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Government launches login.gov to simplify access to public services
- currydove 9y agojust signed up. Service is a little wonky, but they've introduced 2FA via SMS and Authenticators as well! Thankfully not just SMS. They also make you download/print a private key just in case.
- ocdtrekkie 9y agoThis is kinda cool, but it's also a little concerning. One of the ways our government protects our privacy is specifically by not centralizing information. Just because you pay taxes or have healthcare doesn't mean the police has that info, for example. The efficiency of connecting a large number of governmental agencies to a single account for you is pretty concerning, it puts all the data in one spot that can be extremely tempting to access.
- dkhenry 9y agoIts important to remember that login.gov isn't an account its an Identity Provider. It will allow you to prove to an agency that you are who you say you are, but all the account information will be stored by the agency.
- sharemywin 9y agoyou know what I like about google+ if someone miss uses it I don't really care. I don't use it for anything Important.
- dragonwriter 9y ago> Its important to remember that login.gov isn't an account its an Identity Provider. Doesn't matter, the consequenes are the same. If it is compromised or exploited (internally or externally) the exploiter can access all of your information from, and impersonate you too, all the government systems that rely on it for identity.
- dkhenry 9y agoI don't think that was the concern being expressed by the grandparent. If the concern was the government now has a secret trove of all your information this specific product doesn't change anything on that front as it doesn't store your information it just acts as an identity provider. If the concern is exploiting this one account allow an attacker to get at all your government systems, then yes this is a new treasure trove. I am going to fall on the side of its better to have one secure account then 100 different less secure accounts. I think the industry has found this to be the case and widespread use of Password Managers and Oauth based logins backs me up on that.
- dragonwriter 9y agoI'm not saying that it's not better net, I’m saying that, insofar as there is an internal or external risk of compromise or abuse, a single government identity provider poses the same kind of risk as a single government profile would provide.
- Joeri 9y agoI pity the fool who hacks such a strategic government service. The expression "threw away the key" comes to mind for what might happen to them.
- dragonwriter 9y agoImproper (but not necessarily unsupported from above) internal use is at least as worrisome as hacking, and centralization reduced the size of the necessary conspiracy and the probability of detection and whistleblowing.)
- skybrian 9y agoWill it? Apparently login.gov doesn't even ask for your real name?
- ocdtrekkie 9y agoSure, but other services using it will. And the login.gov account will be a handy new primary key for relating disparate databases across government resources.
- sharemywin 9y agoObviously it's not going to get hacked or anything...I mean once an organization gets so big it's vastly better at keeping it from getting hacked...
- oh_sigh 9y agoI know I'm not supposed to say this, but you obviously either didn't read the article or read it but didn't understand it, and perhaps you would be better off reading it more closely before commenting. The article lays out that this is not centralizing information, but is merely allowing a bunch of different agencies to use it as an identity provider. The same way I can, say, connect to my spotify via my Google+ account, but that doesn't mean that google has all of my spotify playlists.
- ocdtrekkie 9y agoI, uh, skimmed it. But bear in mind, once your data is already handily collated by a common system/identifier, it's one policy change from being able to automatically connect that information and make it available.
- blfr 9y agoYes but anyone who pops your Google+ account can get all your playlists.
- josefresco 9y agoIn the case of Google, you can trust their security over the (usually) much smaller vendor. With this? Not so much.
- grzm 9y ago> I know I'm not supposed to say this, but you obviously either didn't read the article If you're referring to the guidelines, they also show how leaving out sentiments like these doesn't diminish the clarification you're adding: > Please don't insinuate that someone hasn't read an article. "Did you even read the article? It mentions that" can be shortened to "The article mentions that."[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html Chiding someone who is trolling isn't going to accomplish anything (and likely make it worse). If they aren't, they'll (hopefully) appreciate the clarification, no chiding necessary.
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- hartator 9y agoI don't get why you downvoted. One phishing on your healthcare plan and you loose access to your taxes.
- nicodjimenez 9y agoIt's hard to say that our government really protects our privacy by scattering copies of our information across a constellation of bureaucracies. And protect from who? Who's really more dangerous than our government itself? login.gov is obviously a good idea. Can you imagine how awful government website's internal authentication software must be? This is like Auth0 for government agencies. It will probably be 10x worse than Auth0 but 10x better than the atrocities probably being committed right now.
