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Not only is secret voting an integral part of a democratic voting system, it is also entirely possible to implement a system where everyone can check their own

Not only is secret voting an integral part of a democratic voting system, it is also entirely possible to implement a system where everyone can check their own vote while keeping their vote secret. Each registrant can simply be given a unique string that is connected with their vote.

bluejekyll 9y ago
We have these "receipts" with a code that matches the one on the ballot on the paper ballots in SF, though I've never actually tried to check it anywhere. Has anyone else tried this?
- medmunds 9y ago
  The SF elections website allows you to confirm that your ballot was counted. But not how you voted.
  - SAI_Peregrinus 9y ago
    And Scantegrity lets you further confirm that your individual votes on the ballot were counted correctly, but still keeps the whole vote secret.
Klathmon 9y ago
Having the ability to verify your own vote is still dangerous. There's a fine line between "can be verified by the government at any time who you voted for" and "can be forced to show proof of who you voted for" or even "if you don't publicly show your proof of who you voted for, you are on a list". not to mention the ability to "sell" your vote to whoever and have proof that you followed through. In a truly "secret ballot" voting system, you should be incapable of proving who you voted for. You can still tell others who you voted for, but there shouldn't be any "proof".
- SAI_Peregrinus 9y ago
  Look up Scantegrity. It provides the ability to prove that your vote was counted as cast, but not the ability to prove who you voted for.
  - Klathmon 9y ago
    I'm perfectly fine with being able to prove your vote was cast (I'd actually prefer if you were required by law to vote. You can make a vote of "nobody", but you'd need to vote), but that is very different from being able to verify who you voted for. But even still paper ballots where you check off a square and put it in a box can give the same assurances as that complicated Scantegrity system as long as you stick around and watch the ballot box yourself till it's counted. yes, it's a day of time, but it's something you or literally anyone else can do regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, social status, education, or anything else.
    - pm24601 9y ago
      Not possible to watch it being counted. * The ballot gets mixed in with others * the bundle gets divided up (A cards go in 1 bundle, B cards go another) * taken to a vote counting location; * each bundle is then divide between ballot counting machines. The whole point is that an individual ballot becomes untraceable before the counting actually starts.
Tharkun 9y ago
I disagree. When you're casting a vote on paper, it's pretty easy to check that your vote is not being observed. When you're casting an electronic vote, you have no such option. You can claim the vote is secret. The developers of the voting machine can claim the vote is secret. But the voter has no way to verify this. Secret voting is too important to be left to voting machines.
- e12e 9y ago
  > When you're casting a vote on paper, it's pretty easy to check that your vote is not being observed. One thing I've been thinking about lately, is that while we all probably have better intuition for "protecting" our paper vote, I'm not convinced that the huge advances in monitoring technology, covert and generally available, hasn't to an extent invalidated this somewhat. You really only need to be able to read some markings on paper (in IR, via some kind of fairly low resolution x-ray, what have you) - with the voter (eg: general camera surveillance showing a person entering a voting booth) - in order to monitor a vote. It's certainly much higher demand on manpower to do it, but I don't think it should be discounted - the payoff will be proportional to the power wielded by the public office being elected for. So while I think "lets do electronic voting!" is a crazy blanked-statement to make in order to improve security, I don't think we should be so certain analog voting is as secure today, as it was in the 80s and earlier.
  - pm24601 9y ago
    > I don't think we should be so certain analog voting is as secure today, as it was in the 80s and earlier. correct - the machines are vulnerable even if the paper is not.
lightbyte 9y ago
That doesn't solve any of the problems that public voting records creates. You can't keep your vote secret if you can access it later. Someone can steal your secret identifier or they can coerce you to give it up.
pvdebbe 9y ago
The unique string would enable coercion (you come back from the polls with the string that says you voted X or else your mother gets it!) and vote selling (you come back from the polls with the string that says you voted X and this wad of dough is yours).
- zimpenfish 9y ago
  > you come back from the polls with the string that says you voted X How would the criminals know what the unique string would be for a particular vote?
aninhumer 9y ago
No it's not possible. If you provide any way for an individual to verify their own vote, then they can be coerced to provide the same proof to someone else. In this case the coercer would just force the voter to give them their string after they vote. Now they could theoretically lie, but they'd have to be able to give a valid string that matches the preferred vote of the coercer, and that no one else has already given them. This is sufficiently hard to arrange that at least some people will not be able to do so.

bluejekyll 9y ago

We have these "receipts" with a code that matches the one on the ballot on the paper ballots in SF, though I've never actually tried to check it anywhere. Has anyone else tried this?

medmunds 9y ago
The SF elections website allows you to confirm that your ballot was counted. But not how you voted.
- SAI_Peregrinus 9y ago
  And Scantegrity lets you further confirm that your individual votes on the ballot were counted correctly, but still keeps the whole vote secret.

