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>these are all currently crimes in their own right, so they fall under your first category, rather than your second, so I'm not quite clear what sort of point y

>these are all currently crimes in their own right, so they fall under your first category, rather than your second, so I'm not quite clear what sort of point you're making here. I was answering the question below: >Your proposal ignores it - legalizes its distribution, in fact. Why? If, in response to my answer, you conclude that committing a crime is an action tantamount to sharing, viewing, or possessing information about it, I disagree, and I think your outlook is frighteningly authoritarian. "Action" was a poor word choice. "Actions which entail direct harm", such as raping a child, should be illegal, I should've said. "Actions which entail indirect harm", such as possessing, sharing, or viewing data, should not be, in my opinion. That doesn't matter if you're ignoring actions' directness and level of harm altogether and arguing that, since a judicial body classifies an action as a crime, it is a crime, and so I should agree that it should be a crime. But, in that case, I also disagree, and I think you're being a poor advocate for orthodoxy. >ongoing harm to the victims, which, while not unreasonable, I think might be a weaker argument than that distribution in particular may make and expand a market even when not done for money Here, I think you're doing it more justice. Incidentally, though, I'm the other way around. The "harm to victims" angle is much more salient than the "increasing demand" one, but both are pretty spurious to me, and certainly seem like underwhelming reasons to imprison and permanently cripple the lives of people whose only actions consisted of manipulating bits in storage media to the direct harm of no one.

throwanem 10y ago
Well, what makes a crime is a law stating that such-and-so action is a crime, so I suppose I'd say that, since a legislative body classifies an action as a crime, it is pretty much by definition exactly that. We're discussing whether this specific action should be a crime, which is a separate conversation altogether, and one I think best carried out without reference to some sort of nebulous Platonic ideal of crime, to which you seem implicitly to appeal. You're also underplaying your hand here somewhat, I think - either that, or you find your own arguments unconvincing. You've already conceded, in your concept of "indirect harm" (still harm, but less so?) and the weaksauce relative-injury argument which constitutes your last paragraph, that the distribution of child pornography does inflict ongoing harm on those abused in order to produce it - but you don't think that that harm suffices to justify the injury inflicted upon those who engage in such distribution, but not such production, in the course of being convicted of and punished for that crime. That the former are innocent, and the latter are not, seems not to move you; your concern appears instead to be purely utilitarian. I don't suppose it would be surprising if you were indeed unconvinced of this - it strikes me as a very difficult position to defend! But I'd be interested to see whether and how you do so, nonetheless. Or perhaps I've misgathered your point?

throwanem 10y ago

Well, what makes a crime is a law stating that such-and-so action is a crime, so I suppose I'd say that, since a legislative body classifies an action as a crime, it is pretty much by definition exactly that. We're discussing whether this specific action should be a crime, which is a separate conversation altogether, and one I think best carried out without reference to some sort of nebulous Platonic ideal of crime, to which you seem implicitly to appeal. You're also underplaying your hand here somewhat, I think - either that, or you find your own arguments unconvincing. You've already conceded, in your concept of "indirect harm" (still harm, but less so?) and the weaksauce relative-injury argument which constitutes your last paragraph, that the distribution of child pornography does inflict ongoing harm on those abused in order to produce it - but you don't think that that harm suffices to justify the injury inflicted upon those who engage in such distribution, but not such production, in the course of being convicted of and punished for that crime. That the former are innocent, and the latter are not, seems not to move you; your concern appears instead to be purely utilitarian. I don't suppose it would be surprising if you were indeed unconvinced of this - it strikes me as a very difficult position to defend! But I'd be interested to see whether and how you do so, nonetheless. Or perhaps I've misgathered your point?