7 ms·

WhatsApp Backdoor/Vulnerability demonstration [video]

49 points by sajid 10y ago

activatedgeek 10y ago
There was another article claiming there's no backdoor. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13394900 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13394900. Anybody with any ideas what is happening exactly?
- tonfa 10y ago
  It's what the other article says, for in flight message (single tick), if the key changes it might be reencrypted with a new key if the recipient key changes. If there's a double-tick it's too late, and it won't reencrypt. In practice, unless you have a very long monologue, only one message would "leak", not the full discussion. (after the key changes you'll get a warning if you have the settings to show cryptographic details enabled).
  - FabHK 10y ago
    Nice term, btw, "in flight message" :-)
  - mentat 10y ago
    People have "monologues" on IM all the time. I'm sure FB has the data from Messenger and WhatsApp, what the aggregate exposure in message volume is at any time. I do not have that data but I suspect it's "a lot".
- cryptozeus 10y ago
  Update (May 31, 2016) Facebook responded to my white-hat report "[...] We were previously aware of the issue and might change it in the future, but for now it's not something we're actively working on changing.[...]"
- kasey_junk 10y ago
  Backdoor and vulnerability are not the same thing. Your link is to an article explaining the design decisions that lead to the weakness that is being taken advantage of. A purpiseful & public design trade off is not a backdoor.
  - PunchTornado 10y ago
    It IS a backdoor. 1) Signal protocol doesn't have this issue, it was introduced by Whatsup. 2) It wasn't public until now. 3) The security notification is turned off by default in android and ios apps. Huge issue especially since Whatsup is recommended for activists and whistle-blowers. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=we-pJE5JjAs https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=we-pJE5JjAs
    - FabHK 10y ago
      It was made public in April last year. Most knowledgeable advice only recommends Signal, and possibly Threema or Wire, for communication that needs to be secure, see e.g. https://www.securemessagingapps.com https://www.securemessagingapps.com
      - tptacek 10y ago
        Can you point me to the cryptographic engineer who has ever recommended Threema or Wire over Signal?
- y7 10y ago
  Basically, disagreement over the term "backdoor", which sounds like it was put there intentionally. WhatsApp/Moxie: we made a security/usability trade-off. The video's author/The Guardian: this trade-off allows an attacker to intercept messages (undetected, as long as he permanently cuts off the recipient's phone), which is bad.
  - Certhas 10y ago
    Isn't undetected, as long as he permanently cuts off the recipient's phone a bit of a contradiction?
  - FabHK 10y ago
    > undetected No, a) not if user has enabled security notifications (disabled by default) b) not across a back-and-forth conversation, provided user checks for blue double ticks
- detaro 10y ago
  and here is the discussion about a guardian article this is in response to: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13389935 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13389935
- whyoh 10y ago
  It's an "intentional vulnerability". It's there to prevent users from being annoyed. Which is a bit of a lame excuse, because users would only be "annoyed" in very rare cases and special circumstances, namely: A sends a message to B while B is offline AND then B gets a new phone before coming back online. Even if you disagree with me that it's a very rare case, WhatsApp could still give us an option to show a confirmation before automatically re-sending messages to a new device.
  - FabHK 10y ago
    It's not that rare. It happens anytime the other user gets a new phone, or re-installs WhatsApp. > WhatsApp could still give us an option to show a confirmation before automatically re-sending messages to a new device. Just to clarify: they do optionally notify you (off by default), but after having re-sent the re-keyed messages. It would be nice if they (optionally) offered you a choice to re-send the message, or discard it. (You could then verify key fingerprints out of band before making that choice.) Doing that (making it "blocking") would leak information, OpenWhisperSystems argues, correctly.
    - whyoh 10y ago
      >It's not that rare. It happens anytime the other user gets a new phone, or re-installs WhatsApp. That, and the messages also have to be sent while the user is offline, otherwise there is no vulnerability--assuming you enabled the currently available notifications. So I still believe it's a very rare circumstance and very few people would get "annoyed" by a notification/confirmation for that specific circumstance. >It would be nice if they (optionally) offered you a choice to re-send the message, or discard it. That's exactly what I had in mind.
      - FabHK 10y ago
        > and the messages also have to be sent while the user is offline, otherwise there is no vulnerability a) the notification and concomitant irritation to non-technical users is there when the other user switches phone, whether they were online or not b) the vulnerability is there when the server is compromised, whether the other user is online or not (can just filter out "delivery receipts")