Klathmon 9y ago

Having the ability to verify your own vote is still dangerous. There's a fine line between "can be verified by the government at any time who you voted for" and "can be forced to show proof of who you voted for" or even "if you don't publicly show your proof of who you voted for, you are on a list". not to mention the ability to "sell" your vote to whoever and have proof that you followed through. In a truly "secret ballot" voting system, you should be incapable of proving who you voted for. You can still tell others who you voted for, but there shouldn't be any "proof".

SAI_Peregrinus 9y ago
Look up Scantegrity. It provides the ability to prove that your vote was counted as cast, but not the ability to prove who you voted for.
- Klathmon 9y ago
  I'm perfectly fine with being able to prove your vote was cast (I'd actually prefer if you were required by law to vote. You can make a vote of "nobody", but you'd need to vote), but that is very different from being able to verify who you voted for. But even still paper ballots where you check off a square and put it in a box can give the same assurances as that complicated Scantegrity system as long as you stick around and watch the ballot box yourself till it's counted. yes, it's a day of time, but it's something you or literally anyone else can do regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, social status, education, or anything else.
  - pm24601 9y ago
    Not possible to watch it being counted. * The ballot gets mixed in with others * the bundle gets divided up (A cards go in 1 bundle, B cards go another) * taken to a vote counting location; * each bundle is then divide between ballot counting machines. The whole point is that an individual ballot becomes untraceable before the counting actually starts.

Tharkun 9y ago

I disagree. When you're casting a vote on paper, it's pretty easy to check that your vote is not being observed. When you're casting an electronic vote, you have no such option. You can claim the vote is secret. The developers of the voting machine can claim the vote is secret. But the voter has no way to verify this. Secret voting is too important to be left to voting machines.

e12e 9y ago
> When you're casting a vote on paper, it's pretty easy to check that your vote is not being observed. One thing I've been thinking about lately, is that while we all probably have better intuition for "protecting" our paper vote, I'm not convinced that the huge advances in monitoring technology, covert and generally available, hasn't to an extent invalidated this somewhat. You really only need to be able to read some markings on paper (in IR, via some kind of fairly low resolution x-ray, what have you) - with the voter (eg: general camera surveillance showing a person entering a voting booth) - in order to monitor a vote. It's certainly much higher demand on manpower to do it, but I don't think it should be discounted - the payoff will be proportional to the power wielded by the public office being elected for. So while I think "lets do electronic voting!" is a crazy blanked-statement to make in order to improve security, I don't think we should be so certain analog voting is as secure today, as it was in the 80s and earlier.
- pm24601 9y ago
  > I don't think we should be so certain analog voting is as secure today, as it was in the 80s and earlier. correct - the machines are vulnerable even if the paper is not.

lightbyte 9y ago

That doesn't solve any of the problems that public voting records creates. You can't keep your vote secret if you can access it later. Someone can steal your secret identifier or they can coerce you to give it up.

pvdebbe 9y ago

The unique string would enable coercion (you come back from the polls with the string that says you voted X or else your mother gets it!) and vote selling (you come back from the polls with the string that says you voted X and this wad of dough is yours).

zimpenfish 9y ago
> you come back from the polls with the string that says you voted X How would the criminals know what the unique string would be for a particular vote?

aninhumer 9y ago

No it's not possible. If you provide any way for an individual to verify their own vote, then they can be coerced to provide the same proof to someone else. In this case the coercer would just force the voter to give them their string after they vote. Now they could theoretically lie, but they'd have to be able to give a valid string that matches the preferred vote of the coercer, and that no one else has already given them. This is sufficiently hard to arrange that at least some people will not be able to do so.