26 ms·
"So, in Borel’s view, most reals, with probability one, are mathematical fantasies, because there is no way to specify them uniquely." (Paraphrasing, because th
by whatshisface 10y ago
"So, in Borel’s view, most reals, with probability one, are mathematical fantasies, because there is no way to specify them uniquely." (Paraphrasing, because there are only countably many possible math papers that might describe a number.)
I think Borel has confused names with things. The fact that we can only write down only countably many expressions for numbers doesn't mean that there are numbers that we may never write expressions for - only that in a single symbolic system we can't have expressions for all of them at once.
Besides, if you confuse extant with useful you might end up believing that some random large integers aren't "there!"
- xyzzyz 10y agoonly that in a single symbolic system we can't have expressions for all of them at once. I don't think that's true. There are only countably many different symbolic systems[1], and as we can only express countably many numbers in each, we don't leave the realm of countable. [1] - A "symbolic system" must at least come with a procedure to tell whether a sequence is a part of it, and, unless you disbelieve the Church-Turing thesis, there are only countably many procedures.
- j2kun 10y agoDoesn't this (and by extension, Curch-Turing) rely on the assumption that the universe is discrete? Provided it were not, and one were able to harness infinite precision, one could presumably make a new symbolic system based on it. Not saying I believe it, just teasing out assumptions. If one is arguing whether the universe is continuous and using the Church-Turing thesis as justification for something, there's a danger of circular reasoning. Also, I think the parent commenter is getting more at naming vs existence rather than naming versus "could be named in the future." Is the argument boiling down to that something does not exist (is not "real") if it cannot be named?
- xyzzyz 10y agoDoesn't this (and by extension, Curch-Turing) rely on the assumption that the universe is discrete? Provided it were not, and one were able to harness infinite precision, one could presumably make a new symbolic system based on it. That's a valid point -- if you read it in a certain way, the Church-Turing hypothesis indeed states that continuous models are no more powerful than the discrete ones. In fact, we have every reason to believe it's true. See [1], and references [BCGH07], [GCB08] in that paper. [1] - http://perso.ens-lyon.fr/yassine.hamoudi/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/pnpgpac.pdf http://perso.ens-lyon.fr/yassine.hamoudi/wp-content/uploads/...
- nightcracker 10y agoThe Church-Turing hypothesis only applies to functions that apply on discrete data. If the data itself is also continuous it does not apply.
- MrMoenty 10y agoYou are right, this reasoning depends on only allowing formal systems with finitely many symbols. Turing himself actually gave justification for this in a beautiful footnote in his 1936 paper [1]: page 249: > I shall also suppose that the number of symbols which may be printed is finite. If we were to allow an infinity of symbols, then there would be symbols differing to an arbitrarily small extent. And then in the footnote: > If we regard a symbol as literally printed on a square we may suppose that the square is 0 < x < 1, 0 < y < 1. The symbol is defined as a set of points in this square, viz. the set occupied by printer's ink. If these sets are restricted to be measurable, we can define the "distance" between two symbols as the cost of transforming one symbol into the other if the cost of moving unit area of printer's ink unit distance is unity, and there is an infinite supply of ink at x = 2. y = 0. With this topology the symbols form a conditionally compact space. [1] https://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/Turing_Paper_1936.pdf https://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/Turing_Paper_1936.pdf
- marcosdumay 10y agoPhysics would have something to say about infinite precision. But yes, with those assumptions, it does not hold. It is not as much that the argument is circular, but that the only tech we know how to use (symbols) limits our expressiveness.
- Retra 10y agoThe universe doesn't have to be discrete. Only our capacity to understand it rationally and form consistent linguistic models of it.
- surement 10y ago> The fact that we can only write down only countably many expressions for numbers doesn't mean that there are numbers that we may never write expressions for Yes it does: there are countably many numbers we can define, and the reals are uncountable, therefore there are uncountably many numbers that cannot be defined.
- Smaug123 10y agoThis may be clearer to the parent commenter if expressed as "there are only countably many strings drawn from the Unicode alphabet, so if we fix a coding scheme such that a string expresses at most one number in that scheme, then there are only countably many numbers we could have defined. If you try and get around this by saying that the coding scheme is arbitrary so the symbol L can be made to stand for any real, then you have dodged the question of how you specify that coding scheme; there are only countably many coding schemes which can be expressed by strings of Unicode once a coding scheme is fixed, and in particular there are only countably many coding schemes expressible in English".
- upquark 10y ago"Real numbers that cannot be defined with language" is not a well-defined set though. Just like "integers that cannot be described in less than 100 words" is not well-defined (I could reach a contradiction by pointing to the "smallest integer that cannot be described in less than 100 words").
- Smaug123 10y agoA sentence which fails to specify a real uniquely… fails to specify a real uniquely. Borel's talking about numbers which can be defined uniquely: that is, picked out, identified. Your Berry-paradox description doesn't identify an integer.
