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Yes, this reminds me of the Mozilla IoT gateway from yesterday, which seemed like it pulled exactly that rat-tail of requirements behind it. Something like: -
by xg15 9y ago
Yes, this reminds me of the Mozilla IoT gateway from yesterday, which seemed like it pulled exactly that rat-tail of requirements behind it. Something like:
- We'd like to make an IoT gateway that you can use from a browser.
- To get access to necessary APIs, we have to provide it via HTTPS.
- The get HTTP we need a certificate. Because no one is going to pay for it, we'll use Let's Encrypt.
- To get a Let's Encryt cert, we need a verifyable hostname on the public internet. Ok, let's offer subdomains on mozilla-iot.com.
- To verify that hostname, Let's Encrypt needs to talk to the gateway. Ok, let's provide a tunnel to the gateway.
- Now the gateway is exposed to the internet and could be hacked. So we need to continously update it to close vulnerabilities.
So in the end all your IoT devices are reachable from the internet. But hey, you can use Firefox to turn your lights on!
- throwaway2048 9y agoThe real solution to this would be something like TLS-SRP where you can authenticate both sides of a TLS session with a zero knowledge password proof (devices could ship with a piece of paper containing the generated password, no need for central servers, remote connections to the mothership, gateways, or certificates, or exposing stuff to the internet, or even any internet connectivity at all). In simple terms it allows you to setup a TLS session by both sides proving they know the secret password, without either side exposing it, thus MITM is unable to capture it, it is an alternative to the cert model that works very well for network local devices. But of course Chrome and firefox both have zero interest in supporting this use case despite TLS-SRP kicking around for ages now, they'd much rather have you connect to your own devices via a mediated cloud gateway server, for your own safety of course.
- dcow 9y agoPre-shared keys are only good for bootstrapping a stronger trust relationship. You could use TLS-SRP to exchange identities and then mutually authenticate each other for the general case. X509 is not the problem. Centrally manager trust hierarchies are.
- collinmanderson 9y agoI’d rather see an ssh-style ask once and then trust forever after that.
- dcow 9y agoThat's what you use the pre-shared secret to establish: longer lived identities.
- kernelPan1c 9y agoIsn't this just key pinning? I'd like to see a P2P system. This way governments can't force CA's to allow MITM.
- phicoh 9y agoThough there are a couple of technical options to make this work, the thing I realised many years ago is that if you want to use internet technology you need to be connected to the internet. Anything else is just an endless headache. If you are sure that you don't want your IoT devices to be reachable from the internet, don't use the internet protocol to talk to them, don't use DNS, web browsers, etc. Just create a new local protocol (or switch back to IPX)
- dcow 9y agoIt really feels like you're throwing in the towel. The internet is designed specifically to allow federation between forests of hosts. That's what routers do. Browser vendors need to get their heads out of the fucking cloud and stop coercing people into relying solely on global TLS. I think TLS is wildly misunderstood. The whole global certificate thing only works for global communication. Global hosts should be your first point of contact and from there you should be able to leverage global TLS to bootstrap more intimate trust relationships... to make informed decisions about the trust relationships you want to establish. Browsers need to facilitate this not do everything possible to prevent you from owning your trust. If your browser is only able to communicate globally that's not the internet's fault. It's not TLSs fault (TLS is designed to allow clients to choose who they trust). That a failure of your browser to support your diverse use case.
- collinmanderson 9y ago> Global hosts should be your first point of contact and from there you should be able to leverage global TLS to bootstrap more intimate trust relationships... to make informed decisions about the trust relationships you want to establish. Explain more how this would work.
- dcow 9y agoPart of setting up an account with a web service or iot device provider or whatever should be acquiring their certificate authority. However, instead of having a single bucket OS level root trust store, browsers empower users to whitelist the sites they trust that authority to well have authority over. You trust googles ca for google.com. Or maybe you don't. At the application level, trust should be managed by the application provider and the user. Their certificate authority can issue whatever certificates it wants for whatever kind of network topology or application use cases or whatever else they need to support. As a user you're either still using a browser or you've at this point switched to their native app or you've got their JS helpers loaded or whatever. Their application logic can manage all the certificate crap so that users are minimally encumbered by it. If you're talking to local network devices their application logic would issue certificates for whatever scope of IPv6 addresses you're using. Maybe your fancy device is running dns, their thing issues certs for your scope's site, etc. You can even do mutual TLS now because their authority can issue installs of their app their own certificates. Browsers should support client certs too. Navigating to foo.com using a scoped IPv6 address? You're prompted to select the identity you wish to use. Your browser remembers your choice for that scope. The CA is only valid for your blessed names, scope aware.
- jameshclark 9y agoI didn't see that post, but if you control the DNS for a domain you can use the DNS challenge with Let's Encrypt.
- rb808 9y agoMost people dont control a domain.
- gsich 9y agoThen you usually don't need a certificate from a CA. Just selfsign.
- fps 9y agoThis seems like it's going in circles, but, if you selfsign modern browsers display a big scary warning. If you're making a device or software meant to live behind a firewall and to be accessed from a browser, users will either have to install your CA in their browsers, or deal with the big scary warning. Both of which are bad.
- gsich 9y agoIf you don't have a domain, chances are that you don't provide service to normal users. Or to users at all besides yourself.
- pessimizer 9y ago> chances are that you don't provide service to normal users. Or to users at all besides yourself. I think that's the point. Creating friction that scares normie users when people are using web UIs on local networks puts non-cloud based products at a disadvantage against the centralized giants.
- Ajedi32 9y agoMozilla does though. So if their plan is to "offer subdomains on mozilla-iot.com" then they just need to set it up so that their infrastructure will fulfill the DNS challenge for the user's device when it requests a new cert.