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Download Signal? No, thank you. The fact that the guy behind it is hyping it via the New York Times, a generalist publication, instead of validating the thing

by at612 10y ago

Download Signal? No, thank you. The fact that the guy behind it is hyping it via the New York Times, a generalist publication, instead of validating the thing through professional cryptographers (which he isn't) and recognised privacy champions such as the EFF is very telling. The thing has not been properly validated or verified (for a start, because there is no design document to validate against, and no published goals to verify against), it uses an ad-hoc encryption scheme from a non-cryptographer, it is not open source (see F-Droid discussion why it's not there), it uses hardwired servers controlled by a party or parties which are not known to be trustworthy, and apparently it requires Google Play services, which nobody who is truly concerned about their privacy is going to use in the first place (and definitely one should not). From the way this is going, it is becoming clearer by the day that this is just another start-up, their target market are unsophisticated but paranoid users and hipsters with no real need for privacy but who think they should make some kind of statement. Their plan is to hype it up (e.g., via the NYT), get enough users, then get bought by one of the so-called "social media" players. It is more attractive to them than Telegram because the latter is run by a Russian, which to the American public sounds sinister (Mr Brin and countless other great scientists and innovators notwithstanding), and their servers are probably based in Germany, which is a bit more of a problem since there are (still) some proper privacy laws over there, and which would cause some headaches to the acquiring party. Besides which, there is a good chance that their current investors come from those "social media", or are the usual Silicon Valley VC crowd, so things stay between friends, as it were. So, in brief: * If you want a new Skype, go for it. * If you care about the privacy of your communications, you should avoid it. * If you need to keep your comms private, you must avoid it. Anyone disagrees? Feel free to reply and tell me why!

