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Post-mortem of this weekend's NPM incident
- josephorjoe 9y agoSo, a spammer uploaded something containing copied data from a legitimate user and npm deleted everything from that user. Oy. Seems like npm might want to review the policy that allows stuff like that to happen. Even if a user violates the spam policy (which, to be clear, it seems the affected user in this case did NOT do), that hardly seems to be appropriate grounds for deleting everything the user has ever published on npm. That is a policy that is just begging for griefing.
- detaro 9y ago> Seems like npm might want to review the policy that allows stuff like that to happen. That's one of the things the post mentions as what they are doing.
- DanBC 9y agoAre "joe jobs" still a thing? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_job https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_job > A joe job is a spamming technique that sends out unsolicited e-mails using spoofed sender data. Early joe jobs aimed at tarnishing the reputation of the apparent sender or inducing the recipients to take action against them [...]
- daurnimator 9y agoYep. I had one against me mid last year.
- cwmma 9y agoIt wasn't a policy it was a spam heuristic
- josephorjoe 9y agoI meant the policy which allowed this to happen: `In the course of reviewing and acting on spam reports, an npm staffer acted on this flag without further investigating the user and removed the user and all of their packages from the registry.` Specifically, a policy that allows removing "all of [a user's] packages" based on something related to the user rather than on the packages themselves. Feels like there should be a disconnect between decisions made about a 'user' and those made about a 'package'. Once the package is published, there should be an understanding that the package belongs to npm and npm's users, even if the original publisher retains some authority over it. And if there is cause to ban a user, it should not automatically mean that packages published by the user are affected (aside from removing whatever authority the user had).
- bhuga 9y agoThis is a good post-mortem with clear, policy-based remediations. Nicely done. I wonder why they are only preventing republishing for 24 hours. Is there a good reason to allow a package namespace to be recycled with less than, say, a week? Is it based on the assumption that the only case where it comes up is during an incident, and 24 hours is enough time to assume an incident will be resolved? I'm curious what went in to that number.
- smt88 9y agoWhy allow namespace recycling at all? The potential harm is high and the potential benefit is some slight convenience. If npm packages used a Github-style "author/package" format, name collision would never be an issue again.
- JonathonW 9y agoI'd like to see a package registry with (1) Github-style author-namespaced packages, and (2) package signing (i.e. if an author starts signing packages with a different key, I'd like to know about it). Maybe integrate the latter with Keybase to help users decide if they should trust a key. I don't know how you gain any kind of critical mass trying to compete against a well-established registry like npmjs, though.
- colanderman 9y agoPackage signing by the author helps, but not if (a) the author's key is compromised, or (b) the author acts in bad faith. With npm-style package registries, the risk of such an event increases with the number of dependencies your project has. Better to (a) ship your code with explicit version and content dependencies (e.g. a SHA-256 of the package you expect to exist), or (b) delegate trust in upstream packages to fewer, more well-vetted, authorities (i.e. distro-style).
- hyperpape 9y ago(1) has the consequence that names are associated with the original creator long after they may no longer be involved. Package signing I can't tell if it's a good idea or not. It would require you to accept a new key in this case, but that is going to happen super frequently with NPM, inducing alert fatigue, and it doesn't do anything to prevent the authors' publishing credentials getting stolen.
- kodablah 9y ago> At the time of Saturday’s incident, however, we did not have a policy to publish placeholders for packages that were deleted if they were spam. I see this acknowledgement, but I cannot find where they will remedy this by putting placeholders in place of spam removals. As a concession, maybe only placeholders for spam removals of packages that are older than X days or depended on (explicitly or transitively) by X packages. Did I miss where the remedy for this spam-removed-package-reuse was in the blog post?
- avianlyric 9y agoThey have added a 24hour re-publishing cooldown for all package removals regardless of reason. Exceptions are made for the original publisher and npm staff. Explained somewhere near the bottom of the post, basic rational is that it gives them time to notice fuckups and fix them.
- kodablah 9y agoThis does not alleviate the issue where you can reuse package names. I suppose they believe what they mark as spam packages won't be used enough or is already bad enough that reusing the name is harmless. And they probably also believe that they can catch fuckups in a day. I don't think either are necessarily true and are only true in this case because it hit popular dep trees. But what happens when something is erroneously marked as spam that's not as popular and the downstream dependents don't realize in 24 hours? If the problem is that "placeholders" are too heavy, then they could be made lighter weight or put some rules around when they will add them and when they won't.
- testplzignore 9y agoMy guess is that the cost of the placeholders is indeed what is driving their decision, though perhaps it is a premature optimization. Maybe they've had situations where a spammer has created a very large number (millions, billions?) of packages. It's possible that the majority of user submissions are automated spam from botnets. I would assume npm has some mitigations in place to prevent this abuse in the first place, such as rate limiting and captchas, though maybe that's not enough to stem the tide. Though, given that they say they have humans doing the package deletion, that makes me think that the number of spam packages created can't be that high. Certainly not high enough to outweigh the risks of package name reuse. Increase your prices a few pennies a month so you can afford to store the placeholders forever.
- cremp 9y ago> we have policies against ever running SQL by hand against production databases—but in this case we were forced to do so Uh... Add in the fact that staff are now trigger happy, since a single button can do a lot of damage.
- carsonreinke 9y agoI feel like a project that could help with this to identify package importance by the dependents and downloads.
- carsonreinke 9y agoI think I might actually try this out.
- dumbmatter 9y agoOur first action, which began immediately after the incident concluded, was to implement a 24-hour cooldown on republication of any deleted package name. Why not infinity hours? I don't get it.
- Vinnl 9y agoIf it's a spam package that gets deleted, that would mean you'd quickly run out of available names.
- h1d 9y agoWhy can't they just reuse when it is apparent the case is harmful (as in, people complain and check number of downloads and dependent packages) by blocking the name and disallow reuse for any other cases?
- Vinnl 9y agoHmm, I'm not sure if I can follow your question, but I'm guessing that they're already planning to do what you want?
- kylemuir 9y ago> Our first action, which began immediately after the incident concluded, was to implement a 24-hour cooldown on republication of any deleted package name I don't understand this. Why hard delete packages at all? Soft deleting feels like it would be easier and would stop people republishing with the same name. They could also bake their warning process for dependent libraries (i.e. "this package is gone!") into the soft delete process.