(I did not read the entire text) A great many of the security issues that we are seeing in computing are mainly due to fundamental, architectural decisions (it

(I did not read the entire text) A great many of the security issues that we are seeing in computing are mainly due to fundamental, architectural decisions (it's probably in the text), but it's not as if there is no choice. We had and we still have hardware and architectures that are not memory-oriented and don't use memory-protection, but are fundamentally object-based and use object permissions (i.e. ACLs), enforced at a hardware level. It's just that when these were introduced they were complex and either too expensive or too slow for the mass market, hence simpler architectures prevailed (and no one could've expected otherwise) in the mass markets (desktops, laptops, mobile, computer servers). The difference between these approaches boils down to memory-oriented systems being fail-open, information-dissemination machines, while object and permission oriented systems are meant to be fail-closed, information-protection machines at the hardware level (before adding millions of lines of C code distributed across rings -2 to 0). Note how successful information security nowadays tends to be based on similar principles, e.g. SGX or the Enclave on iDevices — the main processor and the main OS are so completely and fundamentally untrustworthy that you throw in either another completely separate computer, or strong-arm (some pun intended) protections at the hardware level, e.g. encrypting memory so the host can't read it, since it is physically unable to access the key.