7 ms·
That sounds very un-clever (edit: I mean by Microsoft). Why couldn't malware do the exact same thing?
by TylerE 9y ago
That sounds very un-clever (edit: I mean by Microsoft). Why couldn't malware do the exact same thing?
- slededit 9y agoPresumably you need to grant the installer admin privileges for it to work
- weddpros 9y agoJust imagine what the developer thought when his boss said "we don't want to buy an actual certificate, find something that works". And now this developer is learning on HN he should remove that line in his resumé. Or maybe he thought it was a clever idea... Let's call it a learning experience.
- voltagex_ 9y agoIt's a driver associated with some open source Android stuff. Driver signing certificate are $100+/year.
- varenc 9y agoThis seems a better and more secure solution than buying an actual certificate. If they had a single certificate and used that across devices then the private key could be compromised and used to authenticate malware or pull off a man in the middle attack on an HTTPS site since your system now trusts this new CA. By generating the private key locally and throwing it away, you can be relatively confident that no one has the private key to this new root CA. What's silly in the first place is that something not trusted to install unsigned drivers still has the perms to install a new root CA but given that constraint, this is a better solution than what Savitech did.
- ChristianBundy 9y ago> If they had an actual root CA with a private key, that private key could be compromised and used to authenticate malware or pull of a man in the middle attack on an HTTPS site. If they had an actual root CA with a private key, they'd sign it locally (on the company machine). In no scenario would the company's private key be given to a customer (unless we're talking about Adobe).
- varenc 9y agoYes, that's the ideal case... But what do you want to do more? 1) Trust some company to keep a very important private key secure for a long time? (with attackers knowing it's a single high-value target) 2) Or be confident that the private key was used once and destroyed forever? Even if the private key generated on your device could be recovered it would only be good for an attack against you making it a lower priority to attackers.
- dec0dedab0de 9y agoOr be confident that the private key was used once and destroyed forever? Even if the private key generated on your device could be recovered it would only be good for an attack against you making it a lower priority to attackers. Doing it that way completely undermines the reason for having a cert in the first place. You might as well not have one at all.
- usrusr 9y agoThe difference is that with the on the fly cert, you blindly trust one piece of code, at one point in time, and when it did not lie to you then you will be safe from it later. A conventional cert owner on the other hand could theoretically turn on you any time (e.g. when ownership multiplies into pwnership) once "automatic trust" for the next binary is established. I'd still prefer the latter, given reasonable standards in terms of key handling, but the one-time trust is not completely without merit. It would certainly be more reasonable though to just allow one-time blind trust without forcing the installer to create a certificate that may or may not be as private as advertised.
- ComodoHacker 9y agoThere's a difference. With auto-generated root certs you can't just steal one private key, sign your malware with it and push it to all users of the original software.
- weddpros 9y agoI wouldn't trust anything closed source to forget that private key. I can't see how buying an actual cert could be more risky than installing a new root CA. The goal of signing is to ensure origin and anti-tampering: two fails in this case. So now you may have a tampered with driver that doesn't remove the private key and uses the new CA to inspect your TLS traffic, and you wouldn't know.
- AstralStorm 9y agoCan you trust random procedures of company xyz to secure their private key store? I don't. Not even Microsoft themselves. There were embarrassing slips.
- lultimouomo 9y agoI don't think this was done to skim in money, but to let you install a driver that binds only with your mobile USB ID. Alternatively they would need to ship hundreds of different drivers or a single driver that binds to hundreds of different device IDS. Not nice.
- tialaramex 9y agoIt absolutely could. The alternative is that Microsoft has complete control over what software can run on any Windows PC. It turns out that people who want this ("Man. I wish I could only run programs chosen by the monopoly supplier") already have an iPad so this basically just creates a backlash. I know what you're thinking "Oh, well there could be an exception for when you need it, you'd just use admin to authorize it or something" and that's exactly what this is.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- fencepost 9y ago> The alternative is that Microsoft has complete control over what software can run on any Windows PC. That would be the relatively little known (and new) Windows 10 S, where only apps from the Windows Store can be installed or run. Designed for security (?) and to compete with Chromebooks. See also Windows RT
- m-p-3 9y agoI can see some scenarios where this would be desirable. Like my grandparents, who basically just wants to browse Facebook, etc. Since they have a Chromebox, I do not have any calls regarding viruses or their computer being slow, etc.
- Spivak 9y agoBut the desirability is proportional to the level of moderation of the store and Microsoft's is complete shit: it's full of not-quite-malware and not-quite-scams.
- ubernostrum 9y agoIt turns out that people who want this ("Man. I wish I could only run programs chosen by the monopoly supplier") Or people don't know/care. Or weighed the comparative downsides of a controlled app platform versus the wild west, and decided the controlled platform is less of a downside for what they want to do. Or lots of options, really.
- toyg 9y agoDriver signing is not really about malware, but rather about Microsoft trying to enforce a bit of quality control on the shit-show that was driver development by noname hardware manufacturers. If a driver is signed I can look up the owner and bash him for his crap quality code. Similarly, any manufacturer caught doing this sort of trick would be blacklisted.
- zeusk 9y agoBecause: a) Adding a root CA to the cert store requires UAC elevation prompt. b) The certificates are more useful in verifying if a given driver was issued by the manufacturer it says it was issued from.
- TylerE 9y agoRebuttal: Users just blindly click ok so UAC doesn't actually do anything useful.
- iancarroll 9y agoA better rebuttal is that UAC is not a security boundary and bypassing it is trivial.
- dingo_bat 9y agoHas that been done? I have been thinking it's pretty secure!
- iancarroll 9y agoYes. UAC was not really designed as a security boundary in the first place. Here are some public exploits for it: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
- Dylan16807 9y agoIt's pretty bad. Even if you put it on max, disabling automatic elevation, there are still flaws that microsoft doens't bother to fix.
- zeusk 9y agoWell, the same is true of any osx pre high sierra. A malware can disguise as installer utility and it can make modifications to system or install kexts after user okays it (keychain saves the password). Linux makes you type in the password manually every time for elevation but that will just make the average consumer remove or use unsafe passwords for their accounts.