4 ms·
See the Twitter thread here: https://twitter.com/nicoleperlroth/status/948678006859591682 https://twitter.com/nicoleperlroth/status/948678006859591682 (Edit: t
by MBCook 9y ago
See the Twitter thread here: https://twitter.com/nicoleperlroth/status/948678006859591682 https://twitter.com/nicoleperlroth/status/948678006859591682
(Edit: there are 9 posts total, go to her user page to see them all)
Seems there are two issues. One, called Meltdown, only effects Intel and is REALLY bad, but the kernel page table changes everyone is making fixes it.
The other, dubbed Spectre, is apparently common to the way all processors handle speculative execution and is unfixable without new hardware.
I’d like to know more about that but I haven’t seen anything yet.
Whoever discovered this stuff on Google’s team deserves some sort of computer security Nobel prize.
- chainsaw10 9y ago> computer security Nobel prize While they're not as big of a deal AFAIK, we do have the Pwnie Awards: https://pwnies.com/ https://pwnies.com/
- londons_explore 9y agoI can't really see how it would be fixable even with new hardware. Speculative execution is fundamental to getting decent performance out of a CPU. Without it you should probably divide your performance expectations by 5 at least. Rolling back all state rather than just user visible state in the CPU is neigh on impossible. When you evict something from the cache, you delete it. Undeleting is hard. There are also a lot of other non-user-visible bits of state in a CPU.
- ytpete 9y agoCouldn't you do something like have a separate chunk of "speculative cache" which you only commit to the main cache once the speculatively-executed instructions are retired? Sounds complex, sure - but it seems like that would give you the performance benefits of speculative execution while still being able to roll back (or prevent in the first place) any cache-state side effects when branches were mispredicted. Could also imagine processors start segregating cache by privilege level. I guess part of the question you're raising is: are there so many different caches, translation buffers, etc. in a modern CPU that keeping 'uncommitted buffers' for the state of all of them would be just as complex as throwing a whole other core in there?
- spenczar5 9y agoPossibly - but that's an entirely new processor design. That would take years to get released an adopted. The scary thing is that you can't fix this in software.
- contrarian_ 9y agoNo, that would not be enough. CPUs speculatively execute across multiple branches. Even if you had a separate speculative cache for every code path, you could still build a side-channel from the amount of contention. [1] [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/613.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/613.pdf > Both hardware thread systems (SMT and TMT) expose contention within the execution core. In SMT, the threads effectively compete in real time for access to functional units, the L1 cache, and speculation resources (such as the BTB). This is similar to the real-time sharing that occurs between separate cores, but includes all levels of the architecture. [...] SMT has been exploited in known attacks (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1)
- fyi1183 9y agoI agree that we'll probably see new attacks in this area for a long time. That said, the main new ingredient of Spectre seems to be the idea that userspace can poison the branch target buffer to cause speculative execution of arbitrary code in kernel space. That part of the attack should be fairly easy to mitigate with new hardware, by XORing (or hashing) the index into the BTB with a configurable value that depends on the privilege level. So each process has its own "nonce", and they're all different from the kernel's. Then BTB poisoning won't work unless the attacker knows its own and the other context's nonce. Even if further attacks are found that leak this nonce, they could be mitigated by changing the nonce at regular intervals.
- mike_hearn 9y agoIt effectively means wiping the caches, TLBs, BTBs and any other caches and optimisations on any form of context switch, as far as I can see? Which yes will likely require new silicon.
- Cyph0n 9y agoThat's not even close to a thread... You can see all the tweets here (courtesy of @svenluijten): https://twitter.com/i/moments/948681915485351938 https://twitter.com/i/moments/948681915485351938.
- MBCook 9y agoI didn’t find out there were more than 4 posts until after I made my comment (thus the edit). Thanks for the handy link.
- PuffinBlue 9y agoThe linked thread suggests that Spectre doesn't have _any_ mitigation. > The business/economic implications are not clear, since eventually the only way to eradicate the threat posed by Spectre is to swap out hardware. Is this fully accurate, there's no software mitigation available now? From [0], the above may be true: > There is also work to harden software against future exploitation of Spectre, respectively to patch software after exploitation through Spectre . There is 'work'? No current patch? So Spectre is unpatched? This point doesn't seem to be being highlighted but appears particularly important. [0] https://meltdownattack.com/#faq-fix https://meltdownattack.com/#faq-fix
- Cyph0n 9y agoYes, from my understanding, Spectre is an architectural-level flaw in the so-called speculative execution unit. In other words, Spectre will only be fixed once Intel, AMD, and ARM redesign the unit and release new processors. Given the timelines of CPU design, this will take 5-10 years at least. On the positive side, the flaw is very difficult to exploit in a practical setting.
- noncoml 9y ago> On the positive side, the flaw is very difficult to exploit in a practical setting. Is it? "As a proof-of-concept, JavaScript code was written that, when run in the Google Chrome browser, allows JavaScript to read private memory from the process in which it runs"
- thrill 9y agoWe should have an annual vulnerability/amelioration award (the Cerberus?) and give one to those guys.