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"Conscious states include states of perceptual experience, bodily sensation, mental imagery, emotional experience, occurrent thought, and more. There is somethi
by joe_the_user 9y ago
"Conscious states include states of perceptual experience, bodily sensation, mental imagery, emotional experience, occurrent thought, and more. There is something it is like to see a vivid green, to feel a sharp pain, to visualize the Eiffel tower, to feel a deep regret, and to think that one is late. Each of these states has a phenomenal character, with phenomenal properties (or qualia) characterizing what it is like to be in the state."
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"Here, the task is not to explain behavioral and cognitive functions: even once one has an explanation of all the relevant functions in the vicinity of consciousness — discrimination, integration, access, report, control — there may still remain a further question: why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?"
-- I'm not getting why this is suppose to be "hard". Any information processing system would have internal processes, ones that reflect current and past input, "raw" and suitably modified. A sophisticated information processing system could be expected to have observations on its internal processes too - just a server might have logs, processed logs and what-not.
I mean, all of this is important to us because we are it. Any autonomous system would be more concerned with its internal processes than random things. So for such a thing, a brain or even a self-driving car, it's internal processes have a unique place - inside of its memory.
" Why do not these processes take place "in the dark," without any accompanying states of experience? This is the central mystery of consciousness."
-- Because each information processing system only processes its own information? It only "sees" its input, not some other system's input.
Of course, I'd say that such reasoning seems plausible because humans have a strong tendency to project our experiences on other human beings and to imagine other people having our experiences and vice-verse. So we experience only our input (rather tautologically) but imagine others having our experiences, imagine others imagining us having their experiences and so-reflexively via "mirror neurons" and such.
But beyond that I think it seems "hard" because we value these experiences so highly. Having it all be banal and obvious seems to devalue it. And that's about it.
- mcbits 9y agoSubjective perception is "hard" because everything we know about physics works exactly the same without it, so at this point we have literally no idea where it fits. But this is kind of a predestined result because the way we approach most science is to filter out subjective phenomena as much as possible and examine only so-called objective phenomena.
- pmoriarty 9y agoI don't think that's it. The real problem is that no science (whether physics, chemistry, biology, or even psychology -- if you deign to call the latter a science) describe what it's like to experience anything. Certainly there are measurements (like the wavelength of light), or even observations (ex: that a certain light was in the red spectrum), but the actual subjective experience of any phenomena seems to be completely out of reach. No one and no scientific theory can tell you what any experience is going to be like for you. For instance, no scientific theory can tell you what seeing the color red is like. This actually goes far beyond the lack of a way for science to grapple with subjective experience, and goes to the root of communicating that experience or even communicating about that experience. It's hard, if not impossible, to communicate what any subjective experience is like. Poets, musicians, or artists might arguably be able to get at it, through some indirect means. But until telepathy comes along, there's really no way to know if what one person describes as their experience really is that way or can even be properly understood by their audience. The ideal that many scientists aim for creates an additional burden of trying to be "objective" and of distrusting reporting on individual's own subjective experiences. Nevertheless, at least in psychology, neurology, and cognitive science, self-reporting on personal experiences is still quite common and is at least tacitly accepted. Researchers may ask, for instance, if the subject feels pain, or about their emotional state, and so forth. That is not completely out of bounds. I'm not aware of so-called "hard sciences" being very interested in what personal experience is like, or in attempting to bring them under their theoretical rubric.
- taneq 9y agoIt's all begging the question that there's something special about some of those states, because we feel that they're special. That there's a 'subjective experience' attached which is more than just the information flow through the self-monitoring feedback loop that is our brain.
- themgt 9y agoAlways hilarious to me how many educated humans will actually go argue that they are p-zombies rather than face the paradoxes of consciousness. I guess all I'll say is, physics seems capable of explaining the evolution of our universe and e.g. the emergent complex phenomena of solar systems and planets and such. Physics and the other hard sciences do not seem to lend a lot of clarity as to how a self-organizing piece of the universe developed into beings that believe themselves to be conscious, believe they in some sense have the power of mind-over-matter, and in fact have constructed a globe-spanning civilization that appears to demonstrate the ability of billions of minds to understand to some degree themselves, each other and the universe, and to willfully bend matter to suit its purposes. aka Hofstadter's "who pushes whom around inside this cranium?" question. We have not come anywhere close to constructing an artificial system with similar capabilities nor to understand how or why they arise in our own brains. It's presumptuous in the extreme to hand-wave away this conundrum with an "information processing" metaphor.