e12e 10y ago
> it is not open source Huh? https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android I'd even argue it's free software - the team has managed to create some confusion about distributing modified binaries - with regards to using the servers Signal operates -- but have clarified that it is indeed ok to build your own binary from the source they provide, and use their servers. I'm not quite convinced about their argument for official app store distribution and updates, but I can understand the argument. > it requires Google Play services I'm fairly sure the iOS client doesn't depend on Google Play Services. Sticking with an app store does require trust in the provider though. Whisper System have made some fairly clear choices, and while it's perfectly fine to disagree, I think it would be best to avoid FUD. It certainly strikes me as one of the better options for pragmatic secure messaging, that allows for a fairly narrow and reasonable set of threats (Google/Apple/Microsoft (possibly more than one of each, depending on your platform), Whisper Systems themselves, probably most state actors). The other reasonable option I'm aware of (that make slightly different trade-offs), is ChatSecure/zom.im (where zom.im is a "friendly" fork of ChatSecure).
- at612 10y ago
  > I'd even argue it's free software Terminology. What you call free software I call open source. As you go on to mention, you can see the source but not use it in any meaningful way. In particular: > but have clarified that it is indeed ok to build your own binary from the source they provide, Exactly. Your own binary. From their source. Build your own binary for someone else, and it's "malware", as the guy had the nerve to call F-Droid in that bug report (here: https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/53 https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/53). That sort of bad faith, coming from a known liar (see my other reply) is what I really cannot condone. > and use their servers. Yeah, similarly. Use a source other than theirs or servers other than theirs and they start whingeing. That is not open source. > I'm not quite convinced about their argument for official app store distribution and updates, Possibly because every time it's a different excuse? > but I can understand the argument. Yes, so can I: they want to control the platform so that it is their users, so that they can sell it to someone else, like they did last time. And I would be perfectly fine with that, if it wasn't done via lies, deception, and denigrating third parties, particularly the chaps at F-Droid who at least have the decency of using their real names (not to mention not seeing you as the product). > Sticking with an app store does require trust in the provider though. Agreed. How high is Google in your "trusted" list? Yes, I'm picking on Google because it's a bit of an easier target than Apple, but still. > I think it would be best to avoid FUD. I agree, and that's precisely why I feel the need to speak up. I challenge the honesty not of their enterprise (which is no different from that of Skype, Whatsapp, or any other player) but of the way they are pursuing their goal. See above. > It certainly strikes me as one of the better options for pragmatic secure messaging, I don't know. As mentioned elsewhere, XMPP meets all my requirements and is not vendor-dependent. But the availability of options depends on each user's definition of things like "pragmatic" and "secure" (and even "messaging" for that matter!) From seeing what's out there though, it appears that modern versions of Whatsapp (which I don't use, I'm FOSS-only) offer essentially the same capabilities as this application though, including end-to-end encryption. And of course, essentially the same disadvantages. I could be mistaken here though. > that allows for a fairly narrow and reasonable set of threats (Google/Apple/Microsoft (possibly more than one of each, depending on your platform), Whisper Systems themselves, probably most state actors). I guess it also depends on each user's definition of "fairly narrow and reasonable". :-)
garrettr_ 10y ago
I'm probably just inviting myself to get trolled by replying to this, but this comment is just ridiculously wrong on so many levels. > The fact that the guy behind it is hyping it via the New York Times, a generalist publication, instead of validating the thing through professional cryptographers (which he isn't) and recognised privacy champions such as the EFF is very telling. Cryptographer Matthew Green on Signal's crypto and code quality (it was called RedPhone/TextSecure at the time of this writing): https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/09/here-come-encryption-apps/ https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/09/here-com... Version 1.0 of EFF's Secure Messaging Scorecard gave Signal 7/7: https://www.eff.org/node/82654 https://www.eff.org/node/82654. > The thing has not been properly validated or verified (for a start, because there is no design document to validate against, and no published goals to verify against) Signal has been analyzed, with favorable results, by academic researchers at least twice: - https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/904.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/904.pdf - https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf > it uses an ad-hoc encryption scheme from a non-cryptographer Moxie Marlinspike and Trevor Perrin probably wouldn't call themselves "cryptographers," but almost anybody in the field would agree that they are experts on applied cryptography.
- at612 10y ago
  > I'm probably just inviting myself to get trolled by replying to this I'm sorry that you get that impression, but I do appreciate your input. > Cryptographer Matthew Green on Signal's crypto and code quality (it was called RedPhone/TextSecure at the time of this writing) That's the application that they sold to Twitter, not the one being talked about here. I do not know how different the code bases are. It is also around that time that the app had a gaping, amateurish hole in that it was simply leaking everything via logcat. And what does the guy do? Instead of addressing the issue like a professional, he goes on a complete tangent rubbishing F-Droid (https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/53 https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/53) and then making rather poor excuses as to why you should get your application from the Google store and not from anywhere else. Excuses which by the way, have been evolving over time. I think he eventually admitted that he wants to keep track of how many users are using it (handy to show to your potential buyers). He also has a history of lying, such as when he used fake WHOIS details to run his "Google anonymiser" thing. And of course, when he was shut down by the registrar, as you do when someone has given you false details, what did he do? He went to the press to whine about the registrar! After he entered a contract in bad faith, something which happens to be a prosecutable offence. That's the sort of person we are talking about here. I hope you will understand if his word does not exactly fill me with confidence. > https://www.eff.org/node/82654 https://www.eff.org/node/82654. That page starts with: "This is version 1.0 of our scorecard; it is out of date, and is preserved here for purely historical reasons." And continues with: "the results in the scorecard below should not be read as endorsements of individual tools or guarantees of their security" > Signal has been analyzed, with favorable results, by academic researchers at least twice: Yes, I am aware of those. And that is not what validation and verification is which, as I said, in the absence of publicly available design documents, is impossible to do independently. The guy is trying to make it look like he's selling a "secure" communication platform, but if you presented that to a defence contractor (which I have some experience with) you would be laughed out of the building. Proper security is not done like this at all. For a start, you actually define your goals, i.e., what you intend to secure, against what threats, etc., etc. If you can show me a paper with that information I would be grateful. Notably, you may have noticed that those papers, like Green's, are a protocol analysis, not an analysis of the entire solution. In that respect, you're back to the previous situation: the protocol might be ultra-secure, but if you're still leaking your plaintext on a different channel... > Moxie Marlinspike and [...] probably wouldn't call themselves "cryptographers," At the risk of sounding elitist, what is his academic background? (I elided the other person because I do not know who he is). > but almost anybody in the field would agree that they are experts on applied cryptography. What do you base that conjecture on?

by at612 10y ago

e12e 10y ago

> it is not open source Huh? https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android I'd even argue it's free software - the team has managed to create some confusion about distributing modified binaries - with regards to using the servers Signal operates -- but have clarified that it is indeed ok to build your own binary from the source they provide, and use their servers. I'm not quite convinced about their argument for official app store distribution and updates, but I can understand the argument. > it requires Google Play services I'm fairly sure the iOS client doesn't depend on Google Play Services. Sticking with an app store does require trust in the provider though. Whisper System have made some fairly clear choices, and while it's perfectly fine to disagree, I think it would be best to avoid FUD. It certainly strikes me as one of the better options for pragmatic secure messaging, that allows for a fairly narrow and reasonable set of threats (Google/Apple/Microsoft (possibly more than one of each, depending on your platform), Whisper Systems themselves, probably most state actors). The other reasonable option I'm aware of (that make slightly different trade-offs), is ChatSecure/zom.im (where zom.im is a "friendly" fork of ChatSecure).

