20 ms·
Someone Created a Tor Hidden Service to Phish My Tor Hidden Service
- XR0CSWV3h3kZWg 9y ago0.002 BTC seems generous these days! Interesting post, I wonder how common this is.
- krisives 9y agoVery common look up rancid tomato proxy
- jstanley 9y agoGoogle: No results found for "rancid tomato proxy". DuckDuckGo: this HN thread is the only result. Did you get the name slightly wrong?
- tyingq 9y agoTry: rotten onions cloner
- XR0CSWV3h3kZWg 9y agoIf that doesn't work try: Putrid walnut skimmer
- finnn 9y agoI wonder what the requests look like coming through the proxy. Is there a distinct user agent? or some other header send with the request
- jstanley 9y agoIt passes through the client User-Agent unchanged. I've not yet looked at anything else although I doubt it will do anything but pass through the client headers. It might be interesting to send confusing or contradictory request headers and see how it reacts.
- finnn 9y agoyeah, i'd definitely try sending it all sorts of weird things. Can you setup a path that will respond with a ton of data? Maybe a bunch of things that it will try to parse? etc
- jstanley 9y ago"GET /headers" will dump the request headers, but note this has gone through one layer of munging by nginx and another by Mojolicious, so don't draw any conclusions about what you see in the response without bearing that in mind! I'd be interested to hear if you spot anything surprising. EDIT: And in case you haven't seen it, "torsocks" is a tool that lets any (?) other program speak Tor, e.g. it works with both curl and nc.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- finnn 9y agoCool! Looks like the Accept-Encoding header is being set to "gzip, deflate, sdch" regardless of what i send.
- larkeith 9y agoExcellent writeup, and a good example of what types of attacks to expect as we move forward towards a more decentralized web.
- ewams 9y agoWe are moving towards a more centralized web, not decentralized. The technology industry, and the Internet, is consolidating. Look at the news for all the companies being purchased by facebook, google, microsoft, amazon, apple, hpe and cisco. Also look at ISPs, Timewarner and spectrum, verizon, att, etc all are consolidating. It will continue to become harder to hide, or be anonymous, as we make this path because not only will data be held by just a few players, but so will the transmission lines only be held by a few.
- jstanley 9y agoThe more the "mainstream" web becomes centralised, the more technical people are being pushed towards working on tools for decentralisation and anonymity. It's happening, just not in the places that most people tend to look.
- cookiecaper 9y agoIt's not happening in a meaningful way. The technology for a decentralized web is already here -- it's just the normal web. Our artificial legal barriers are what keep it centralized, and those will be an issue regardless of technical innovation. Legalize scraping and fix copyright law so that users can truly assert ownership over the content they generate, and this will quickly become a non-issue. P2P technology is cool and it has its uses; I'm even developing a decentralized distribution thing as a side project. But it is more work, which means in the typical web browsing use case, it is slower and less convenient than a conventional 1:1 conversation with a stable endpoint. Suggesting that everyone introduce four hops of latency or that we all participate in a multi-billion device DHT (which all just translate to "much slower" to the typical user) is just not a practical solution to these problems. The good and correct solution is to look to the root cause and fix it. That root cause is the incentive structure, including legal and financial arrangements, that heavily encourages the "AOLizaiton" of the web and allows the AOLizers to use the courts to clobber the hackers that try to re-liberate it.
- PhisherPrice 9y agoHit it offline with a denial of service attack.
- zethraeus 9y agoWelcome to the dark web. It's terrible here.
- jstanley 9y agoNote that since the phishing site proxies requests to the legit site, this also has a high risk of knocking the legit site offline.
- PhisherPrice 9y agoMaybe with a layer 7 attack, but not with a layer 3 attack. The author also described the difference between the proxy request and a legit request, so he can just block the proxy requests. Try using slowhttptest. You don't even need a botnet.