- geocar 10y ago
  That is a very loaded question. It may be easier to understand "what is going on" broadly if you try to frame it in terms of actions: What can you do about this? What do you want to do about this? The "backdoor" (insecurity) is that Facebook can read and spoof your WhatsApp messages, and can be compelled to by any government of a country in which they operate, or by any determined attacker. This surprises people because they believe WhatsApp is secure, since Facebook said so, and because it ostensibly obtains that security from someone who is endorsed by someone else who is considered knowledgable about security. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11431728 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11431728 However it is (in this case) insecure because of a "user-interface issue" (whatever Moxie means by that). Basically, the key and software can be changed at any time, and if it is changed (because of a cloned phone, or with FaceBook's help, or with Google/Apple's help, or because someone hacks some FaceBook/Apple/Google servers, or for other reasons). Moxie intimates that this shouldn't be called a "backdoor" because it wasn't put in with malice, even if it was put in intentionally. Do you agree with that? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13396129 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13396129 Now what do you want to do? Do you want to get some pitchforks and find someone to stab? Do you want to stop using WhatsApp and convince other people to do so as well? Do you want to learn more about security and how cryptography works? Right now, we are looking some kind of campaign- perhaps it is organised and malicious, or perhaps we are seeing multiple actors who have multiple ways of benefitting so they only appear coordinated. That is, are you making this decision yourself? Or are you being encouraged down a path that supports someone elses' goals? Do these actors want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal because they like chaos and carnage and hope that by being doomsayers they will get you to watch their video/read their blog and earn money from advertising? Do these actors want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal because they think we (society) need to actually demand real security and privacy? Should we ask a private company to respect our security and privacy wishes? Or should we ask our government (which is us)? Do these actors want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal because they have a competitors' product? Is there another popular "secure messaging" product for mobile devices that does not have these problems? Do these actors want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal because these tools are actually quite secure and problematic, and it would be more convenient if people who wanted privacy and security could be more easily investigated covertly? Is this a "false flag" on privacy launched perhaps by a state actor? Are there other reasons actors would want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal? What is going on "exactly" has questions and answers on so many levels it is difficult to know where to begin, but I have popcorn.
y7 10y ago
For those not wanting to watch 14 minutes of video, here is the author's blog post explaining the vulnerability: https://tobi.rocks/2016/04/whats-app-retransmission-vulnerability/ https://tobi.rocks/2016/04/whats-app-retransmission-vulnerab...
dogma1138 10y ago
Hmm doesn't WhatsApp puts a red system message when the phone or key is changed? When I talked to my gf the other day noticed it when she switched her work phone.
- FungalRaincloud 10y ago
  I'm not sure, but I think that might be an optional feature that is off by default.
- whyoh 10y ago
  It does [if you enable it], but in special circumstances (as described in the video/article) the warning is only displayed AFTER your messages have already been delivered to a new phone.
nodesocket 10y ago
I could be wrong, but he just puts the sender phone in Airplane mode and then sends a few messages. Then he swaps the sim card from the receivers "Laura's" phone to the government's phone. Then the government's phone is able to view the messages sent while the sender's phone was in Airplane mode. Is that really the vulnerability?
- mike-cardwell 10y ago
  The governments phone doesn't have Laura's private key on it. It is not transferred when the SIM is transferred. So even without the private key, they can intercept the messages. [edit] Also, even if Lauras phone wasn't in airplane mode, all they need to do is prevent the delivery reports, then they can repeat the trick. And of course, they don't need the SIM in order to take over the phone number.
  - nodesocket 10y ago
    I get that the Government's phone does not have Laura's private key. What does Airplane mode have to do with it though? Does this exploit only work when messages are sent unconfirmed/no-network from the sender's phone?
    - y7 10y ago
      Yes. It only works when the original recipient is offline (when they come back online it can be detected).
      - mike-cardwell 10y ago
        Or when the original recipient is not offline, but has been targeted for an attack so their delivery reports are getting blocked.
- Buge 10y ago
