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This is a load of crap. It's part of an entire genre of "Vietnam revisionism" that has been circulating around right-wing circles at low intensity since the lat

This is a load of crap. It's part of an entire genre of "Vietnam revisionism" that has been circulating around right-wing circles at low intensity since the late 70's. It's usually centered around the idea that we were just about to win in Vietnam, with just a couple more months or a couple more thousand troops, and that it was the cowardly liberals who snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. The whole idea could only exist with years of distance from the war itself, once people have forgotten what the actual situation was like. None of them remember that Vietnam was what Afghanistan is today: we don't even know what "winning" looks like, never mind have anything close to a coherent or realistic plan about how to do it, and everyone knows it. As for the specific faults with this editorial, it's right there in the opening paragraph: "He considered the Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese on the ropes, and headed for defeat." The author doesn't even acknowledge the possibility that Westmoreland was simply wrong; no, it must have been those schemers in Washington.

georgeecollins 9y ago
The line that got me: "choosing the optimum time to commit the Reserves, when the enemy losses had opened the door to a powerful counterassault. " 1) He was asking for an additional 206k troops, which was unpopular. Who cares if he asked for them before the offensive? It was unpopular to mobilize reserves either way. 2) What evidence is there that "the door was opened to a powerful counter assault". The war went on for six years including bombing Cambodia, invading Laos, etc. We didn't quit in 1968. I never thought I would live long enough for people to forget the lessons of Vietnam. It was a disaster of a war.
spikels 9y ago
While I agree with some of your points much of what you say is unnecessarily simplistic and partisan. As John Prados writes “what actually happened was more complex.” This article is about the details of what actually happened not revisiting political arguments from the 1960s and 1970s. John Prados is no “Vietnam revisionist” or right-winger. If you read his main book on Vietnam War, “Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975”, you will learn that he was actually an anti-war activist during the war. He later became one of our top military historians and has written several books on the Vietnam war. Prados is particularly known for his advocacy for openness in government records. This article draws from once secret documents that Prados helped uncover and declassify. Lastly it is almost universally acknowledged that the Tet Offensive was militarily a disaster for the NVA/Viet Cong and huge win for ARVN/US forces. This is a common refrain in the most histories of the war and this NYTimes series, Vietnam ‘67. The political debates about the war are separate matters.
- wahern 9y ago
  universally acknowledged that the Tet Offensive was militarily a disaster Does it really make sense to try to distinguish military success from the political consequences? The notion that those things are gainfully distinguishable seems horribly flawed and can be found at the root of our foreign policy and military blunders. It's sort of like talking about how technology A is better than technology B without giving any consideration to market viability, path dependency, etc. Someone who appreciates and emphasizes the latter will almost always see greater success than someone who focuses on the "best" technology. What's worse is when someone bitterly complains about how their startup failed even though they had the better technology. Not only did they fail in the market, but they don't even understand why they failed, which is that realistically there's no objective "better" technology independent from market dynamics. Likewise, there can exist no objective military "success" if the political consequences result in the campaign ultimately crumbling. Another way to put it is that given the American strategic posture, the only to have seen success in the Tet Offensive would have been to have been more prepared and taken many fewer casualties such that the public would have never wavered in its support. That may seem an unfair benchmark, but war isn't fair. If you're going to win a war, you have to understand how wars are won. You not only go to war with the army you have instead of the army you wish you had, you go to war with the public support you have, not the public support you wish you had. If the public is fickle, you better make sure you account for that. Otherwise you'll fail.
geezerjay 9y ago
> It's usually centered around the idea that we were just about to win in Vietnam, with just a couple more months or a couple more thousand troops, and that it was the cowardly liberals who snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. After browsing through the article I have to say that I don't agree, or that the article comes close to suggest your interpretation. The article simply states that after the Tet offensive Westmoreland asked for reinforcements, and his request depleted the US's reserves. It points out all the reasons why that request was impossible to fulfill. More to the point, the sheer number of troops (over 200k) made it quite clear that the involvement was too great to justify. In short, the general fended off the Tet offensive and requested reinforcements to keep fighting. A general in any similar circumstamce has no option, as he has no power to simply call off a war, even if its too drawn out and with a heavy social toll. So as his forces weren't defeated then he did the only thing any general would do: petition for the reinforcements he felt were required to win (better yet, keep fighting) and kept up the fight as best as he could.
topynate 9y ago
And if LBJ was possessed of what is now the conventional wisdom about Vietnam (yours), you might have a point. But LBJ was an interventionist liberal anti-Soviet. That's why Prados has an article to write, after all – almost every post-Vietnam liberal, in LBJ's position, would have pulled out of Vietnam ASAP. Prados' piece is about how the players of the time, as they actually were, reacted to and shaped the events of the time. On that note, what is so damnably awful about learning Westmoreland's point of view? Do you really think that the article would have been improved by the rote acknowledgement "… and as a historian, I must say, he was dead wrong", or is that simply what it takes for those in left-wing circles to feel better about reading history in late '10's?