- jasonjayr 9y agologin.gov is using "Let's Encrypt", which is kinda awesome :) Should they have used an EV certificate?
- mholt 9y agoNah. DV gives you the same cryptographic guarantees, but with the benefit of 100% automation.
- chipperyman573 9y agoTo add to this, a US government site does not need this, because only the US government site can register a .gov domain.
- gitchanhub 9y agoWe have a similar service in Hungary since 2005. I wonder why something like this was not a thing in the US before? I mean we are not a 3rd world country but definitly behind the US in almost every aspect. Is it something to do with the relationship between the states and the federal government?
- bllguo 9y agothe US adopted a system that was good enough at the time, and since then there is little impetus for improvement, despite the now obvious flaws. Same story for US infrastructure. Disadvantage of being a first mover
- TulliusCicero 9y agoThe US is backwards in plenty of ways, honestly, and the government is frequently a good (bad?) example. Moved to Germany a year ago, the government just seems so competent and drama-free here in comparison.
- ihattendorf 9y agoWasn't it Germany that had the electronic voting machines compromised?
- germanier 9y agoNot a voting machine (we don't have any) but software used to tabulate preliminary results was shown to be vulnerable. Honestly, this is pretty bad but not "voting machines compromised" bad.
- tvanantwerp 9y agoI'm getting "Oops, something went wrong" for nearly everything I do to create an account. Took two or three tries to get my password correctly set. Then I was given the prompt to add my phone number, but got another error and ended up signed out again. Definitely needs some work.
- forforthought 9y agoGiven that this is a typical identity provider, I'm curious there's interest to make this service available to the saas industry at large. For example, I'd rather NOT have to manage login credentials for my bank, mortgage car payment, and various airlines. I'd rather let login.gov handle it. Moreover, as a saas provider, I wouldn't mind deferring this liability to someone other than google or facebook.
- castis 9y agoOver the past few years, I have been conditioned to be weary of handing even more control over my personal life to the government than they already have. Assuming they open this up to private businesses (which I don't believe they're planning to), I wouldn't use any business that uses this service. I apologize if this sounds futile or like I'm donning my tinfoil hat, but my guard is way up these days.
- losteric 9y agoI would use this if it was implemented as a federated state-level service, expanding on drivers license/ID card programs. Not everything, but certainly for applications that already require a drivers license (eg airlines, banks, apartment applications).
- Micoloth 9y agoTo me, this is the right attitude towards this. Really? Are you more scared by your own democratic government than by facebook? Besides i'm not even american, so whatever
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- barsonme 9y agoWell, yeah. I can choose to not use Facebook (for the most part). I can't choose to not use the federal government. Plus, disliking and being wary of government is quintessentially American—it goes back to our roots as a country. As an example that just popped into my head, look at DACA: a bunch of undocumented persons told the federal government about their undocumented status (in exchange for something good) and now that information can/will/may be used to deport them. With the government, it cuts both ways.
- whalesalad 9y agoIronic that https://login.gov https://login.gov does not have a login form located anywhere on it. Just a teeny and hard-to-notice "Manage Account" text link in the corner.
- JaniceLeblanc 9y agoI wouldn't call Manage Account "teeny and hard-to-notice". I spotted it immediatelly as I'm used to look up in the right corner for logging in on for example reddit.
- rhencke 9y agoConsider this may be on purpose: Not all information requires an identity system to manage access. You can protect the privacy of users and reduce the security risk to your systems by avoiding any unnecessary collection of personally identifiable information — this even includes contact details.
- sdornan 9y agoTry https://secure.login.gov https://secure.login.gov
- rhencke 9y agoFor those interested, development is done in the open here: https://github.com/18F/identity-idp https://github.com/18F/identity-idp
- 7imon7ays 9y agoA rails app?? That's kinda awesome.
- sheeshkebab 9y agoRails app?? I’d think something go-based would be more appropriate for this kind of service.
- rhencke 9y agoWhy? Rails powers many huge, important things. Like GitHub.
- sheeshkebab 9y agoImplementing sso idp requires pretty good crypto support - last I looked ruby, python, node don't have anything built in and use external native libraries (OpenSSL etc) that are a pain to setup and use securely.