at612 10y ago
> I'd even argue it's free software Terminology. What you call free software I call open source. As you go on to mention, you can see the source but not use it in any meaningful way. In particular: > but have clarified that it is indeed ok to build your own binary from the source they provide, Exactly. Your own binary. From their source. Build your own binary for someone else, and it's "malware", as the guy had the nerve to call F-Droid in that bug report (here: https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/53 https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/53). That sort of bad faith, coming from a known liar (see my other reply) is what I really cannot condone. > and use their servers. Yeah, similarly. Use a source other than theirs or servers other than theirs and they start whingeing. That is not open source. > I'm not quite convinced about their argument for official app store distribution and updates, Possibly because every time it's a different excuse? > but I can understand the argument. Yes, so can I: they want to control the platform so that it is their users, so that they can sell it to someone else, like they did last time. And I would be perfectly fine with that, if it wasn't done via lies, deception, and denigrating third parties, particularly the chaps at F-Droid who at least have the decency of using their real names (not to mention not seeing you as the product). > Sticking with an app store does require trust in the provider though. Agreed. How high is Google in your "trusted" list? Yes, I'm picking on Google because it's a bit of an easier target than Apple, but still. > I think it would be best to avoid FUD. I agree, and that's precisely why I feel the need to speak up. I challenge the honesty not of their enterprise (which is no different from that of Skype, Whatsapp, or any other player) but of the way they are pursuing their goal. See above. > It certainly strikes me as one of the better options for pragmatic secure messaging, I don't know. As mentioned elsewhere, XMPP meets all my requirements and is not vendor-dependent. But the availability of options depends on each user's definition of things like "pragmatic" and "secure" (and even "messaging" for that matter!) From seeing what's out there though, it appears that modern versions of Whatsapp (which I don't use, I'm FOSS-only) offer essentially the same capabilities as this application though, including end-to-end encryption. And of course, essentially the same disadvantages. I could be mistaken here though. > that allows for a fairly narrow and reasonable set of threats (Google/Apple/Microsoft (possibly more than one of each, depending on your platform), Whisper Systems themselves, probably most state actors). I guess it also depends on each user's definition of "fairly narrow and reasonable". :-)

garrettr_ 10y ago

I'm probably just inviting myself to get trolled by replying to this, but this comment is just ridiculously wrong on so many levels. > The fact that the guy behind it is hyping it via the New York Times, a generalist publication, instead of validating the thing through professional cryptographers (which he isn't) and recognised privacy champions such as the EFF is very telling. Cryptographer Matthew Green on Signal's crypto and code quality (it was called RedPhone/TextSecure at the time of this writing): https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/09/here-come-encryption-apps/ https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/09/here-com... Version 1.0 of EFF's Secure Messaging Scorecard gave Signal 7/7: https://www.eff.org/node/82654 https://www.eff.org/node/82654. > The thing has not been properly validated or verified (for a start, because there is no design document to validate against, and no published goals to verify against) Signal has been analyzed, with favorable results, by academic researchers at least twice: - https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/904.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/904.pdf - https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf > it uses an ad-hoc encryption scheme from a non-cryptographer Moxie Marlinspike and Trevor Perrin probably wouldn't call themselves "cryptographers," but almost anybody in the field would agree that they are experts on applied cryptography.

at612 10y ago
> I'm probably just inviting myself to get trolled by replying to this I'm sorry that you get that impression, but I do appreciate your input. > Cryptographer Matthew Green on Signal's crypto and code quality (it was called RedPhone/TextSecure at the time of this writing) That's the application that they sold to Twitter, not the one being talked about here. I do not know how different the code bases are. It is also around that time that the app had a gaping, amateurish hole in that it was simply leaking everything via logcat. And what does the guy do? Instead of addressing the issue like a professional, he goes on a complete tangent rubbishing F-Droid (https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/53 https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/53) and then making rather poor excuses as to why you should get your application from the Google store and not from anywhere else. Excuses which by the way, have been evolving over time. I think he eventually admitted that he wants to keep track of how many users are using it (handy to show to your potential buyers). He also has a history of lying, such as when he used fake WHOIS details to run his "Google anonymiser" thing. And of course, when he was shut down by the registrar, as you do when someone has given you false details, what did he do? He went to the press to whine about the registrar! After he entered a contract in bad faith, something which happens to be a prosecutable offence. That's the sort of person we are talking about here. I hope you will understand if his word does not exactly fill me with confidence. > https://www.eff.org/node/82654 https://www.eff.org/node/82654. That page starts with: "This is version 1.0 of our scorecard; it is out of date, and is preserved here for purely historical reasons." And continues with: "the results in the scorecard below should not be read as endorsements of individual tools or guarantees of their security" > Signal has been analyzed, with favorable results, by academic researchers at least twice: Yes, I am aware of those. And that is not what validation and verification is which, as I said, in the absence of publicly available design documents, is impossible to do independently. The guy is trying to make it look like he's selling a "secure" communication platform, but if you presented that to a defence contractor (which I have some experience with) you would be laughed out of the building. Proper security is not done like this at all. For a start, you actually define your goals, i.e., what you intend to secure, against what threats, etc., etc. If you can show me a paper with that information I would be grateful. Notably, you may have noticed that those papers, like Green's, are a protocol analysis, not an analysis of the entire solution. In that respect, you're back to the previous situation: the protocol might be ultra-secure, but if you're still leaking your plaintext on a different channel... > Moxie Marlinspike and [...] probably wouldn't call themselves "cryptographers," At the risk of sounding elitist, what is his academic background? (I elided the other person because I do not know who he is). > but almost anybody in the field would agree that they are experts on applied cryptography. What do you base that conjecture on?