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A few days ago (on the discussion of the Uber app tracking users' movements after the end of their ride) an Uber employee commented on their data handling: [0]
by taneq 10y ago
A few days ago (on the discussion of the Uber app tracking users' movements after the end of their ride) an Uber employee commented on their data handling: [0]
> Individual users' data is very closely guarded internally. It's immensely difficult to look at user data without specific access. Overwhelmingly, this data is queried in aggregate and fed into machine learning systems. The risk of abuse is exceptionally low.
Obviously this doesn't add up. What gives?
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13085775 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13085775
- tedunangst 10y ago"Uber continues to increase our security investments and many of these efforts, like our multi-factor authentication checks and bug bounty program, have been widely reported" That has absolutely nothing to do with preventing insider access. Where there's smoke screen, there's fire.
- click170 10y agoThis. This bit stood out to me (emphasis mine): > Uber says employees don't receive across-the-board access to customer data and there are several controls in place to ensure that employees only access that data for work purposes. The choice of the word "control" in this context I think gives away a little bit here, it's auditor-speak. This word does not always mean to an auditor what it means to you or I. Having a written policy that says "Don't access X unless it's required for your job" and keeping access logs can satisfy a "control" from an auditor's perspective, depending on the certification. That's better than nothing, but back to your point, you're right that it doesn't prevent insider access. Which isn't something I worry about normally... Edit: Typo
- Khaine 10y agokeeping an audit log should never satisfy an auditor. The keeping of a log is not a control, reviewing the log to detect inappropriate activity and acting upon it, thats the control.
- ProAm 10y agoMost auditors just want to check a box on a sheet, I've never been apart of an audit that was worth anything.
- thenewwazoo 10y agoCareful with that brush, Eugene. As someone who has done (extensive) audit, I respectfully submit that the problem is not the audit process but the auditors you hire. The usual process for such a control should be: * Is there a requirement for a log? * Does that log exist? * Can the system(s) that write to the log be prevented from doing so/tampered with? (branch here to system security review) * How are the contents of that log secured against tampering? (branch here to security review of logs) * Who is responsible for reviewing it? * Where is the evidence that such reviews occurred? * What violations of policy were found during those reviews? (branch here to a review of the follow-up process) * Can I, the auditor, find violations that were not found during the reviews? (if yes, branch here to figuring out why not) This is not an especially complex script to follow, and winning at that last step is the kind of thing that gets you nice fat bonuses and happy bosses, because suddenly the auditee needs remediation consulting services. Especially as the cost of "taking a complete sample" (i.e. reviewing every entry in the log) goes down to nearly zero, this kind of review gets easier and easier (and is often automated by the company being audited, which just shifts the focus slightly... with no change to the last step).
- Khaine 10y agoThats broadly correct, although auditing is usually risk based. The first question should be is there a risk that requires a detective control of audit logging to be in place, if the answer is no (because the system is of low risk or value) then you would be unlikely to continue down the checklist.
- scottlamb 10y agoThey're probably both true. The article talks about information from last February and a New York settlement this year. The comment you linked is from 11 days ago and used present tense. Adding them together, Uber probably was far too open with this data and then, under pressure from New York and other parties, locked it down recently.
- EugeneOZ 10y agoThis quote from another employee also looks naive now (and I'm not trying to offend him): https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13086454 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13086454
- employee8000 10y agoNo, I'm not naive, and I, proudly, stand behind everything I wrote. The person in the article was terminated before I joined, so I don't know what the systems were like back then, but every time I access production systems, I have a ton of messages telling me that our access is being completely tracked and we are prohibited from doing anything that was mentioned in the article. I haven't actually tested to see what I can get away with because I'm not in the habit of risking my job and career over curiosities.
- droopyEyelids 10y agoI don't know if you're being serious or you're trying to damn them with faint praise by mentioning they changed their MOTD as a 'security measure' If you want to defend uber, it's pretty easy, just say there you know people that work on the team that audits the logs of employee access to personal data every quarter, and if those logs aren't justified by a ticket people get fired.
- employee8000 10y agoI have no idea what you're talking about, I'm just telling the truth. I don't access customer information, and I don't know anyone who audits the logs so I can't comment on those. I also don't know what other processes are in place, I'm sure there are others, but I've just never had to deal with it so I don't know. But I trust that Uber takes the security of their customers information very very seriously. The image of Uber being a brogrammers haven just isn't true anymore. There are thousands of engineers working that care very much about the company and our customers, including drivers and riders.
- 10y ago
- geofft 10y agoSelection bias. Nobody wants to work at an unethical company, and engineers in the Valley generally have enough job mobility that they can follow through on that. Humans perceive whether a company is unethical in very different ways (I would never work at, say, Palantir, but clearly people do; I'm sure many of them would never work for my current employer, in finance). So, the only people with objective knowledge of a company's internal safeguards and hiring practices are those with favorable subjective value judgments of just how hard it is to bypass those safeguards or just how good those hiring practices are at keeping out unethical people.
- hibikir 10y agoI don't know about Uber, but I've worked at a lot of places that had sensitive data. A common patterns is to fail to treat employees like attackers, and protect data in ways that are very beatable by a motivated employee. Some examples that hopefully have been fixed: -A company had a specific dataset that would be worth millions: The kind of things that a wikileaks might want to publish, and would make the papers. I was supposedly unable to access the app that displayed it, but I had access to the tables. For legitimate business reasons, I took the data out, put it in my company laptop, and stuck a search engine on top. There were no logs of my activity, and nobody came to ask why in the world I was doing something like this. -At another place, they were saving credit cards, encrypted, but their idea of saving encryption keys was to put them in a file that only root could access. Well, everyone had access to create batch jobs (yes, even phone reps), and batch jobs ran as root, so anyone could walk out with the lot. I had to do a lot of work to convince them that yes, this was not PCI compliant. -Another system had relatively well protected data, only available to people with access. Except they had single sign on, and some of they systems that took credentials did so in the clear. Peek at network traffic, steal credentials, and then do whatever you want as anyone you want! They had a process where you were never supposed to leave your computer unattended, and if you did, team members would go into your computer and send an email to the team promising cake, and you'd have to bring it as punishment for your security problems. Imagine their surprise when people were sending emails promising cake while they were using their computers. -A phone company having cell call metadata in the clear, in a DB any developer could query. There was another system with billing information, equally accessible. So search for your favorite person in one, and go to the other and see who they call, when they call, and from where. Isn't that convenient? So I don't believe anyone's claims about their data security unless they come from someone that has some security knowledge and has tried to evaluate the security pretending to be a real attacker. And even in that case, I'll probably want a team of them. Otherwise, I'll assume there are major flaws that nobody has found, just because nobody has cared enough. I have yet to find an employer where this was not the case.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- drvdevd 10y ago
- mikeash 10y agoFrom the way that description lacks any specifics and is filled with unnecessary adverbs, I'd guess that the engineer in question doesn't work with this data, and is just repeating what he's been told. I would imagine that Uber reassures its employees about how great their data privacy policies are, just as they do with their customers.