- sp332 9y agoI think the article described a different response, but not a different request? Anyway they mentioned that some requests were cached, so you could request a cached object to avoid hitting the original host, if you wanted a level-7 attack.
- driverdan 9y agoThe seemingly easy way to DoS it would be to hit pages with Bitcoin addresses. You could even setup a hidden static page with hundreds or thousands of addresses and call it through that proxy. No load on the legit server but heavy load on the rogue proxy.
- bflesch 9y agoI'm not a tor expert, but could this be solved by using something like namecoin for DNS within tor? So there would be a "proper" domain system for the .onion routes? The whole confusion comes from the fact that tor domains have this random string added to the name you actually want to take, right?
- koolba 9y agoThe string isn’t random. It’s a public key with the private key of the service able to decrypt content sent to it. Anyone can generate a key with a vanity prefix, it just takes computing power and the longer the match, the greater the computing power involved.
- flashmob 9y agoFacebook's hidden service address is particularly impressive: https://facebookcorewwwi.onion/ https://facebookcorewwwi.onion/ It seems like everything except the 'i' is a prefix, a lot of computing must have went in to generating it. One tool to do it is called 'Shallot' https://github.com/katmagic/Shallot https://github.com/katmagic/Shallot The readme includes a table of estimated computing time required. A 15 char prefix like Facebook's is not even on the table, and a 14 char prefix is estimated to take 2.6 million years. There is also a GPU version which should be an order of magnitude faster: https://github.com/lachesis/scallion/blob/gpg/README.md https://github.com/lachesis/scallion/blob/gpg/README.md Also, technically. the onion addresses not public keys, but derived from a public key. It's actually a hash of the public key. It appears that the hashing algorithm used is SHA1. Source: The last few lines of the easygen function https://github.com/katmagic/Shallot/blob/master/src/math.c https://github.com/katmagic/Shallot/blob/master/src/math.c
- the_stc 9y agoFacebook said they just looked for Facebook and got very lucky. corewww does not have a lot of meaning. We tried the same thing for PinkApp and got all sorts of much-longer matches that we could retcon into meaning something.
- 9y ago
- pbhjpbhj 9y agoIf you can get js to execute on the server, can't you get info that disambiguates the server? Is the a way to make the server run a bitcoin miner, for fun really ...?
- jstanley 9y agoThe JavaScript I talked about ran in browsers when accessed via the phishing site, it didn't run on the server.
- ageisp0lis 9y agoIsn't this connected to crimewave's "Rotten Onions"? The author doesn't seem to make the connection: https://twitter.com/campuscodi/status/917231902033104896 https://twitter.com/campuscodi/status/917231902033104896
- jstanley 9y agoThanks, I hadn't come across this. It could very well be the same thing. I didn't notice any XMR mining though, FWIW.
- firloop 9y agocrimewave claims to donate 25% of their stolen coins to charity: https://www.reddit.com/r/onions/comments/4c9xlp/robbin_the_hood_25_of_the_money_i_steal_from/?st=j8qlmbd0&sh=ab728ca4 https://www.reddit.com/r/onions/comments/4c9xlp/robbin_the_h...
- nrki 9y agoInterestingly, the smsprivacy guy sent a payment to a faked bitcoin address, and that address has since paid an address associated with the Human Rights Foundation: https://blockchain.info/address/1GM6Awv28kSfzak2Y7Pj1NRdWiXshMwdGW https://blockchain.info/address/1GM6Awv28kSfzak2Y7Pj1NRdWiXs...
- jstanley 9y agoThis is a fake human rights foundation.
- Mizza 9y agoThe guy who runs the phishing servers, "crimewave", (everything is automated, all hidden services have these BTC phisher clones) actually posts on r/onions sometimes. I had a good discussions about possible counter-measures with him.
