3 ms·
> Your service should instead store a cryptographically strong hash of the password that cannot be reversed — created with, for example, PBKDF2, SHA3, Scrypt, o
by JoshTriplett 9y ago
> Your service should instead store a cryptographically strong hash of the password that cannot be reversed — created with, for example, PBKDF2, SHA3, Scrypt, or Bcrypt.
One of these things is not like the others, one of these things just doesn't belong
Don't use SHA3 or any other fast hash for passwords. Use a password hash designed to stymie brute-forcing, like PBKDF2, scrypt, or bcrypt.
- iraklism 9y agoMillion guesses per second vs thousands. Really interesting how SHA3 made its way to this blog post.
- whatevaa 9y agoStill better than no hashing. Still a tough nut to crack if it's hashed plus salted with unique salt.
- oldcynic 9y agoUgh. It's supposed to be Best Practices, rather than better than nothing, and is ostensibly from Google. So should be limiting to the appropriate choices: bcrypt, scrypt, PBKDF2 or Argon2.
- user5994461 9y agoNot everyone can used the last hype algorithm, whether because of library support, regulations or technical constraints.
- mediumdeviation 9y agobcrypt is old enough to vote this year
- cyberfart 9y agostill can't drink in US though
- isostatic 9y agoSomething they acknowledge later with SMS being a bad idea, but may be the best option for a specific workflow.
- jabl 9y agoglibc crypt() uses sha512, IIRC (the thing that encrypts passwords in /etc/shadow). Iterated a number of times to make it suitably expensive. So perhaps not as good has the bespoke password hashing functions, but not a disaster waiting to happen either.
- JoshTriplett 9y agoSalting and iterating would make it more reasonable, but the article (a "best practices" document) didn't say to do that, or why.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]