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Sure, I meant we cannot impart the property of transparency to a gold bar by "programming" it. Programming isnt a magical spell that can rewrite the causal inte

Sure, I meant we cannot impart the property of transparency to a gold bar by "programming" it. Programming isnt a magical spell that can rewrite the causal interactions that take place in the universe. > and you'll find a whole lot of things that most people wouldn't call "conscious" I disagree. I cannot think of anything with a nervous system engaging in the particular neurochemical reaction I'm talking about not being conscious. No example comes to mind? I dont mean any old reaction. As, the digestion of wheat. I mean the specific kind that define neurological systems. > why do the details of the biochemical activity matter beyond being a particular physical realization of some differential equations Because the "details" we're talking about are the causal effects. > precisely emulates the behavior of that biochemical activity For the same reason you cannot programme a gold bar into transparency. Or program a table into an elephant. Or to put it another way, a program which "precisely emulates the behavior of gold" doesnt turn machine into gold. A program which "precisely emulates the behavior of digestion" does not digest pizza. A program which "precisely emulates the behavior of" consciousness isnt conscious. By "emulation" you mean, "imitation in form". Since it is only the FORMS the program and the nervous system share (or, gold, whatever). Ie., that they can be both described to an extreme level of abstraction in the same way. But the universe isnt abstract. It isnt a form. A program simulating a gold bar may be an instance of some equation that a gold bar is -- but possesses none of the properties that make it gold. A machine which imitates some highly abstract equational description of thought is as close to thinking as a bird is to an aeroplane. The bird's heart will burn as much jet fuel as your machine will think. The universe isnt taking place in the abstract, it's taking place in the concrete. You have no soul. Your mind is not a program. You consciousness is not ideal. It isnt a number. A pattern, a structure, an equation. These are descriptions. Your mind is something your body is doing -- as so it is for every known thing that has a mind. To speak as if the mind could be abstracted enough to a description that may be realized in silicon is to believe in an almost magical power of electric.

yorwba 9y ago
>> and you'll find a whole lot of things that most people wouldn't call "conscious" > I disagree. I cannot think of anything with a nervous system engaging in the particular neurochemical reaction I'm talking about not being conscious. No example comes to mind? Is a jellyfish conscious? Does it have the particular neurochemical reaction you are talking about? > A machine which imitates some highly abstract equational description of thought is as close to thinking as a bird is to an aeroplane. The bird's heart will burn as much jet fuel as your machine will think. This is actually a good analogy for our disagreement. Your definition of "thought" seems to inherently depend on the implementing substrate; and if it doesn't burn jet fuel, a bird doesn't really "fly". But for me the substrate is irrelevant; I don't care whether a machine "really thinks", so long as it can solve any problem which I might have to "think" about otherwise.
- mjburgess 9y ago
  > I don't care whether a machine "really thinks", so long as it can solve any problem which I might have to "think" about otherwise. OK, well then your calculator satisfies your definition of "thinking". I'm concerned to know whether a machine is doing what my dog is or I am. And mostly when people become hysterical or tedtalky (which is the same thing most of the time) about AI they are presenting an "I, Robot" future where androids dream of electric sheep. > and if it doesn't burn jet fuel, a bird doesn't really "fly" When I think, "I'd like my pen" and subsequently my arm moves to get my pen, my thinking is causally connected to my arm moving. My arm moving is some chemical my muscles do, in order to be connected at all with my thinking, my thinking has to be something broadly chemical too. The plane doesn't move air out of the way because its flying. It does that because its burning fuel (etc.). "Flying" as a description of what the bird and the aeroplane are both doing isnt actually any physical process at all. Is a pattern they both very abstractly follow that we have invented. In this sense nothing in the universe actually flies: the bird does its thing, the aeroplane does its thing --- and from our point of view, they are both abstractly similar. IT's our pov which makes them similar though. The airplane isnt distressed to burn too much. The bird is.
Dylan16807 9y ago
> Or to put it another way, a program which "precisely emulates the behavior of gold" doesnt turn machine into gold. > A program which "precisely emulates the behavior of digestion" does not digest pizza. > A program which "precisely emulates the behavior of" consciousness isnt conscious. If my goal is probing the behavior of gold, I don't care if it's real or emulated. If my goal is having a list of chemicals pizza turns into, I don't care if the digestion is real or emulated. If my goal is having a conversation, I don't care if they're a p-zombie. Tell me if I'm missing anything here: Either a computer can perfectly imitate a neuron's behavior, or it can't. If it can, then a giant computer should be able to make either a conscious being or a P-zombie. (Do you make a distinction there? If you do, can you justify it?) If you say it can't, then I accuse you of magical thinking. There is no evidence of physical interactions that cannot be emulated. > To speak as if the mind could be abstracted enough to a description that may be realized in silicon is to believe in an almost magical power of electric. Here's the thing. The idea of emulating a person does not depend on abstracting the mind. The 'proof of concept' is just building a computer so big that you emulate an entire nervous system, fully intact, every single atom.
- mjburgess 9y ago
  A simulation of digestion, does not digest pizza. > Either a computer can perfectly imitate digestion, or it can't. Yeah, it cant. What you seem to think is that "imitation in form" means being the same as. A photograph of me is imitation in the form of me, it isnt me. It doenst have a pulse. The universe is not an idealised abstract world of Forms, and so anything with the same abstract pattern is equivalent. Abstract patterns exist only form our point of view. They are our way of describing things. To say a computer imitates anything is only to say that when we look at it, we can use it to inform ourselves. Simulating digestion is a means of learning about digestion because we design it to correlate across systems. Without a point-of-view to impose correspondence, the two systems are a like in no respect. "Being a simulation of" is like Beauty. Its not a process in the universe, its not a property of objects. A piece of silicon with an oscillating electric field across it remains the same regardless of whether it is running the "digestion simulation" or the "consciousness simulation". It is only a matter of electrical frequencies and amplitudes. This acquires meaning to us when we look at them. In the case of digestion one 01010 pattern means "too acidic", in the case of a lifelike chat bot "01010" means "hi!". The cinema screen is not a train. It's a movie. Its just light hitting a canvas. It wont hurt you. 01010 isnt acid. It isnt thought. It's just a voltage fluctuation, it cant talk to you.