- ahmadss 9y agowhere can i use these login credentials?
- andrefrancisco 9y agologin.gov is currently live on this app from the Customs and Border Patrol https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/cbp-jobs/id1210368989?mt=8 https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/cbp-jobs/id1210368989?mt=8 We're working with other agencies interested in the platform and will announce them as they go live. *I work for 18F
- briankwest 9y agoThe Government equivalent of Equifax. YAY!
- pdabbadabba 9y agoThis appears valuable and well executed, but I worry that private businesses will be eager to outsource their authentication to this service, if they are allowed to. And once it's fully stood up, I suspect the government would be all too eager to oblige. This might be convenient, but might also mark the beginning of a major new point of U.S. government control over the Internet, with all the surveillance and other civil liberties issues that this might raise, to say nothing of the issues that could arise from this degree of centralization. Now seems like the time to set the expectation that this service may not ever be used by private websites. Of course, we tried that with Social Security numbers too, for all the good it did us. http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/26/weekinreview/the-nation-not-for-identification-purposes-just-kidding.html?mcubz=1 http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/26/weekinreview/the-nation-no...
- spencerhakim 9y agoGiven the alternative of handing out my SSN and hoping for the best, I'd be more than happy to use this for banking and related services. Presumably, third-party use would be covered by some form of ToS, and maybe we'd see actual repercussions for leaking data that originated here.
- KGIII 9y agoRepercussions? For the OPM hack, I got a form letter and a year (I think, I didn't use it) of credit monitoring. That was some of my most intimate information. That was a huge invasion of my privacy. I didn't even get a phone call. I didn't even get a sincere apology.
- ylem 9y agoJust as an FYI, I think they extended the period to 10 years. I agree that it was handled poorly!
- KGIII 9y agoI froze my credit. I am in a position where I don't need credit and can get credit by virtue of assets if I did need to. I was, for lack of a better phrase, pretty pissed off. I got a form letter and something about credit monitoring in one of those weird security envelopes, as I recall. Ten years? Yeah, that'll help. I pretty much admitted to everything I'd ever done, on those forms. It wasn't just me impacted, it had names of my friends and family. Then, I'm guessing it had all the notes I didn't see, from things like the interviews. I don't have any real enemies, or any reason to be afraid, but that makes me no less angry and feel no less violated. Meh... I try to let the anger go, so it only pops up when I discuss it. There's nothing I can do to change it. I do consider it the greatest violation of trust ever enacted on me by the government. There was no reason for me to even be in the system any more, I am retired. [redacted] Oh well... If you can get away with it, freeze your credit. This does, curiously, impact your credit score. The peace of mind is worth it. Sorry for the novella.
- marsrover 9y agoWhy is it that of all services I'm scared to actually register and log in to, this is at the top?
- slackoverflower 9y agoMaybe you don't have trust in the people that run the current government, just like a good portion of the American population do.
- throwawaythrow1 9y agoIt's interesting that no one here has yet mentioned the UK government system "Verify". Fundamentally there are different authentication mechanisms and idealogies at work, but it's the same UK CESG GPG implementation as Verify. I genuinely wonder if the US people understand the privacy implications of a central authenticating party as opposed to many federated ones?
- Edmond 9y agoYeah I think USDS is taking motivation from Verify. I actually contacted the Verify folks about leveraging a privacy-preserving approached as outlined here: https://www.cipheredtrust.com/doc/ https://www.cipheredtrust.com/doc/ I believe they were involved in some sort of porn regulation effort launched in the house of commons with a lot of privacy implication, a mechanism as described above would address all of that privacy problem.
- toomuchtodo 9y agoUSDS does take motivation from and works with the UK version of the USDS. Source: Interviewed with USDS.
- ProAm 9y agoI would not trust our government to implement this safely, efficiently or well.
- dkhenry 9y agoYou don't have to trust them. Its open source https://github.com/18F/identity-idp
- grepthisab 9y agoThis is a US Digital Service project for 18F. Probably the best engineers in the world working on it.
- ProAm 9y agoArguable, and they are still working within/for the government. I have little to no faith.
