6 ms·
It seems that most people are completely in the dark when it comes to security, including myself, but there are some principles that should be unwavering that r
by colordrops 10y ago
It seems that most people are completely in the dark when it comes to security, including myself, but there are some principles that should be unwavering that regularly get ignored again with every new iteration of "secure" software:
* If there is a weak layer in the stack, from the physical layer to to UI, then the system is not secure. Even if your messaging app is secure, your messages are not secure if your OS is not secure
* If the source code is not available for review, the software is not secure
* If you or someone you trust has not done a full and thorough review of all components of the stack you are using, the software is not secure
* Even if the source code is available, the runtime activity must be audited, as it could download binaries or take unsavory actions or connections.
* On the same note, if you do not have a mechanism for verifying the authenticity of the entire stack, the software is not secure.
* If any part of the stack has ever been compromised, including leaving your device unlocked for five minutes in a public place, the software is not secure.
I could go on, and I'm FAR from a security expert. People compromise way too much on security, and make all kinds of wrong assumptions when some new organization comes out and claims that their software is the "secure" option. We see this with apps like Telegram and Signal, where everyone thinks they are secure, but if you really dig down, most people believe they are secure for the wrong reasons:
* The dev team seems like honest and capable people
* Someone I trust or some famous person said this software is secure
* They have a home page full of buzzwords and crypto jargon
* They threw some code up on github
* I heard they are secure in half a dozen tweets and media channels
- espeed 10y agoThe Signal protocol (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_Protocol https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_Protocol) has been vetted, and the code is online available to be audited: - Signal code: https://github.com/whispersystems/ https://github.com/whispersystems/ Telegram has had known flaws, which have been discussed in part here: - Telegram protocol defeated. Authors are going to modify crypto-algorithm https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6948742 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6948742 - A Crypto Challenge For The Telegram Developers https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6936539 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6936539 - Telegram (initial discussion) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6913456 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6913456 https://hn.algolia.com/?query=telegram&sort=byPopularity&prefix=false&page=0&dateRange=all&type=story https://hn.algolia.com/?query=telegram&sort=byPopularity&pre...
- colordrops 10y agoIt's not just about the protocol though, it's the whole stack, and the OSes that it runs on are frequently not secure. Also, the Signal app on Google Play requires your phone number and a Twilio API call to function. No thanks.
- jplayer01 10y agoThat's something we can't do anything about though.
- colordrops 10y agoWe can't do anything about the phone number requirement?
- espeed 10y agoThe phone number is not required as per the Signal protocol -- it's an implementation detail -- another token could be used. At this time, phone number verification is used in the initial authentication flow to protect against someone else spoofing your phone number and pretending to be you. See https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/1181 https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/1181
- homakov 10y agoActually magic link sent to your email would be MUCH better. Also central authority but Gmail >>> any telecom
- yellowapple 10y agoIt also doesn't have to be a central authority, since "anyone" (meaning: anyone who can afford to operate a mailserver, which is actually a surprisingly-high number) can be such an authority for one's own mail.
- caustiko 10y agoThis post is grey, and I'm not quite sure why. It's a bit on the "pessimistic" side, but... that philosophy is actually spot on IMO when it comes to security. So why downvote this? I'm honestly a bit new to this community but to me this sceptic perspective as it pertains to software security is ... well, actually it isn't even enough. Is this a weakness w/HN where even justified pessimism is eschewed?
- matt4077 10y agoOh, HN is plenty pessimistic... But this sort of pessimism isn't really useful. The attitude that "anything is insecure if there is any closed source software anywhere in the stack" means that it's impossible to advance security, because it's almost impossible to avoid binaries (i. e. firmware). Apple, for example, has done a few things that are laudable in this field – i. e. risking a public court fight with the FBI to keep the iPhone secure. If we say that such actions are meaningless because they ship binaries, they have no incentive to do such things. Just rolling over and giving the US gov big-pipe-access to everything like yahoo did becomes the better business proposition. Similarly, what do you answer when a friend who works at the EPA asks you how to securely contact a journalist? If it starts with ordering a custom open-firmware mainboard from somewhere in China, your advice will be ignored.
