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If I'm not mistaken, there is no mention in the article that the system was actually connected to the Internet. The Stuxnet attack (which as another commenter

If I'm not mistaken, there is no mention in the article that the system was actually connected to the Internet. The Stuxnet attack (which as another commenter said was the real "watershed" event) managed to infect the target system even if it was air-gapped, by infecting the PC of someone that eventually connected to the private network of the target onsite. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet#Windows_infection https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet#Windows_infection

mcgarnagle 9y ago
Okay, then really the comment should be renamed to why is critical infrastructure allow to be tampered with. Say this infection was brought in via hardware or bluetooth exploitation or wifi exploitation. None of those attack vectors should ever be accessible. No human working there should ever be able to "by accident" infect the system.
- tueo23094 9y ago
  That's nice in theory, but perhaps you have to change the logic of that SIS. Perhaps some parts need to be decommissioned, or added to. A security hot patch is needed or a backup taken. There are thousands of reasons someone may need to connect to a system
- PeterisP 9y ago
  Why do you assume that none of those attack vectors should ever be accessible? It's reasonable to assume that the systems need to exchange data with external systems on a daily basis, possibly on a real-time basis. They most likely need remote monitoring and reporting, they can need data that needs to be periodically inserted from an outside system, they might even need remote real-time control. Any such accessibility is a possible attack vector, and "security at all costs" isn't reasonable - even if the operation is literally priceless, you still need to balance the security risks of malicious attacks versus the increased risks of downtime or faults caused by more difficult/slower monitoring and control due to the security measures you implement; a strict airgap might prevent an attack but be a contributing factor in a non-malicious accident that's just as disastrous.
ams6110 9y ago
The article says "In the incident, hackers used sophisticated malware to take remote control of a workstation running a Schneider Electric Triconex safety shutdown system" "Remote control" certainly implies that it was connected at least indirectly to the internet, though something like a direct dial-up modem or leased line compromise could also be possible.
freeflight 9y ago
Stuxnet propagated itself, on a pretty wide scale, through a BadUsb exploit to bypass the Iranian air-gap.

mcgarnagle 9y ago

Okay, then really the comment should be renamed to why is critical infrastructure allow to be tampered with. Say this infection was brought in via hardware or bluetooth exploitation or wifi exploitation. None of those attack vectors should ever be accessible. No human working there should ever be able to "by accident" infect the system.

tueo23094 9y ago
That's nice in theory, but perhaps you have to change the logic of that SIS. Perhaps some parts need to be decommissioned, or added to. A security hot patch is needed or a backup taken. There are thousands of reasons someone may need to connect to a system
PeterisP 9y ago
Why do you assume that none of those attack vectors should ever be accessible? It's reasonable to assume that the systems need to exchange data with external systems on a daily basis, possibly on a real-time basis. They most likely need remote monitoring and reporting, they can need data that needs to be periodically inserted from an outside system, they might even need remote real-time control. Any such accessibility is a possible attack vector, and "security at all costs" isn't reasonable - even if the operation is literally priceless, you still need to balance the security risks of malicious attacks versus the increased risks of downtime or faults caused by more difficult/slower monitoring and control due to the security measures you implement; a strict airgap might prevent an attack but be a contributing factor in a non-malicious accident that's just as disastrous.

ams6110 9y ago

The article says "In the incident, hackers used sophisticated malware to take remote control of a workstation running a Schneider Electric Triconex safety shutdown system" "Remote control" certainly implies that it was connected at least indirectly to the internet, though something like a direct dial-up modem or leased line compromise could also be possible.

freeflight 9y ago

Stuxnet propagated itself, on a pretty wide scale, through a BadUsb exploit to bypass the Iranian air-gap.