  Yes it's a real vulnerability. Edward's phone is reencrypting the message with a new (malicious) public key without Edward's permission. It's not clear this would be a very practical attack, but it's definitely something that Whatsapp should stop if the extra security mode is enabled.
truncheon 10y ago
The premise here, being that powerful (or technically adept) people may have the capacity to impersonate a phone number, or clone a SIM card. ...since that part isn't directly stated, and might not be obvious to everyone.
- FabHK 10y ago
  That would indeed be enough. The other conceivable scenario is that the server gets compromised (and suppresses the "delivery receipts", then sends a spurious "rekeying" message).
  - deleted 10y ago
    [deleted]
Javantea_ 10y ago
It now is a lot more clear what's going on here. The discoverer of this issue is basing his argument on the fact that when you verify a fingerprint, you are now confident that your end-to-end encryption won't transparently send your encrypted data to someone with a different keypair. The other side of the argument is that if WhatsApp actually did what you expect, data would be lost when a person switched phones in the middle of someone sending them a message. As a person who doesn't switch phones very often, I would prefer an end-to-end encryption to never send data to a different public key than the one I've used before. I would rather lose data than divulge it to a third party who has the ability to spoof the recipient's phone. This would only come up whenever someone switched their phone when I was sending them a message, so it's pretty rare. To me the trade off is a no brainer, and apparently to Facebook and Whisper Systems the trade off is a no brainer in the opposite direction.
- whyoh 10y ago
  >if WhatsApp actually did what you expect, data would be lost when a person switched phones in the middle of someone sending them a message Only temporarily lost. WhatsApp could ask you: "do you want to resend the message(s) to the contact's new phone?". An easy solution and it could be optional, even off by default.
  - FabHK 10y ago
    I like that idea. OpenWhisperSystem's response was that due to the delay involved the (potentially compromised) server would know who has enabled notifications/blocking and who hasn't.
    - whyoh 10y ago
      >the (potentially compromised) server would know who has enabled notifications/blocking and who hasn't. How would that be worse than the current situation, where everyone is vulnerable and we all know it?
      - FabHK 10y ago
jMyles 10y ago
I think the past few days of back-and-forth about this issue have made a few things clear: 1) The double-check was not widely understood as an indicator of any particular security state prior to the attention this has gotten. 2) Is it fairly easy to imagine a scenario in which the behavior of WhatsApp can be readily exploited - think of a journalist on the ground in Tahrir Square using WhatsApp to report on conditions, neither expecting nor receiving replies or confirmations, perhaps for hours at a time. 3) The matter of whether this is a "backdoor" or not is contentious, but also not terribly important to the stakeholders. 4) Moxie wholesale approves of the WhatsApp implementation. 5) WhatsApp does in fact provide substantial security for a common and important use case. So, where do we go from here? I think that those of us that care about freedom in the information age well-advised to remember that Moxie has done incredible, substantial, and landscape-shifting work in this space. Nevertheless, I also think that Moxie can provide a few more details and thoughts that will be hugely helpful to the community in thinking through the coming years of IM security. Specifically, I will quote the comment I made in the other article, addressing Moxie directly: Moxie, I think it's fair to say that you are the world thought leader on these matters right now. One thing that the rest of us are wondering right now is: > (Quoting Moxie, in response to my comment) I've been impressed with the level of care that WhatsApp has given to that requirement. To what degree do you really know that? Is there a place where we can read about your interactions with Facebook, the level of access they've given you, and the degree to which they have allowed your recommendations to shape the contours of their implementation? Nothing less than the strength of dissent lies in the balance of questions like these. > I think we should all remain open to ideas about how we can improve this UX within the limits a mass market product has to operate within, but that's very different from labeling this a "backdoor." I agree that the jump to scary terminology is dangerous. However, at the end of the day, I think that many of us have been trying to make a simple point that shows that there is a sort of crossing of that line: WhatsApp claimed that they were simply unable to intercept communications, and now we find out that, without any user interaction or approval, messages which haven't received the "double check" are re-transmitted when a new key is generated. So look: nobody here is trying to diminish your tireless work and your accomplishments in bringing freedom into the information age. But there are nuances here that are important, and fleshing them out is a big part of what this community is about.
mavhc 10y ago
Seems like Facebook should start testing, turn on security notifications for 1% of users, see what happens