- wslack 9y agoOld reputations are hard to shake. This speech[1], by the first administrator of USDS, is my favorite to quote on the topic: > Some of you, not all of you, are working right now on another app for people to share pictures of food or a social network for dogs. I am here to tell you that your country has a better use for your talents. [...] > The Social Security Administration mails checks from a mainframe running COBOL, which might kind of be OK except that more than half of the workforce that maintains it is at or near retirement age. What happens then? The Department of Veterans Affairs has a serious backlog of disability claims. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service processes permanent resident applications and everything else on paper. If you lose your green card, it will take you 6–8 months to get a new one and in the meantime you will not be able to prove you have the right to be in the country or get a job. > All of these are design and information processing problems and all of these are matters of life or death to millions of citizens and all of them are things you can fix if you choose to. Think about the response to the hurricane this weekend - that's a government function, and we need talented people serving to make sure that people who lose their homes retain access to shelter. [1]: https://medium.com/the-u-s-digital-service/mikey-dickerson-to-sxsw-why-we-need-you-in-government-f31dab3263a0 https://medium.com/the-u-s-digital-service/mikey-dickerson-t...
- djwbrown 9y agoImpressive response to the HealthCare.gov fiasco: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/18F https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/18F Some other interesting projects here: https://github.com/18f https://github.com/18f
- andrefrancisco 9y agoOur repos can be a lot to wade through. You can see examples of our specific projects here https://18f.gsa.gov/what-we-deliver/ https://18f.gsa.gov/what-we-deliver/ (and each project links to the right repos if you want to see the code/docs) *I work for 18F
- antimatter 9y agoI know elsewhere in the thread you mentioned that you're not on the login.gov team but would you mind passing U2F support and removing SMS as a second-factor auth as a feature request? Thanks :)
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- d1ffuz0r 9y agoGood to see where governments are going with tech. In Russia we've had similar tools available for a few years https://pypi.python.org/pypi/esia-connector/0.1 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/esia-connector/0.1
- cyberferret 9y agoHopefully the US government will do better than the awful AUSKEY system that the Australian Government designed. Every time I upgrade my PC or notebook, I have to download a ton of Java crud, not to mention certificates, in order to be able to use it, and even then I have constant browser issues with particular versions of Java or certificate chains being misconfigured. Unfortunately, I have to use AUSKEY to transact on my business tax details etc., and just the sheer UX nightmare that it is makes an already detested task even harder to swallow.
- inopinatus 9y agoFor most ATO business dealings there is support for a myGov login now. I was very relieved to retire all the AUSKEY crap.
- mizzao 9y agoThis looks promising. I'm currently in Denmark and they have this inane two-factor authentication system for all (e.g. banks and not just public) services that uses physical printed cards with 150 codes each; when you are close to using one up you need to get another one in the mail. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NemID https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NemID Hopefully if this requires 2FA it can use the TOTP open standard, etc.
- Erwin 9y agoYou can buy a digital keyring to show the code if you want, e.g. https://www.nets.eu/dk-da/l%C3%B8sninger/nemid/nemid-til-private/n%C3%B8gleviser https://www.nets.eu/dk-da/l%C3%B8sninger/nemid/nemid-til-pri... -- which has a limited lifetime battery; I don't check my account often enough so I'm not bothered with the paper card.
- jeremyevans 9y agoIn case you are wondering how it handles password encryption and storage, it appears to use a custom password hash based on SHA256 and scrypt: https://github.com/18F/identity-idp/blob/980c2aa26397f530673e009a8370019ab3330b54/app/services/user_access_key.rb https://github.com/18F/identity-idp/blob/980c2aa26397f530673... Passwords appear to be stored in the users table in the "encrypted_password" column, and it does not appear that any database-based security is used. This is one RCE/SQLI vulnerability away from exposing the password hashes for all users. To be fair, that's probably true of most sites that store password hashes, but I would have expected better from 18F.
- zackbloom 9y agoCan you elaborate on what you were hoping for?
- jeremyevans 9y agoRestricting access to the password hashes using database security so that a vulnerability in the web application cannot expose password hashes unless a separate vulnerability in the database was also exploited. In PostgreSQL (and other SQL databases), this generally involves having multiple database users with separate permissions, making it so that the database user the web application uses doesn't not have SELECT permissions for the password hash column. If you want an example for a Ruby authentication library that does this, there is Rodauth: https://github.com/jeremyevans/rodauth https://github.com/jeremyevans/rodauth
- dangero 9y agowhat is database-based security?