- zodiac 10y agoBut if we assume that we can say a sentence either specifies a real number uniquely or does not, the Berry paradox number is uniquely specified.
- rgossiaux 10y ago>Besides, if you confuse extant with useful you might end up believing that some random large integers aren't "there!" In addition to the points already made about the "all at once" claim, every integer (every rational number, even) can be given a finite description (just write it down).
- LfLxfxxLxfxx 10y agoyep, like many other faux paradoxes, it stems from mixing language and meta-language
- enugu 10y agoI think you (and some other commenters) are responding to something different - potential vs actual infinity - not being able to write down all natural numbers, but we can potentially write any number(with some assumptions like an infinite universe). Whereas the point being made is different and needs some math background which is the work of Cantor. Countable can include all natural numbers that you count until infinity, and the reals are uncountable in that they exceed even this. The proof of this fact(Reals are uncountable), has the same idea involved in Turing machines halting problem and also Godel's theorem. The general version is the power set of a set(set of subsets of a set) cant be put in one to one correspondence with original set. If you assume such a correspondence, then (<guess the clever trick>) leads to a contradiction. Reals are sequences of naturals which include sequences of 1's and 0's which can be interpreted as subsets of naturals(a sequence represents the subset of indexes which get assigned the value 1). So reals are bigger than the power set of naturals. Also, the infinite countable union of countable sets is countable. The number of grid points(integer coordinates) on a plane is the same as the number of grid points on a line. You can set up a zig-zag correspondence. A salesman can visit all grid points on a plane in infinte time. This is used to prove rationals are countable. So even countably infinitely different symbolic systems doesnt help.
- Smaug123 10y agoNitpick: the infinite countable union of countable well-ordered sets is countable. This statement is immune to the failure of Choice.
- enugu 10y agoAs Lang used to say the Axiom Of Choice is obvious, 'I just pick the elements'. Just kidding, thanks for this interesting logical point.
- gjm11 10y agoThe formulation I prefer: a countable union of counted sets is countable. (Any countable set has a well-ordering, because a bijection with the natural number gives you one in an obvious way. The trouble is that you need well-orderings for all of them together. The unusual term "counted" emphasizes that we need the actual "countings" to do the job, whereas for me "well-ordered" is sufficiently commonplace that it doesn't shove in my face the requirement that each set come along with a specific choice of well-ordering.)
- robinhouston 10y agoA rather more technical – but very interesting – take on this question is [0], which opens: > One occasionally hears the argument — let us call it the math-tea argument, for perhaps it is heard at a good math tea — that there must be real numbers that we cannot describe or define, because there are are only countably many definitions, but uncountably many reals. Does it withstand scrutiny? then explains in detail why it does not withstand scrutiny. [0] https://arxiv.org/abs/1105.4597 https://arxiv.org/abs/1105.4597
- petercerno 10y agoThink about a real number with digits: 0.a_1 a_2 a_3 ... in which a_i encodes whether Turing Machine with index i (or program i) halts or not. Since Halting problem is not computable, we will never be able to compute the digits of this real number. Never in our universe.
- upquark 10y agoYes but you defined the number just fine, right? "Compute" is a separate issue from "define", you can't compute a lot of things. Is this going in the intuitionistic logic direction?
- eatitraw 10y agoEven though you defined the number, you can't really do usual stuff with it: e.g. you can't compare it to other numbers. IMO, these kind of numbers are no more "real" than infinitesimals: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperreal_number https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperreal_number
- upquark 10y agoOh it's definitely more real, as in it belongs to R and not to any of its extensions. You guys realize that the definition of R is non-controversial in modern math, right? There are fringe theories like constructivist logic and other groups that reject all infinite constructions, but this is not the consensus view among practicing mathematicians... The way you defined that number makes it a perfectly valid element of the set R, as described by, say, the axiomatic definition here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real_number#Axiomatic_approach https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real_number#Axiomatic_approach Whether it's easy or hard or computationally intractable to compare it to other numbers, that's a totally different question unrelated to its definition. Plus, you can actually empirically compute a finite set of initial digits (a specific Turing machine can be analyzed to see if it terminates or not), so you can compare this number with one that's constructed by flipping its digits, or with pi, etc.
- 10y ago
- mcherm 10y agoConsider the set of all real numbers which you can actually specify IN ANY FASHION AT ALL, so that the person writing a paper about it and the person reading the paper are talking about the same number. This includes easy ones like "3" or "Square root of Pi". It includes oddballs like Chaitin's constant -- the probability that a randomly constructed program will not get stuck in an infinite loop (for some particular choice of computer and programming language) -- which is so ornery a number that we cannot (even in THEORY) figure out a single digit of it (other than its being between 0 and 1). Consider that great big set. It's still countable. The thing that makes "real numbers" bigger than integers, the "extra" that real numbers have must be very, very peculiar.