49 points by sajid 10y ago

There was another article claiming there's no backdoor. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13394900 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13394900. Anybody with any ideas what is happening exactly?

tonfa 10y ago
It's what the other article says, for in flight message (single tick), if the key changes it might be reencrypted with a new key if the recipient key changes. If there's a double-tick it's too late, and it won't reencrypt. In practice, unless you have a very long monologue, only one message would "leak", not the full discussion. (after the key changes you'll get a warning if you have the settings to show cryptographic details enabled).
- FabHK 10y ago
  Nice term, btw, "in flight message" :-)
- mentat 10y ago
  People have "monologues" on IM all the time. I'm sure FB has the data from Messenger and WhatsApp, what the aggregate exposure in message volume is at any time. I do not have that data but I suspect it's "a lot".
cryptozeus 10y ago
Update (May 31, 2016) Facebook responded to my white-hat report "[...] We were previously aware of the issue and might change it in the future, but for now it's not something we're actively working on changing.[...]"
kasey_junk 10y ago
Backdoor and vulnerability are not the same thing. Your link is to an article explaining the design decisions that lead to the weakness that is being taken advantage of. A purpiseful & public design trade off is not a backdoor.
- PunchTornado 10y ago
  It IS a backdoor. 1) Signal protocol doesn't have this issue, it was introduced by Whatsup. 2) It wasn't public until now. 3) The security notification is turned off by default in android and ios apps. Huge issue especially since Whatsup is recommended for activists and whistle-blowers. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=we-pJE5JjAs https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=we-pJE5JjAs
  - FabHK 10y ago
    It was made public in April last year. Most knowledgeable advice only recommends Signal, and possibly Threema or Wire, for communication that needs to be secure, see e.g. https://www.securemessagingapps.com https://www.securemessagingapps.com
    - tptacek 10y ago
      Can you point me to the cryptographic engineer who has ever recommended Threema or Wire over Signal?
y7 10y ago
Basically, disagreement over the term "backdoor", which sounds like it was put there intentionally. WhatsApp/Moxie: we made a security/usability trade-off. The video's author/The Guardian: this trade-off allows an attacker to intercept messages (undetected, as long as he permanently cuts off the recipient's phone), which is bad.
- Certhas 10y ago
  Isn't undetected, as long as he permanently cuts off the recipient's phone a bit of a contradiction?
- FabHK 10y ago
  > undetected No, a) not if user has enabled security notifications (disabled by default) b) not across a back-and-forth conversation, provided user checks for blue double ticks
detaro 10y ago
and here is the discussion about a guardian article this is in response to: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13389935 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13389935
whyoh 10y ago
It's an "intentional vulnerability". It's there to prevent users from being annoyed. Which is a bit of a lame excuse, because users would only be "annoyed" in very rare cases and special circumstances, namely: A sends a message to B while B is offline AND then B gets a new phone before coming back online. Even if you disagree with me that it's a very rare case, WhatsApp could still give us an option to show a confirmation before automatically re-sending messages to a new device.
- FabHK 10y ago
  It's not that rare. It happens anytime the other user gets a new phone, or re-installs WhatsApp. > WhatsApp could still give us an option to show a confirmation before automatically re-sending messages to a new device. Just to clarify: they do optionally notify you (off by default), but after having re-sent the re-keyed messages. It would be nice if they (optionally) offered you a choice to re-send the message, or discard it. (You could then verify key fingerprints out of band before making that choice.) Doing that (making it "blocking") would leak information, OpenWhisperSystems argues, correctly.
  - whyoh 10y ago
    >It's not that rare. It happens anytime the other user gets a new phone, or re-installs WhatsApp. That, and the messages also have to be sent while the user is offline, otherwise there is no vulnerability--assuming you enabled the currently available notifications. So I still believe it's a very rare circumstance and very few people would get "annoyed" by a notification/confirmation for that specific circumstance. >It would be nice if they (optionally) offered you a choice to re-send the message, or discard it. That's exactly what I had in mind.
    - FabHK 10y ago
      > and the messages also have to be sent while the user is offline, otherwise there is no vulnerability a) the notification and concomitant irritation to non-technical users is there when the other user switches phone, whether they were online or not b) the vulnerability is there when the server is compromised, whether the other user is online or not (can just filter out "delivery receipts")
geocar 10y ago
That is a very loaded question. It may be easier to understand "what is going on" broadly if you try to frame it in terms of actions: What can you do about this? What do you want to do about this? The "backdoor" (insecurity) is that Facebook can read and spoof your WhatsApp messages, and can be compelled to by any government of a country in which they operate, or by any determined attacker. This surprises people because they believe WhatsApp is secure, since Facebook said so, and because it ostensibly obtains that security from someone who is endorsed by someone else who is considered knowledgable about security. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11431728 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11431728 However it is (in this case) insecure because of a "user-interface issue" (whatever Moxie means by that). Basically, the key and software can be changed at any time, and if it is changed (because of a cloned phone, or with FaceBook's help, or with Google/Apple's help, or because someone hacks some FaceBook/Apple/Google servers, or for other reasons). Moxie intimates that this shouldn't be called a "backdoor" because it wasn't put in with malice, even if it was put in intentionally. Do you agree with that? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13396129 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13396129 Now what do you want to do? Do you want to get some pitchforks and find someone to stab? Do you want to stop using WhatsApp and convince other people to do so as well? Do you want to learn more about security and how cryptography works? Right now, we are looking some kind of campaign- perhaps it is organised and malicious, or perhaps we are seeing multiple actors who have multiple ways of benefitting so they only appear coordinated. That is, are you making this decision yourself? Or are you being encouraged down a path that supports someone elses' goals? Do these actors want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal because they like chaos and carnage and hope that by being doomsayers they will get you to watch their video/read their blog and earn money from advertising? Do these actors want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal because they think we (society) need to actually demand real security and privacy? Should we ask a private company to respect our security and privacy wishes? Or should we ask our government (which is us)? Do these actors want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal because they have a competitors' product? Is there another popular "secure messaging" product for mobile devices that does not have these problems? Do these actors want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal because these tools are actually quite secure and problematic, and it would be more convenient if people who wanted privacy and security could be more easily investigated covertly? Is this a "false flag" on privacy launched perhaps by a state actor? Are there other reasons actors would want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal? What is going on "exactly" has questions and answers on so many levels it is difficult to know where to begin, but I have popcorn.