- rwbhn 10y agoPractical security is all about risk management. And the first step is understanding what your risks are - not assuming or pretending they don't exist. Depending on the nature of the secrets your friend wants to share and who they are trying to hide from, advising them to avoid phones altogether might not be a bad idea. And falsely assuring them something is secure when that can't be confirmed could cause somebody a world of hurt.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- MarkMc 10y agoI think you are being too strict in your definition of 'secure'. 99.99% of devices run Android, iOS or Windows which are closed source and therefore not 'secure'. To me, security is not a binary property but rather a sliding scale. WhatsApp say they use end-to-end encryption and they have a strong financial incentive to be telling the truth. No hacker has demonstrated that WhatsApp are lying and the Wikileaks dump suggests the CIA has been unable to intercept messages in transit. Given this information I would rate WhatsApp at least 'reasonably secure'.
- FreeFull 10y agohttps://source.android.com/ https://source.android.com/ The source code for Android is open under the Apache 2.0 license. Of course, iOS and Windows are closed source.
- cyphar 10y agoYou're ignoring that most drivers for android phones are proprietary, the baseband is entirely proprietary (required by law), the Google services are proprietary (which many apps use) and most apps are proprietary (including Google's replacements for the AOSP apps). If you want a completely free software smartphone experience, it is simply not possible at the moment. Even Replicant[1] still hasn't cracked the baseband puzzle (and is still struggling with the firmware for a couple of phones). So no, Android is definitely proprietary -- even if some parts are not. [1]: http://www.replicant.us http://www.replicant.us
- iheartmemcache 10y agoBasebands fall under exactly which entities juristiction such that they can regulate a baseband to be 'entirely proprietary' ? I mean, BB + superhet. mixer => IF => carrier wave envelope containing your data. How do you even regulate a concept of physics? If you're paying the proper fees as a subscriber to $provider_foo you could even design your own receiver off the public standards documents.. (used to be a popular project for 4th year undergrads to do on FPGAs for the CE's who wanted to get closer to the silicon but MOSIS project space was reserved for only the EEs). If you want a completely 'free' (as in GPL) cell phone experience, you can setup a OpenBTS transmitter and transmit at the 900mhz range which is commons property. To stay legal in the US, your antenna has to put out less than a watt, but the setup allows you to even use off-the-shelf phones and trunk into normal phone lines via standard POTS software. Your device would have to be something a-la http://alumni.media.mit.edu/~mellis/cellphone/ http://alumni.media.mit.edu/~mellis/cellphone/ (just a janky setup, but just a proof-of-concept -- you can patch together components from DigiKey pretty easily these days; if you want free-silicon, I think the closest you're going to get is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OsmocomBB https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OsmocomBB or maybe some soft cores, but if you're actually going to take that soft core to tape-out, you're probably going to be running 6 figures just for masks...)
- maxerickson 10y agoSource code isn't required to study what software may do. If you were really worried about what a particular binary would do, trusting that the binary matched the source and studying runtime behavior would both be a waste of time compared to fully analyzing the binary in question. If you treat the software as a black box and only study run time behavior, you have no idea if you have tripped a countermeasure that silences the malicious behavior; if you study the control flow directly, you can look for such countermeasures.
- fnordfnordfnord 10y ago>If you treat the software as a black box and only study run time behavior, you have no idea if you have tripped a countermeasure that silences the malicious behavior; if you study the control flow directly, you can look for such countermeasures. It would be great to find such a countermeasure, and be able to trigger it reliably, or assert the behavior on a permanent basis. Considering that particular weakness of such countermeasures though, wouldn't the safest [for the attacker] default countermeasure likely be to simply crash the device?
- maxerickson 10y agoCould be. A user that knows about malicious code (which you would have to in order to trigger it to go silent) in a binary just shouldn't use the binary at all though. The broader point is more important: compiled software isn't a black box, treating it like a black box is not the only or best way to analyze it.
- cwyers 10y agoSecurity is not a binary. "Secure" is not something that can be evaluated without context, ie, a threat model. Security is something that comes with tradeoffs. If you require a 100% certainty that no adversary, no matter how well resourced, can obtain electronic communications from you when conducting active surveillance, your only defense is to stop using computers. Most of us don't live with that sort of a constraint, and thus can evaluate things that increase our relative security given a threat model of mostly passive surveillance by state actors and active malicious attacks from private parties that mostly just want our credit card numbers.