5 ms·

Highly skilled technical employees cost time and money to build/train. People who don't train for highly skilled jobs typically do not have the money or the su

Highly skilled technical employees cost time and money to build/train. People who don't train for highly skilled jobs typically do not have the money or the support infrastructure required for that training. This gets compounded when a low skilled worker finds themselves between jobs: they now have the same constraints but also need to find money quickly to service debt such as rent or home loan. When you describe as "mismatch" what is a bona fide shortage, you are completely ignoring the structure of society which leads to this problem: education is a profit industry, at cost to the student. Industry has few apprenticeships or cadet ships available. Industry doesn't want to train the good people ("matches") to become skilled the way industry wants. Once the inividual has been trained, industry will trip over themselves to hire or poach them. So industry doesn't want to pay for training even though they can afford it, the individual can't afford training even though they want it. If only there was a way to provide training for highly skilled roles in such a way that all industry pays for the training and the individual only shoulders the time costs.

pasquinelli 9y ago
I agree with you but at the same time, if there was a bona fide shortage of labor then wouldn't industry be training people?
- Terr_ 9y ago
  > then wouldn't industry be training people? Ideally, but there's also a sort of prisoner's-dilemma [0] going on, where if company A trains well and company B doesn't but puts the budget into wages, people will train at A and then leave for B higher pay. [0]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma
  - pasquinelli 9y ago
    If there's actually a labor shortage, B will starve for want of labor. Labor isn't just a cost, it's an investment, and the kind of loyalty you'd get by training someone without a lot of prospects in a high demand field for free shouldn't be ignored.
    - Terr_ 9y ago
      > If there's actually a labor shortage, B will starve for want of labor. B is able to offer higher salaries. Yes, employee loyalty is a thing, but it's also hard to justify to MBA-types and is softer when the employees are in demand.
- Glyptodon 9y ago
  Maybe they don't believe there's enough demand and/or economic growth to justify the investment considering its risks and expenses? If given a choice between paying for 6 months of training, or 6 months of waiting for the perfect candidate, waiting is much cheaper. In fact, the longer training takes and the more valuable the trainee at the end (the more demand for the trainee from competitors, essentially), I would guess the less likely businesses are to want to foot the bill. Likewise, training means you have to pay/contract so as to insure that there's not a high risk of a trainee being sniped. On the demand/economic growth angle, witness all the large corporations hoarding record amounts of cash. It seems like many businesses recognize that disposable income is fairly well soaked - I think a general perception is that there's not enough disposable income to risk much investment in new products/industries unless they somehow clearly cannibalize from an existing market segment or specifically target upper incomes (and it takes a lot for something targeting upper incomes to be viable enough to not be boutique). Anyway, this is mostly speculation on my part.
  - pasquinelli 9y ago
    "If given a choice between paying for 6 months of training, or 6 months of waiting for the perfect candidate, waiting is much cheaper." Fair enough, but then this is not a labor shortage. An employee makes their boss money. In a labor shortage, waiting for the perfect candidate is choosing to lose money.
  - rjblackman 9y ago
    it is also likely at the end of the training the employee is more valuable to the company than to the competitors (since they know the culture and technology), so in order to keep them from moving to a competitor they should pay more than a competitor would.
wolfgke 9y ago
> Once the inividual has been trained, industry will trip over themselves to hire or poach them. Why not simply create employment contracts that bind the respective apprentice/employee to the company, say, for 5 or 7 years (or whatever) if they fear that the employee will be poached?
- thedufer 9y ago
  I suspect such a contract would be unenforceable in most first world countries. It certainly would be in the US, which is not exactly a paragon of worker protections.
  - chii 9y ago
    why would it be unenforceable? it's not like you can't leave (indentured servitude). it's just that if you choose to leave before your term is up, you have to pay back the training cost pro-rata, and that sound very reasonable.
    - joslin01 9y ago
      I signed a contract like that. They were paranoid I was going to jump ship during a critical time, so gave me a bonus under condition that if I leave company before X months, I would be forced to pay back bonus. Not sure if it's enforceable, but I didn't leave.
      - JCharante 9y ago
        I've heard Amazon gives out bonuses with those conditions, so I'd guess it's enforceable.
    - imron 9y ago
      Yes, I'm sure such a system would never be abused. /s
    - IanCal 9y ago
      > . it's just that if you choose to leave before your term is up, you have to pay back the training cost pro-rata, and that sound very reasonable. This is pretty common [edit - in the UK], and there are distinctions made in law to stop this being abused (e.g. "if you leave you owe us a million for the basic training cost") [context, liquidated damages clauses are OK in an employment contract, penalty clauses are not] > Case law has clarified that in order for a clause to be a liquidated damages provision rather than a penalty, it must be a genuine reflection of an employer’s pre-estimate of loss that it is likely to suffer if the employee breaches that provision. If an employer is unable to quantify the exact loss that would be suffered, a best guess of the likely loss would be satisfactory. - See more at: http://rosenblatt-law.co.uk/bulletins/are-repayment-provisions-in-contracts-of-employment-unenforceable-penalties/#sthash.cvfHfrlu.dpuf http://rosenblatt-law.co.uk/bulletins/are-repayment-provisio... [snip] > The key to a repayment sum being regarded as a genuine pre-estimate of loss appears to be that the sum specified must be compensatory and not ‘in terroreum’ or simply a deterrent to breaching the contract - See more at: http://rosenblatt-law.co.uk/bulletins/are-repayment-provisions-in-contracts-of-employment-unenforceable-penalties/#sthash.cvfHfrlu.dpuf http://rosenblatt-law.co.uk/bulletins/are-repayment-provisio... http://rosenblatt-law.co.uk/bulletins/are-repayment-provisions-in-contracts-of-employment-unenforceable-penalties/ http://rosenblatt-law.co.uk/bulletins/are-repayment-provisio...

pasquinelli 9y ago

I agree with you but at the same time, if there was a bona fide shortage of labor then wouldn't industry be training people?