- joe_the_user 9y agoYou're mobilizing a different argument here - since we can't construct it, there must be some transcendent property. I can't see how that evokes any of the paradoxes of consciousness. I mean, 200 years ago, humans didn't have a plausible idea how the sun work, should they have assumed God was behind it? Edit: and humans certainly broadly have a decent idea of the physics and chemistry that gave rise to life even if the function of the brain is so far beyond us. So we're certainly not confronting life as something wholly unexplained. Some parts are still beyond us, some things we don't know yet. But un-knowledge usually isn't evidence for any specific thing.
- bobbington 9y agoThe sun is a physical body, so a physical explanation makes sense. The problem is, our subjective experience isn't actually physical. It has no mass, no shape, no size. It may correspond to movements in the brain, but the experience itself is not material. For all we know we could be in the matrix, and our subjective experpence could be just as real. In fact Elon musk thinks it's a very high probability that we are in the matrix. Since our experience of the world is not material it doesn't seem to follow that there must be a material explanation for it.
- antonvs 9y ago> " Why do not these processes take place "in the dark," without any accompanying states of experience? This is the central mystery of consciousness." > -- Because each information processing system only processes its own information? It only "sees" its input, not some other system's input. That's not the issue. The issue is why experiences are associated with the processing of input. A computer program represents "green" as some combination of bits, but most people don't believe it has an experience of greenness beyond the mechanistic processing of some bit sequence through its predefined rules. Even if our minds are "merely" a set of rules processing information, there's still an extra element we experience that we currently can't satisfactorily explain. > A sophisticated information processing system could be expected to have observations on its internal processes too - just a server might have logs, processed logs and what-not. Good example - do you believe that a computer program that produces and analyzes logs of its internal processes has a conscious experience, analogous to ours? A process that analyzes logs is still a process like any other. There's nothing special about it that would lead us to believe that suddenly experience arises in that process, where it hasn't arisen in all the lower-level processes. This is why one "solution" to the problem of consciousness is to claim that even e.g. thermostats have some degree of consciousness. By claiming all processes are conscious to some degree, you don't have to explain the leap to consciousness. But if you don't accept that solution, then the information processing model only underscores the problem.
- obastani 9y agoI don't think your comments really answer the questions that are being asked. The question, as far as I understand it, is why humans can't operate exactly as they do now, but without the sensation of consciousness. I don't think the question is "hard", I think it simply does not have a good solution. Science can explain how things work, but not why. One day, we may even be able to have an empirical theory of consciousness, e.g., how manipulating various parts of the brain affect how we are conscious, what physical structures are needed to generate consciousness (or at least, beings that act as if they are conscious), etc., but we can never explain why we are conscious, i.e., why we have experience.
- andrepd 9y ago> I'm not getting why this is suppose to be "hard". Because that's not what's hard. Explaining the physical processes of the brain is very, very difficult for the brain is an extremely complex machine (one could say, bar aliens, it is probably the most complex object in the universe). But it's surely not "hard" in a fundamental level. We know the rules of physics applicable to physical systems like the brain. Technically we were able to image it at a very high resolution, and if we had massive computers to solve the equations, we could explain everything going on in the brain. It's difficult, but not "hard". Yet this would bring us no closer to explaining the subjective conscious experience. Despite the fact that we know it exists, because we experience it, we have no idea how to measure it, how to explain, and why on earth it arises in this specific physical arrangement of atoms called the brain. A computer chip is also very complex, and integrates information. Is it conscious? We don't know and we will never know because any other consciousness other than ours is fundamentally inaccessible. In other words, this is a "hard" problem.
- ppod 9y agoI don't see any advance in this debate since things that Dennett and Hofstadter wrote 20+ years ago (both independently and in their co-authored book "The Mind's I"). Is it really surprising that we have a first person subjective experience? We know that we are incredibly complex things, constantly integrating and acting on very complicated external stimuli. Such a system should have references to its own body and its own neural states, its train of reasoning should frequently include itself, its focus will drift forward and backwards in time... this is just how a system like this would work. If the system communicates about its state then its language should have referents to these internal states, referents like "experience", and "feels like", and "I understand". Is that surprising? Wouldn't it be surprising if it wasn't like that? I think that Tononi's approach is a good approximation, but it can't be a full solution because the word 'consciousness' is too anthropocentric. One criticism of IIT showed that a seemingly uninteresting complex artificial system could have a very high IIT complexity quotient. The problem is that the things we use to define the term 'consciousness' are things that can be approximated to varying degrees by chimps or dolphins or generative adversarial networks or antfarms or thermometers. But behind our use of the word 'consciousness' there is still almost always a very slightly disguised dualism that uses it as a substitute for the word 'soul'.