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The problem is that we don't know what is encrypted, how, and who holds the keys: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2018/01/16/icloud-in-china/ https://b
by tonyztan 9y ago
The problem is that we don't know what is encrypted, how, and who holds the keys: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2018/01/16/icloud-in-china/ https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2018/01/16/icloud-i...
- threeseed 9y agoI would be surprised/mortified if Apple didn't hold the keys. Otherwise iCloud Keychain which houses credentials for non-Apple sites would be exposed. I can't imagine the likes of Facebook, Google, Amazon etc just sitting back and allowing Apple to compromise their sites in the name of Chinese expansion. It would surely amount to the biggest security compromise in history if this was the case.
- sneak 9y agoGoogle and Facebook are already blocked there.
- threeseed 9y agoMaybe you don't understand. In my iCloud Keychain is the credentials for EVERY website that I have basically ever signed it into. It has credentials for internet banking, work email and VPN, AWS and Google Cloud etc. Just for me it is over 250 websites. It even stores SSH keypairs. If the Chinese government had the ability to access those for all Chinese iCloud users (and roaming tourists ?) that would a seriously big deal.
- walterbell 9y agoWould a local-only iOS password manager reduce this exposure?
- rarepostinlurkr 9y agoThat’s not how iCloud Keychain works. It’s a transfer method for data encrypted by keys only your circle has. You control who is added not Apple. Read the white paper
- sneak 9y agoIn theory you control who is added to an iMessage too, but Apple’s closed source software is what does the controlling. Enter a government wiretap, and boom.
- willstrafach 9y agoI am not sure why closed-source code would be relevant here. The opaque aspect in this case would be the server handling it, not the device.
- sneak 9y agoiMessage is end to end encrypted.
- tonyztan 9y agoYes, but the key server (operated by Apple) is free to add additional keys to your account that others will use to encrypt messages to you.
- sneak 9y agoYes. In the iCloud Keychain model, the key client (written by Apple, “operated” without review by you) is free to add additional keys to your account that you will use to encrypt messages to you.
- willstrafach 9y agoCorrect. I was addressing the "closed source software" aspect, because some level is trust is required in the server for key distribution regardless of source availability.
- seanmcdirmid 9y agoApple doesn't hold the keys, they've outsourced responsibility to Guizhou on the Cloud Big Data Industrial Development Co., Ltd.
- threeseed 9y agoThat doesn't mean they have transferred the keys. You can manage and operate a data centre without needing the keys to the HSM.
- seanmcdirmid 9y agoThe whole reason they did this in the first place was to not have control over the data, they definitely don’t have the keys. The Chinese police/government contact Guizhou, not Apple, when they want anything.
- culturestate 9y agoThis comes back to my initial question: if data is encrypted by my key before it ever leaves my device, as Apple has repeatedly claimed, why should it matter to me? China can have all the encrypted blobs of my data they want. I have to assume that unencrypted information has always been available to the CCP on request, even more readily than it is to US law enforcement.
- tonyedgecombe 9y agoWe do to an extent: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303