- devhead 9y agodo tell
- Mizza 9y agoHere's one of the threads from last year: https://www.reddit.com/r/onions/comments/45k2ux/mitm_phishingonion_cloner/czygyem/ https://www.reddit.com/r/onions/comments/45k2ux/mitm_phishin... I appear to be suggesting a) sending BTC addresses as images and b) a 3rd party login visual verification service
- campuscodi 9y agoThe fake site was most likely created by the Rotten Onions crew.
- the_stc 9y agoThis is why we need SSL certs for .onions. DigiCert was doing this, but they told me it is on hold. Maybe when V3 hidden services are out? With an SSL cert, you get a cert for your .onion PLUS your clearnet domain. Then users can access the .onion and see your real enterprise's name. This should be doable even for extrajurisdictional companies like mine. The key is that your clearnet site should be a TCP-level proxy to the hidden service. That way the SSL keys are never on an easily-discoverable system so only IP addresses can be logged, not any contents. Slight plug: Here's the tech design for our system: https://medium.com/@PinkApp/pink-app-trading-latency-for-anonymity-and-other-techniques-815ee21c6da4 https://medium.com/@PinkApp/pink-app-trading-latency-for-ano... (ignore the clickbait title). This should work just fine for .onions too, even with the clearnet entry point. For a DarkNet Market, most small buyers are probably safe visiting over clearnet.
- jerheinze 9y agoSSL certs for .onions exist for years now, here are two examples: https://www.facebookcorewwwi.onion https://www.facebookcorewwwi.onion and https://protonirockerxow.onion https://protonirockerxow.onion Also v3 onion services are available now with Tor 0.3.2.x-alpha.
- the_stc 9y agoBut DigiCert says they are no longer issuing them. Probably because the .onion is an 80-bit truncation of a SHA1 hash so it doesn't meet baseline reqs?
- jerheinze 9y agoAh, so yeah that's probably why they were waiting for v3 onion services which are 56 characters long now (which are available now as mentioned above).
- schoen 9y agoI don't know what DigiCert's motivation was for suspending issuance of .onion certificates, but the CA/Browser Forum had given a special dispensation (by ballot) for issuance of EV certs despite the criticism about cryptographic strength mismatch. This dispensation didn't extend to DV, but it's never been revoked, so DigiCert would still apparently be able to continue its EV issuance if it wanted to! (But it looks like they've even let the facebookcorewwwi.onion certificate expire.) I've recently become an observer at the CA/Browser Forum and plan to bring up the subject of DV certificates for next-generation onion services imminently, just as soon as I'm done with my relaxing vacation!
- tyingq 9y agoNot much you can do other than fight a war of escalation. If you want to give the phisher lots to do, create say 10 versions of your site where the html/css/js are tightly intertwined. Such that html version "a" only works with css/versiona.css and js/versionb.js. Mismatches create a site you can't view, interact with etc. Then, for each version, put your countermeasures in your main js and css files, and tweak your site so that it doesn't work at all without those main js and css files. Add subresource integrity to the each version of the main html that pulls them in. Obfuscate each version of js and css. And vary up the countermeasures per version. Like displaying the bitcoin address with css (selector:after {content: 'abc'}, with an image, dynamically with obfuscated javascript, etc). Round robin which version of the page is served. This will make caching anything hard for the phisher, and the variations of countermeasures might get them to find a softer target. Shitload of work, though, just because some ahole wants to skim money.
- grubles 9y agoJavascript is disabled out of the box in Tor Browser if I remember correctly. At least it should be.
- tyingq 9y agoNope.. https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#TBBJavaScriptEnabled https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#TBBJavaScriptEna...
- meowface 9y agoIf they just reverse proxy the site (and strip or change subresource integrity tags), how would any of this actually help? I don't think there's really a way to prevent someone from creating a phishing version of your website. You can get alerted to it by checking your web server access logs, but beyond that you can probably only take legal measures.