- GregBuchholz 10y ago>Chaitin's constant -- <snip> -- which is so ornery a number that we cannot (even in THEORY) figure out a single digit of it (other than its being between 0 and 1). You might be interested in: https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~cristian/Calude361_370.pdf https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~cristian/Calude361_370.pdf "A Chaitin Omega number is the halting probability of a universal Chaitin (self-delimiting Turing) machine. Every Omega number is both computably enumerable (the limit of a computable, increasing, converging sequence of rationals) and random(its binary expansion is an algorithmic random sequence). In particular, every Omega number is strongly noncomputable. The aim of this paper is to describe a procedure, that combines Java programming and mathematical proofs, to compute the exact values of the first 64 bits of a Chaitin Omega: 0000001000000100000110001000011010001111110010111011101000010000"
- tromp 10y agoUnfortunately, that is not a Chaitin Omega, since the notion of program length in that paper is flawed. In particular, it counts a 0 or a 1 provided as binary data in the program as adding 7 bits of length to the program. Later papers by Calude fix this problem, while reducing the number of computed bits to 43.
- stymaar 10y ago> Consider that great big set. It's still countable. You didn't prove that statement, and actually Cantor's diagonal arguments [1] proves you wrong: Consider the set of «all real numbers which you can actually specify IN ANY FASHION AT ALL». If you can count it, you can order them in a certain fashion: n0, n1, n2, n3 … It's easy to specify a number X which is not part of this set (which is in contradiction with the definition of this set, and demonstrates ad absurdum that this set is not countable). To build such X, consider the n-th decimal of the n-th number: if it's zero, the n-th decimal of X is 1, otherwise the n-th decimal is 0. Then by construction, X is different from any number of this set, which mean X is not a part of the set. □ [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cantor%27s_diagonal_argument https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cantor%27s_diagonal_argument
- protonfish 10y agoNumbers are not physical things, they are symbols that are part of a system that has changed significantly over years. We can make a metaphorical link between a number and a measurement of our universe, but that does not mean that numbers are part of the physical world.
- cgh 10y agoThey may not be part of our physical world but that does not mean they don't exist independently: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism-mathematics/#ExiMatPla https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism-mathematics/#Ex...
- mannykannot 10y ago"So, in Borel’s view, most reals, with probability one, are mathematical fantasies, because there is no way to specify them uniquely." If that were so, might it not offer a way to an "explanation" for the Banach-Tarski paradox that even the likes of I could imagine I understood? - that duplicate volume you constructed is made from the same reals, specified differently! Not that that would be an argument for the proposition quoted. I was going to say that I am not a mathematician, but that would be redundant.
- eli_gottlieb 10y agoBanach-Tarski isn't a paradox. It's just what happens when you build geometric "shapes" out of nonmeasurable sets. In actual, real-world geometry, we almost always assume the set of points inside the shape/construction we care about is measurable, and that any geometric operations we perform must preserve measure.
- mannykannot 10y agoThanks - I have seen it mentioned in many places (often with "paradox" appended, e.g. [1]), but never with such a succinct commentary as you have given here. [1] http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Banach-TarskiParadox.html http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Banach-TarskiParadox.html
- JacksonGariety 10y agoWhy do you suppose there is a difference between things and the names we give them? What sort of basis is there for that? EDIT: How do you know that a large number is "there" if you can't count to it? What would it mean for a large number to "be there." Being-there is something special. ;-)
- stcredzero 10y agoI think Borel has confused names with things. Pedantic positivist?
- TheOtherHobbes 10y agoOr simply a pragmatist. Reals are a useful sensory abstraction. Countability is another sensory abstraction, although for most people it's a rather less useful one. There's no particular obligation for sensory abstractions to be logically watertight - if only because logic is an abstraction itself.
- bo1024 10y agoYou might be reading too much into the phrase "mathematical fantasies". This is not saying Borel claims they literally do not exist. More that they are not "accessible" or "usable".
- sjolsen 10y ago>The fact that we can only write down only countably many expressions for numbers doesn't mean that there are numbers that we may never write expressions for It depends, as they say, on what the definition of is is. What does it mean for a number to exist if it cannot be described? What does it mean for a construction to exist if it cannot be constructed? >if you confuse extant with useful you might end up believing that some random large integers aren't "there!" The question isn't whether it's useful to claim the existence of uncomputable reals; the question is whether it's meaningful. A construction needn't be useful to be meaningful, but surely it must be meaningful to be useful.
- nine_k 10y agoThe standard delta-epsilon type of reasoning crucially depends on existence of arbitrary reals. Many geometry proofs / lines of reasoning crucially depend on the ability to position a point on a line at an arbitrary distance from another point. All numbers ever written are rationals and thus countable. But those endless irrational numbers make a lot of ways of reasoning simpler, or possible at all.