y7 10y ago

For those not wanting to watch 14 minutes of video, here is the author's blog post explaining the vulnerability: https://tobi.rocks/2016/04/whats-app-retransmission-vulnerability/ https://tobi.rocks/2016/04/whats-app-retransmission-vulnerab...

dogma1138 10y ago

Hmm doesn't WhatsApp puts a red system message when the phone or key is changed? When I talked to my gf the other day noticed it when she switched her work phone.

FungalRaincloud 10y ago
I'm not sure, but I think that might be an optional feature that is off by default.
whyoh 10y ago
It does [if you enable it], but in special circumstances (as described in the video/article) the warning is only displayed AFTER your messages have already been delivered to a new phone.

nodesocket 10y ago

I could be wrong, but he just puts the sender phone in Airplane mode and then sends a few messages. Then he swaps the sim card from the receivers "Laura's" phone to the government's phone. Then the government's phone is able to view the messages sent while the sender's phone was in Airplane mode. Is that really the vulnerability?

mike-cardwell 10y ago
The governments phone doesn't have Laura's private key on it. It is not transferred when the SIM is transferred. So even without the private key, they can intercept the messages. [edit] Also, even if Lauras phone wasn't in airplane mode, all they need to do is prevent the delivery reports, then they can repeat the trick. And of course, they don't need the SIM in order to take over the phone number.
- nodesocket 10y ago
  I get that the Government's phone does not have Laura's private key. What does Airplane mode have to do with it though? Does this exploit only work when messages are sent unconfirmed/no-network from the sender's phone?
  - y7 10y ago
    Yes. It only works when the original recipient is offline (when they come back online it can be detected).
    - mike-cardwell 10y ago
      Or when the original recipient is not offline, but has been targeted for an attack so their delivery reports are getting blocked.
Buge 10y ago
Yes it's a real vulnerability. Edward's phone is reencrypting the message with a new (malicious) public key without Edward's permission. It's not clear this would be a very practical attack, but it's definitely something that Whatsapp should stop if the extra security mode is enabled.

truncheon 10y ago

The premise here, being that powerful (or technically adept) people may have the capacity to impersonate a phone number, or clone a SIM card. ...since that part isn't directly stated, and might not be obvious to everyone.

