run that driver today, unless overnight you acquired new information that the driver is insecure or malicious. The ticking of a clock does not convey any such information.
- anonymfus 9y agoIs there such thing as a driver installation for the kernel, or it's just few filesystem operations?
- jimrandomh 9y agoIt's more complex than a display; it's a display plus a collection of USB sensors and some low-level hooks into display management. This requires kernel-mode drivers, for good technical reasons, where a normal monitor wouldn't.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- tomcam 9y agoWhy should the Rift fail when a certificate expires?
- CookieMon 9y agoI imagine someone went to a site like this: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa388170(v=vs.85).aspx https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa3... read the command for signing their code, and signed their code as instructed. Today, the certificate they signed a driver with expired, and because the signature wasn't timestamped it means Windows can't know if the driver was signed with the certificate after it expired, so the signature is now treated as expired as well, so Windows doesn't trust the driver. Why wasn't it timestamped? Probably because instructions like the link above treat that as a separate subject to signing your code, and when you sign your code it looks and works like it's fully correctly signed. or, as wtallis puts it (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16542204 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16542204), someone left a foot-gun lying around that didn't have much value except to cause incidents like this. ...and if your own company makes Windows apps, go check they are timestamped ;)
- tallanvor 9y agoYour same link also explains how to sign a file with a timestamp as well, and contains a link on how to add a timestamp after the fact. It doesn't pretend to know what the best practice is for your specific use case of the signing tool is. But you can also find places where Microsoft does talk about when you should be timestamping: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/ieinternals/2011/03/22/everything-you-need-to-know-about-authenticode-code-signing/ https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/ieinternals/2011/03/22/ever...
- booleandilemma 9y agoThis is why I’m reluctant to shift completely to ebooks.
- PinkMilkshake 9y agoMy solution is to legally pay for ebooks and keep a [partial ;)] backup of each.
- bo1024 9y agoNot all e-books (or readers) have DRM. I understand and share your concern, but you can shift to only DRM-free e-books with your own backups and under your own control.
- sohkamyung 9y agoThat's the only kind of ebooks (non-DRM) ones that I buy. Some publishers (like O'Reilly or Tor dot com) exclusively publish non-DRM books. I politely ask authors or publishers to release non-DRM ebooks when I can. Apart from best-sellers (or time sensitive books), I believe most books are stuck in the long tail of obscurity and releasing them as non-DRM won't affect their sales. This also means I don't visit pirate websites that claim to have ebooks. It takes two to tango. :-)
- nerpderp83 9y agoO'Reilly no longer publishes non-DRM books except via 3rd party agreements.
- gambler 9y agoThis kind of stuff worries me as well. Security experts generally don't seem to give a fuck about things being unusable due to security systems "Working as Designed". It just doesn't factor into their analysis. As long systems are not "compromised" in some narrowly defined sense, everything is considered fine. Generally this attitude doesn't backfire, because individual users loosing access to their data, their accounts or their software can be simply dismissed. But in this case it happened to everyone at once, so it's suddenly a big deal.
- jlgaddis 9y agoThis isn't my experience at all. Most "security experts" I know are familiar with the so-called "CIA triad" and understand quite well that the "availability" part is just as important as the "confidentiality" and "integrity" (i.e., the "not compromised") parts. If one doesn't, well, she isn't much of a "security expert" after all, is she? Firewalling off TCP port 80/443 at your perimeter firewalls isn't a very good solution if you're an e-commerce company selling your product on your web site -- and the "security experts" know this.
- nerpderp83 9y agoYou will absolutely love encrypted USB cables.
- Kenji 9y agoThis future worries me. That's not the future. That's the present! Which is even more worrying.