- Maarten88 9y agoIt's an old craft that died somewhere around the dotcom hype in 2000. It works with SQL, using language elements like VIEW, PROCEDURE, ROLE and GRANT SQL Databases can still do it, but people who know how to use it are all retired or work in management now. :-) Also: no web framework knows how to deal with it.
- scott00 9y agoCreated an account. It asks for and confirms email and phone number. Interestingly it does not ask for name or SSN. So it doesn't really represent an identity as a person but rather as a recipient of communications. Security-wise, starts with using the phone for 2fa, allows setting up TOTP. Generates backup codes and tests for retention. Big problem though: there's no option to disable the phone as a 2fa option. A lesser sin is no U2F support.
- weddpros 9y agoWhy it's a privacy nightmare: you delegate authentication to an oauth service. You trust it to check the authenticity of the login/password. The code is open source, but it doesn't mean login.gov runs exactly this code. Now imagine the NSA forks the code, adds a master password "IworkForTheNSA,LetMeIn!" and runs the fork instead on login.gov. Now the government can impersonate you in seconds. Use Auth0 if you don't want to handle auth yourself. It's probably more difficult to coerce a private company into hacking its users, than it is for the NSA/FBI/IRS/Whatever to hack it's own system. Don't be foolish. Don't use that for private businesses.
- finnn 9y agoIs it even possible to use this for a private business? The title literally says that it is "to simplify access to public services"
- weddpros 9y agoI sure hope it will be restricted to public services... I was reacting to other comments on HN
- devrand 9y agoAccording to the developer registration instructions (https://developers.login.gov/register/ https://developers.login.gov/register/) you need to provide what government agency you are registering for. Therefore I don't believe this is open to non-government agencies.
- bobthecowboy 9y ago> It's probably more difficult to coerce a private company into hacking its users, than it is for the NSA/FBI/IRS/Whatever to hack it's own system. This is a fantasy. I'm shocked to find people parroting this argument mere years after Snowden.
- weddpros 9y ago
- teuna 9y agoFrance has something similar called franceconnect: https://franceconnect.gouv.fr https://franceconnect.gouv.fr
- zaroth 9y agoLogin Spec Here: https://github.com/18F/identity-idp/blob/master/docs/encryption-and-key-rotation.md https://github.com/18F/identity-idp/blob/master/docs/encrypt... Many aspects of this make no sense to me... so IF this is actually what they are doing... hash(user, password) { salt = CS-PRNG(160bit) s = scrypt(salt, password) z1 = s[0:32] z2 = s[32:64] R = CS-PRNG(256bit) d = HSM(R) XOR (pad_right(z1, 0x00, 32 bytes)) cek = SHA256(z2 || d) hash = SHA256(cek) save_record(user, d, salt, hash) } First and foremost, if the HSM operation is to have any meaning, it needs to be in the critical path for encrypting / decrypting data and possibly also calculating the password hash. If you don't need to go through the HSM to perform a decrypt or a hash validation, then obviously the HSM isn't actually securing anything! All it becomes is a source of entropy into the key derivation, but that's more likely to harm than help. From their own specification; "It is important to note that the HSM factor strengthens the model in a way different than the other two factors, which rely on keeping them secret. Because the HSM is tied to a physical object, brute force attacks on our database would need to happen in proximity to the HSM, i.e., within our AWS environment, which greatly reduces the attack surface. A bad actor with a copy of the database cannot apply their own computing power to brute force cracking of passwords." But to be clear, if you have 'd', 'salt', and 'hash', you can brute force attack passwords as; s = scrypt(salt, password) h = SHA256(SHA256(s[32:64] || d)) h =? hash Now, if they were not storing 'd' in the user record, you might think to store what they call 'R' in the user record. Then you would have to go through the HSM as part of each login to derive the correct 'd' and 'cek' which is how it's supposed to work. But even that design is still not good enough. You don't want to allow an attacker to pull 'R' from your database, send it through the HSM just once, and then be able to start brute forcing the password forever from there on out. If you're going to pay for an HSM, and your going to call it for each password verification, then you better make sure an attacker is also required to call the HSM for each attempt at verifying a password. Which means you send your password hash (or something derived from it) through the HSM, not just a random 'R'! Next, besides all of that, the design is horrific for end users. PII is encrypted with 'cek' above. That means if you lose your password, you lose your PII. Which means starting