FabHK 10y ago
That would indeed be enough. The other conceivable scenario is that the server gets compromised (and suppresses the "delivery receipts", then sends a spurious "rekeying" message).
- deleted 10y ago
  [deleted]

Javantea_ 10y ago

It now is a lot more clear what's going on here. The discoverer of this issue is basing his argument on the fact that when you verify a fingerprint, you are now confident that your end-to-end encryption won't transparently send your encrypted data to someone with a different keypair. The other side of the argument is that if WhatsApp actually did what you expect, data would be lost when a person switched phones in the middle of someone sending them a message. As a person who doesn't switch phones very often, I would prefer an end-to-end encryption to never send data to a different public key than the one I've used before. I would rather lose data than divulge it to a third party who has the ability to spoof the recipient's phone. This would only come up whenever someone switched their phone when I was sending them a message, so it's pretty rare. To me the trade off is a no brainer, and apparently to Facebook and Whisper Systems the trade off is a no brainer in the opposite direction.

whyoh 10y ago
>if WhatsApp actually did what you expect, data would be lost when a person switched phones in the middle of someone sending them a message Only temporarily lost. WhatsApp could ask you: "do you want to resend the message(s) to the contact's new phone?". An easy solution and it could be optional, even off by default.
- FabHK 10y ago
  I like that idea. OpenWhisperSystem's response was that due to the delay involved the (potentially compromised) server would know who has enabled notifications/blocking and who hasn't.
  - whyoh 10y ago
    >the (potentially compromised) server would know who has enabled notifications/blocking and who hasn't. How would that be worse than the current situation, where everyone is vulnerable and we all know it?
    - FabHK 10y ago

jMyles 10y ago

I think the past few days of back-and-forth about this issue have made a few things clear: 1) The double-check was not widely understood as an indicator of any particular security state prior to the attention this has gotten. 2) Is it fairly easy to imagine a scenario in which the behavior of WhatsApp can be readily exploited - think of a journalist on the ground in Tahrir Square using WhatsApp to report on conditions, neither expecting nor receiving replies or confirmations, perhaps for hours at a time. 3) The matter of whether this is a "backdoor" or not is contentious, but also not terribly important to the stakeholders. 4) Moxie wholesale approves of the WhatsApp implementation. 5) WhatsApp does in fact provide substantial security for a common and important use case. So, where do we go from here? I think that those of us that care about freedom in the information age well-advised to remember that Moxie has done incredible, substantial, and landscape-shifting work in this space. Nevertheless, I also think that Moxie can provide a few more details and thoughts that will be hugely helpful to the community in thinking through the coming years of IM security. Specifically, I will quote the comment I made in the other article, addressing Moxie directly: Moxie, I think it's fair to say that you are the world thought leader on these matters right now. One thing that the rest of us are wondering right now is: > (Quoting Moxie, in response to my comment) I've been impressed with the level of care that WhatsApp has given to that requirement. To what degree do you really know that? Is there a place where we can read about your interactions with Facebook, the level of access they've given you, and the degree to which they have allowed your recommendations to shape the contours of their implementation? Nothing less than the strength of dissent lies in the balance of questions like these. > I think we should all remain open to ideas about how we can improve this UX within the limits a mass market product has to operate within, but that's very different from labeling this a "backdoor." I agree that the jump to scary terminology is dangerous. However, at the end of the day, I think that many of us have been trying to make a simple point that shows that there is a sort of crossing of that line: WhatsApp claimed that they were simply unable to intercept communications, and now we find out that, without any user interaction or approval, messages which haven't received the "double check" are re-transmitted when a new key is generated. So look: nobody here is trying to diminish your tireless work and your accomplishments in bringing freedom into the information age. But there are nuances here that are important, and fleshing them out is a big part of what this community is about.

mavhc 10y ago

Seems like Facebook should start testing, turn on security notifications for 1% of users, see what happens