georgeecollins 9y ago

The line that got me: "choosing the optimum time to commit the Reserves, when the enemy losses had opened the door to a powerful counterassault. " 1) He was asking for an additional 206k troops, which was unpopular. Who cares if he asked for them before the offensive? It was unpopular to mobilize reserves either way. 2) What evidence is there that "the door was opened to a powerful counter assault". The war went on for six years including bombing Cambodia, invading Laos, etc. We didn't quit in 1968. I never thought I would live long enough for people to forget the lessons of Vietnam. It was a disaster of a war.

spikels 9y ago

While I agree with some of your points much of what you say is unnecessarily simplistic and partisan. As John Prados writes “what actually happened was more complex.” This article is about the details of what actually happened not revisiting political arguments from the 1960s and 1970s. John Prados is no “Vietnam revisionist” or right-winger. If you read his main book on Vietnam War, “Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975”, you will learn that he was actually an anti-war activist during the war. He later became one of our top military historians and has written several books on the Vietnam war. Prados is particularly known for his advocacy for openness in government records. This article draws from once secret documents that Prados helped uncover and declassify. Lastly it is almost universally acknowledged that the Tet Offensive was militarily a disaster for the NVA/Viet Cong and huge win for ARVN/US forces. This is a common refrain in the most histories of the war and this NYTimes series, Vietnam ‘67. The political debates about the war are separate matters.

wahern 9y ago
universally acknowledged that the Tet Offensive was militarily a disaster Does it really make sense to try to distinguish military success from the political consequences? The notion that those things are gainfully distinguishable seems horribly flawed and can be found at the root of our foreign policy and military blunders. It's sort of like talking about how technology A is better than technology B without giving any consideration to market viability, path dependency, etc. Someone who appreciates and emphasizes the latter will almost always see greater success than someone who focuses on the "best" technology. What's worse is when someone bitterly complains about how their startup failed even though they had the better technology. Not only did they fail in the market, but they don't even understand why they failed, which is that realistically there's no objective "better" technology independent from market dynamics. Likewise, there can exist no objective military "success" if the political consequences result in the campaign ultimately crumbling. Another way to put it is that given the American strategic posture, the only to have seen success in the Tet Offensive would have been to have been more prepared and taken many fewer casualties such that the public would have never wavered in its support. That may seem an unfair benchmark, but war isn't fair. If you're going to win a war, you have to understand how wars are won. You not only go to war with the army you have instead of the army you wish you had, you go to war with the public support you have, not the public support you wish you had. If the public is fickle, you better make sure you account for that. Otherwise you'll fail.

geezerjay 9y ago

> It's usually centered around the idea that we were just about to win in Vietnam, with just a couple more months or a couple more thousand troops, and that it was the cowardly liberals who snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. After browsing through the article I have to say that I don't agree, or that the article comes close to suggest your interpretation. The article simply states that after the Tet offensive Westmoreland asked for reinforcements, and his request depleted the US's reserves. It points out all the reasons why that request was impossible to fulfill. More to the point, the sheer number of troops (over 200k) made it quite clear that the involvement was too great to justify. In short, the general fended off the Tet offensive and requested reinforcements to keep fighting. A general in any similar circumstamce has no option, as he has no power to simply call off a war, even if its too drawn out and with a heavy social toll. So as his forces weren't defeated then he did the only thing any general would do: petition for the reinforcements he felt were required to win (better yet, keep fighting) and kept up the fight as best as he could.

topynate 9y ago

And if LBJ was possessed of what is now the conventional wisdom about Vietnam (yours), you might have a point. But LBJ was an interventionist liberal anti-Soviet. That's why Prados has an article to write, after all – almost every post-Vietnam liberal, in LBJ's position, would have pulled out of Vietnam ASAP. Prados' piece is about how the players of the time, as they actually were, reacted to and shaped the events of the time. On that note, what is so damnably awful about learning Westmoreland's point of view? Do you really think that the article would have been improved by the rote acknowledgement "… and as a historian, I must say, he was dead wrong", or is that simply what it takes for those in left-wing circles to feel better about reading history in late '10's?