basically a new account from scratch! I can't endorse the idea that a password reset from an end user will effectively wipe out their account information and make them start over. The vast majority of users will be logging into this service infrequently. Combine this with a typically user hostile password policy, and the result is that a large percentage of users will be resetting their password every time they need to login. With this design, that means they have to start over with validation through a third party... and guess who that third party is? Companies like Equifax now responsible for the single largest PII breach in American history. Now they've also added something like a recovery key which the user is supposed to print out and save at the moment they create their account, and that key is used to separately encrypt all the PII. So if the user forgets their password but can find this magic piece of paper, they can enter this key (that'll be fun) as part of the password reset process and reset their password without effectively wiping their account. To think "Average Users" will succeed in doing this belies reality. But wait... where is this magic key being saved on login.gov servers? If it was a private key they give to the user and they just keep the public key on their side that could work, but it's actually an uppercase 16 character alphanumeric token... 5.17 * 16 = 82 bits. Let's hope that's not literally the encryption key, but the alternative -- it's a token used to lookup the key in their database -- would completely defeat the purpose of encrypting the PII with a PBK in the first place?! And, even if it was the literal encryption key, when you change or update your PII, if they don't also keep it on their side, how would they update their secondary encrypted PII record?
- donatj 9y agoThere's a lot of very positive comments about this, but I don't understand why anyone would want this? It seems very big brother-ish to me.
- korzun 9y ago> Also, security experts protect one service instead of many. Dedicated teams of design and security experts also will continuously improve it. I don't buy it.
- latchkey 9y agoA total nit pick, but why do people have such a hard time consistently naming something as simple as a boolean variable? If we remember that naming is one of the hardest things in software engineering, why don't we put more thought into it? From the documentation in the README: https://github.com/18F/identity-idp https://github.com/18F/identity-idp disable_email_sending: ‘true’ enable_load_testing_mode: ‘true’ telephony_disabled: ‘true’ Multiple directions, multiple naming conventions, strings?!?!?. Just seems like a recipe for failure. I feel like this would be more clear: load_testing_mode: true send_email: false telephony: false When you write your conditionals, it makes it so much easier to read: if !disable_email_sending do_send_email vs. if send_email do_send_email Here is the line in actual use... https://github.com/18F/identity-idp/blob/df549cf9a1fc2c21e3e322fa10e762ccb07da2a9/config/environments/production.rb#L23 https://github.com/18F/identity-idp/blob/df549cf9a1fc2c21e3e... I'd personally rather have the positive condition first as it is easier for me to follow logically in my head.
- mdpopescu 9y agoI agree with having positive names in booleans (email_enabled vs disable_email_sending), but not with having verbs as booleans. send_email is an action; the corresponding flag should be email_enabled or is_email_enabled.
- snambi 9y agonice. SSO for govt. why not?
- pteredactyl 9y agoDoes this mean I'll be able to regenerate my SSN?
- hboon 9y agoSingapore launched SingPass in the early 2000s. There was a breach a few years ago and they have since implemented 2FA. It's really convenient, but scary at the same time.
- jrminton 9y agoThanks for all of the passionate comments on login.gov! First, my name is Joel Minton and I lead login.gov. All of us who came here to build this did so to drive higher Security, Privacy and Usability for all Americans. This is a core building block that we believe will benefit millions of Americans and the government agencies that serve them. Second, the tradeoffs that we have been considering for over 18 months are very similar to those that all of you are bringing up as well. We have made a lot of progress on balancing these tradeoffs, which are primarily focused on Security, Privacy and Usability. Since we are constantly iterating to improve login.gov, we welcome any future feedback that you and others provide. Third, for anyone who has a background in identity and/or large scale platforms and is interested in serving our country by helping to build this critical platform, please consider joining us. Your salary would not likely be as high as the private sector, but trust me, the amount of positive impact you would have on our country is tremendous. You can DM me either on Linked In or my lightly used twitter Account (jrminton). Thanks again!