- tyingq 9y agoThe proxy is altering the JavaScript, css, and HTML to get rid of various countermeasures. Maybe one version dynamically pulls in crucial js with subresource integrity, with obfuscated text that isn't as simple to strip out. Another version where the main obfuscated js bombs if the subresource integrity has been stripped from the HTML, etc. The approach I described means they need to solve for X different variations of different types of countermeasures. Think things like obfuscated JS that checks location.host, or the Bitcoin address. And responds in different ways. Buried in the main js. But each variation of the site using slightly different countermeasures, div ids, ways to encode the text of the bitcoin address, etc. Like copy protection. Yes, you can break it. But time and effort are expended. The article already suggests some laziness from the scraper. He only substituted the hostname if it was lower case. The general idea here is lots of countermeasures, and ones that change with every request. Wearing them down. >You can get alerted to it by checking your web server access logs Maybe. Hard on tor, there may be nothing unique about the requests.
- ezoe 9y ago> How can customers protect themselves? > SMS Privacy customers should make sure they're browsing either smsprivacy.org using HTTPS, or, if using Tor, smspriv6fynj23u6.onion is the only legitimate hidden service. Anything else is almost certainly harmful in one way or another. Posting this very important information which must not be modified by the middle man on Non-TLS web site. I really wondered the author's ability to operate the privacy centric SNS on Tor network. Or am I reading the web page through malicious proxy?
- jstanley 9y agoAbsolutely right. It's shameful that I still don't have HTTPS on my blog. I've got no excuse.
- wybiral 9y agoIMO the risk here is that onion link lists and search engines can't be trusted. How else are people getting these bogus onions? There's no authority on these "hidden services" and hiding identity is kinda the point of Tor so phishing is easy. Onion addresses are basically hashes of the public key of the hidden service. Trusting only the first few characters for match (for these "vanity onions") to identify the service is just a bad idea...
- peteretep 9y agoIs this significantly different from the original site being at anonymoussms.com and me registering anonymoussms.io and doing the same thing? I don’t think I buy that this attack isn’t just as possible on the real web.
- nomadiccoder 9y agoI like the simplicity of this website design!
- ris 9y agoSo clearly the random garble in smspriv6fynj23u6.onion isn't recognizable enough for a user to spot a bogus one. And so as long as an adversary is willing to spend the same amount of money mining their bogus key as you are in generating the original, you're never going to win. My suggestion would be to, during the mining process, search the "random" portion of the domain for "recognizable strings" (probably just any dictionary words) and keep mining until a domain is found with a suitable level of "recognizability". This way you get the extra "strength" of having mined for a significantly longer string at only a fraction of the cost whilst an adversary would have to search for a much more specific string to mimic you convincingly. This is somewhat similar to facebook having "corewwwi" following their domain - not words they were specifically looking for I'm sure, but notable and so would be necessary to bruteforce. Consider it to be a bit like having "correcthorsebatterystaple" on the end of your domain (yeah I know it's too long).
- jstanley 9y agoYou could equally say that a user isn't going to be able to spot the difference between "news.ycombinator.com" and "news.ycombinator.io". I think the answer is not to blindly trust convincing-looking strings and to actually ensure that you're browsing the correct site.
- noobermin 9y agoWhenever talking about security, it's all about probability. The probability of a user distinguishing "io" from "com" is higher than then distinguishing "frh2dj3" and "frh2di3".
- jstanley 9y agoBut if you generate a string at random, it's more likely to be "frh2dj3" vs "swnohl6", which is just as easy to spot as "io" vs "com".
- phire 9y agoRegarding the delay when generating addresses: It's probably just doing an RPC call to an actual bitcoin node, which (in my experience) can actually take a few seconds depending on how fast of a computer the node is running on.
- vmp 9y agoMaybe reducing the entropy by almost half for a vanity key/domain name wasn't such a good idea.
- DyslexicAtheist 9y agothanks for disclosing this https://smsprivacy.org/info-leak https://smsprivacy.org/info-leak in such a proactive way. Delloite, Equifax & Co all could learn something from you.