- sjolsen 10y ago>The standard delta-epsilon type of reasoning crucially depends on existence of arbitrary reals. What do you mean by "arbitrary?" Do you mean uncomputable? How does analysis require the existence of uncomputable reals? >All numbers ever written are rationals and thus countable It is also possible to "write" computable irrational numbers, more or less by definition.
- zerodagger 10y ago>How does analysis require the existence of uncomputable reals? I don't know what the other person was referring to, but from many important theorems of analysis you can prove the existence of uncomputable reals. For example, from the theorem that a continuous function on a bounded interval is uniformly continuous you can prove that there exist uncomputable reals. If we think that this theorem and many more like it are necessary for analysis, we must conclude that analysis requires the existence of uncomputable reals. The above fact comes from the area of mathematical logic known as reverse mathematics. The idea is in the name: rather than proving theorems from axioms, we go in reverse. We take some theorem and we see what axioms we can derive from it (using a weak background theory). This gives us a sense of the logical strength of a theorem; the stronger the axioms we can prove from it the stronger the theorem. An amazing fact is that most classical theorems of mathematics have their logical strength captured by one of five sets of axioms. The weakest are those which are outright provable from the weak background theory (briefly, the background theory, called RCA_0, says that you're allowed to do computable processes). The next is the theory WKL_0, formed from RCA_0 by adding an additional axiom, which goes by the name weak Kőnig's lemma. This axiom states that any infinite binary tree has a cofinal branch (it's a lemma in 'ordinary' mathematics but in reverse mathematics gets treated as an axiom). This is the theory which captures the logical strength of the theorem I mentioned in the first paragraph. From weak Kőnig's lemma we can prove the existence of uncomputable reals. We can construct a computable infinite binary tree so that any branch through it must be uncomputable. From such a branch one can build an uncomputable real, say by insisting that the nth bit in its binary expansion is 1 if and only if the branch went left at level n. (The easiest way to build such a tree is to go through the halting problem. The basic idea is to construct a tree of attempts to solve the halting problem. It turns out this can be done in a computable way, and any branch through the tree will allow us to solve the halting problem and thus must be uncomputable. The key fact used is that while there's no computable procedure to check whether a Turing machine halts at some time, you just want to know whether it halts in n steps (for fixed n), then you can check that with a computer. The program is easy: simply simulate running the Turing machine for n steps and see whether it stops at some point. To build our tree: list the Turing machine programs as p_0, p_1, p_2, ... (This listing can be done in a computable way.) We will associate level n+1 on the tree with p_n. Start with a single node for the root of the tree. Then, to build the (n+1)-st level of the tree, look at each node t on the nth level. Check, in a computable way, whether p_0, p_1, ..., p_(n-1) halt within n steps. If none of them halt, then t has a left and right child at the next level. If p_k does halt within n steps, then look below t to see whether you took the left or right path at level k to get to the node t. If you took the right path, then t gets no child nodes. Otherwise, if you took the left path whenever p_k halts within n steps, then t gets two child nodes. Intuitively speaking, at stage n we keep our options open and don't decide whether p_n halts. But if we later see that it does halt, then we retroactively fix any mistake by not going any further along paths where we guessed wrongly before. For example, it could be that p_0 halts but it takes 1000 steps for this to happen. So while building the tree when you get to level 1000 you'll suddenly stop building any further the entire right half of the tree, since you finally learned that p_0 halts and that you wanted to go left at the root node all along. This process for generating the tree is computable, so by definition it's a computable tree. It's infinite, because you can keep building the tree upward if you happened to have guessed correctly whether each Turing machine so far halts. However, no branch through this tree can be computable. This is because a branch goes right at level n if and only if p_n didn't halt within k steps for any k. That is, the branch goes right at level n if and only if p_n doesn't halt, so from a branch we can decide the halting problem.) ---- Probably the best reference for reverse mathematics is Stephen Simpson's book Subsystems of Second-order Arithmetic. The first chapter is freely available on his website. It nicely lays out the philosophy behind the project and the major results while deferring (most of) the technical details to the rest of the book. http://www.personal.psu.edu/t20/sosoa/chapter1.pdf http://www.personal.psu.edu/t20/sosoa/chapter1.pdf Besides that, the wikipedia page for reverse mathematics isn't awful, but neither is it very good. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_mathematics https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_mathematics
- psyc 10y agoThe fact that we can only write down only countably many expressions for numbers doesn't mean that there are numbers that we may never write expressions for In all seriousness, I don't know that we know for sure that the former doesn't in fact exactly mean the latter.
- mannykannot 10y ago"So, in Borel’s view, most reals, with probability one, are mathematical fantasies, because there is no way to specify them uniquely." So I guess that probability has to be a rational number?