Terr_ 9y ago
> then wouldn't industry be training people? Ideally, but there's also a sort of prisoner's-dilemma [0] going on, where if company A trains well and company B doesn't but puts the budget into wages, people will train at A and then leave for B higher pay. [0]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma
- pasquinelli 9y ago
  If there's actually a labor shortage, B will starve for want of labor. Labor isn't just a cost, it's an investment, and the kind of loyalty you'd get by training someone without a lot of prospects in a high demand field for free shouldn't be ignored.
  - Terr_ 9y ago
    > If there's actually a labor shortage, B will starve for want of labor. B is able to offer higher salaries. Yes, employee loyalty is a thing, but it's also hard to justify to MBA-types and is softer when the employees are in demand.
Glyptodon 9y ago
Maybe they don't believe there's enough demand and/or economic growth to justify the investment considering its risks and expenses? If given a choice between paying for 6 months of training, or 6 months of waiting for the perfect candidate, waiting is much cheaper. In fact, the longer training takes and the more valuable the trainee at the end (the more demand for the trainee from competitors, essentially), I would guess the less likely businesses are to want to foot the bill. Likewise, training means you have to pay/contract so as to insure that there's not a high risk of a trainee being sniped. On the demand/economic growth angle, witness all the large corporations hoarding record amounts of cash. It seems like many businesses recognize that disposable income is fairly well soaked - I think a general perception is that there's not enough disposable income to risk much investment in new products/industries unless they somehow clearly cannibalize from an existing market segment or specifically target upper incomes (and it takes a lot for something targeting upper incomes to be viable enough to not be boutique). Anyway, this is mostly speculation on my part.
- pasquinelli 9y ago
  "If given a choice between paying for 6 months of training, or 6 months of waiting for the perfect candidate, waiting is much cheaper." Fair enough, but then this is not a labor shortage. An employee makes their boss money. In a labor shortage, waiting for the perfect candidate is choosing to lose money.
- rjblackman 9y ago
  it is also likely at the end of the training the employee is more valuable to the company than to the competitors (since they know the culture and technology), so in order to keep them from moving to a competitor they should pay more than a competitor would.

wolfgke 9y ago

> Once the inividual has been trained, industry will trip over themselves to hire or poach them. Why not simply create employment contracts that bind the respective apprentice/employee to the company, say, for 5 or 7 years (or whatever) if they fear that the employee will be poached?

thedufer 9y ago
I suspect such a contract would be unenforceable in most first world countries. It certainly would be in the US, which is not exactly a paragon of worker protections.
- chii 9y ago
  why would it be unenforceable? it's not like you can't leave (indentured servitude). it's just that if you choose to leave before your term is up, you have to pay back the training cost pro-rata, and that sound very reasonable.
  - joslin01 9y ago
    I signed a contract like that. They were paranoid I was going to jump ship during a critical time, so gave me a bonus under condition that if I leave company before X months, I would be forced to pay back bonus. Not sure if it's enforceable, but I didn't leave.
    - JCharante 9y ago
      I've heard Amazon gives out bonuses with those conditions, so I'd guess it's enforceable.
  - imron 9y ago
    Yes, I'm sure such a system would never be abused. /s
  - IanCal 9y ago
    > . it's just that if you choose to leave before your term is up, you have to pay back the training cost pro-rata, and that sound very reasonable. This is pretty common [edit - in the UK], and there are distinctions made in law to stop this being abused (e.g. "if you leave you owe us a million for the basic training cost") [context, liquidated damages clauses are OK in an employment contract, penalty clauses are not] > Case law has clarified that in order for a clause to be a liquidated damages provision rather than a penalty, it must be a genuine reflection of an employer’s pre-estimate of loss that it is likely to suffer if the employee breaches that provision. If an employer is unable to quantify the exact loss that would be suffered, a best guess of the likely loss would be satisfactory. - See more at: http://rosenblatt-law.co.uk/bulletins/are-repayment-provisions-in-contracts-of-employment-unenforceable-penalties/#sthash.cvfHfrlu.dpuf http://rosenblatt-law.co.uk/bulletins/are-repayment-provisio... [snip] > The key to a repayment sum being regarded as a genuine pre-estimate of loss appears to be that the sum specified must be compensatory and not ‘in terroreum’ or simply a deterrent to breaching the contract - See more at: http://rosenblatt-law.co.uk/bulletins/are-repayment-provisions-in-contracts-of-employment-unenforceable-penalties/#sthash.cvfHfrlu.dpuf http://rosenblatt-law.co.uk/bulletins/are-repayment-provisio... http://rosenblatt-law.co.uk/bulletins/are-repayment-provisions-in-contracts-of-employment-unenforceable-penalties/ http://rosenblatt-law.co.uk/bulletins/are-repayment-provisio...