yorwba 9y ago

>> and you'll find a whole lot of things that most people wouldn't call "conscious" > I disagree. I cannot think of anything with a nervous system engaging in the particular neurochemical reaction I'm talking about not being conscious. No example comes to mind? Is a jellyfish conscious? Does it have the particular neurochemical reaction you are talking about? > A machine which imitates some highly abstract equational description of thought is as close to thinking as a bird is to an aeroplane. The bird's heart will burn as much jet fuel as your machine will think. This is actually a good analogy for our disagreement. Your definition of "thought" seems to inherently depend on the implementing substrate; and if it doesn't burn jet fuel, a bird doesn't really "fly". But for me the substrate is irrelevant; I don't care whether a machine "really thinks", so long as it can solve any problem which I might have to "think" about otherwise.

mjburgess 9y ago
> I don't care whether a machine "really thinks", so long as it can solve any problem which I might have to "think" about otherwise. OK, well then your calculator satisfies your definition of "thinking". I'm concerned to know whether a machine is doing what my dog is or I am. And mostly when people become hysterical or tedtalky (which is the same thing most of the time) about AI they are presenting an "I, Robot" future where androids dream of electric sheep. > and if it doesn't burn jet fuel, a bird doesn't really "fly" When I think, "I'd like my pen" and subsequently my arm moves to get my pen, my thinking is causally connected to my arm moving. My arm moving is some chemical my muscles do, in order to be connected at all with my thinking, my thinking has to be something broadly chemical too. The plane doesn't move air out of the way because its flying. It does that because its burning fuel (etc.). "Flying" as a description of what the bird and the aeroplane are both doing isnt actually any physical process at all. Is a pattern they both very abstractly follow that we have invented. In this sense nothing in the universe actually flies: the bird does its thing, the aeroplane does its thing --- and from our point of view, they are both abstractly similar. IT's our pov which makes them similar though. The airplane isnt distressed to burn too much. The bird is.

Dylan16807 9y ago

> Or to put it another way, a program which "precisely emulates the behavior of gold" doesnt turn machine into gold. > A program which "precisely emulates the behavior of digestion" does not digest pizza. > A program which "precisely emulates the behavior of" consciousness isnt conscious. If my goal is probing the behavior of gold, I don't care if it's real or emulated. If my goal is having a list of chemicals pizza turns into, I don't care if the digestion is real or emulated. If my goal is having a conversation, I don't care if they're a p-zombie. Tell me if I'm missing anything here: Either a computer can perfectly imitate a neuron's behavior, or it can't. If it can, then a giant computer should be able to make either a conscious being or a P-zombie. (Do you make a distinction there? If you do, can you justify it?) If you say it can't, then I accuse you of magical thinking. There is no evidence of physical interactions that cannot be emulated. > To speak as if the mind could be abstracted enough to a description that may be realized in silicon is to believe in an almost magical power of electric. Here's the thing. The idea of emulating a person does not depend on abstracting the mind. The 'proof of concept' is just building a computer so big that you emulate an entire nervous system, fully intact, every single atom.

mjburgess 9y ago
A simulation of digestion, does not digest pizza. > Either a computer can perfectly imitate digestion, or it can't. Yeah, it cant. What you seem to think is that "imitation in form" means being the same as. A photograph of me is imitation in the form of me, it isnt me. It doenst have a pulse. The universe is not an idealised abstract world of Forms, and so anything with the same abstract pattern is equivalent. Abstract patterns exist only form our point of view. They are our way of describing things. To say a computer imitates anything is only to say that when we look at it, we can use it to inform ourselves. Simulating digestion is a means of learning about digestion because we design it to correlate across systems. Without a point-of-view to impose correspondence, the two systems are a like in no respect. "Being a simulation of" is like Beauty. Its not a process in the universe, its not a property of objects. A piece of silicon with an oscillating electric field across it remains the same regardless of whether it is running the "digestion simulation" or the "consciousness simulation". It is only a matter of electrical frequencies and amplitudes. This acquires meaning to us when we look at them. In the case of digestion one 01010 pattern means "too acidic", in the case of a lifelike chat bot "01010" means "hi!". The cinema screen is not a train. It's a movie. Its just light hitting a canvas. It wont hurt you. 01010 isnt acid. It isnt thought. It's just a voltage fluctuation, it cant talk to you.