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I always point to David Chalmers when someone wants to understand the problem of consciousness. I like how casual he is about possible solutions and gives credi

by aaimnr 10y ago

I always point to David Chalmers when someone wants to understand the problem of consciousness. I like how casual he is about possible solutions and gives credibility to all the options (unlike eg. Daniel Dennett, who seems almost religious about how revolutionary his "there's no problem at all" approach is). I really recommend this podcast in which Sam Harris talks with Chalmers about all the options currently in the game: https://www.samharris.org/podcast/item/the-light-of-the-mind https://www.samharris.org/podcast/item/the-light-of-the-mind One of the most promising theories (discussed in the podcast) assumes that consciousness is a fundamental attribute of reality, the other side of the coin (matter being the first one). Which leads to the conclusions, that consciousness is everywhere, but not as 'condensed' as in the brain. Seems crazy at first, but the more you think about it the more plausible it seems. Here's a nice paper about it: http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/370/1668/20140167 http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/370/1668/2014... Within this paradigm it starts to make sense to call the reality "The Mind", as some Buddhist schools do. There's also the crazy part, about how under some conditions it could potentially lead to experiencing other peoples' minds. For the more adventurous, here's a talk by Culadasa, very experienced meditator and a neuroscience professor, in which he shares some thoughts about the problem and also some of these crazy experiences he had: http://s3.amazonaws.com/dharmatreasure/150430-tcmc--culadasa--dharma-talk.mp3 http://s3.amazonaws.com/dharmatreasure/150430-tcmc--culadasa...

elorant 10y ago
I first came upon the consciousness as reality theme when I read “The self-aware universe” [0] by Goswami which introduces the idea of monistic idealism. Penrose also contemplates with the idea in the “Emperor’s New Mind” [1]. I highly recommend both books to anyone interested in exploring alternate theories. [0]: https://www.amazon.com/Self-Aware-Universe-Consciousness-Creates-Material/dp/0874777984 https://www.amazon.com/Self-Aware-Universe-Consciousness-Cre... [1]: https://www.amazon.com/Emperors-New-Mind-Concerning-Computers/dp/0198784929 https://www.amazon.com/Emperors-New-Mind-Concerning-Computer...
- aaimnr 10y ago
  Just to be clear, what you are talking about is different to what Chalmers and others are talking about. The "idealistic" monism assumes that matter doesn't actually exists, while "neutral" monism assumes that matter and consciousness have similar ontological status as they are irreducible properties of the 'real stuff' [0]. BTW it may be appealing to the HN crowd that Bertrand Russell, the uber geek, subscribed to neutral monism as well. [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutral_monism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutral_monism
justinpombrio 10y ago
Scott Aaronson's take on the paper you linked to: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799 http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799
david-given 10y ago
If you believe consciousness exists, and that the universe is real, then it's pretty much tautological that the universe is a system which includes consciousness, which is a very, very tiny step away from stating that the universe itself is conscious --- not by way of mysticism, but simply by redefining your terms. In much the same way, my house can be considered a data processing device, because it contains a computer. (Well. Several computers. Many computers.) The problem is, what do we do with this now? There's never been any physical evidence that consciousness is a real thing or can effect the world in any way other than via the actions of people who believe they are conscious (which, speaking from my perspective of a person who believes they are conscious, is no small thing); the only real consequences of deciding that we are part of a greater conscious system are going to be philosophical. And there are plenty of existing philosophical systems which believe that already --- you mention Buddhism. And while I do think that believing that we're part of the world, rather than being somehow separate from it, is definitely a good idea, I'm an engineer. This seems dissatisfying. Is there anything else can we do with this idea?
- aaimnr 10y ago
  I agree that it doesn't have to be in any way mystical and that it comes to redefining what's fundamental and what's merely constructed or emergent (although it's a very tricky term). In the panpsychist approach neither matter nor consciousness can be reduced to the other one. For more engineering approach to the problem, there's lot we can do. One way would be to study in more and more details the correlates of consciousness to understand the "linking" mechanism better. Anil Seth describes this approach here: https://aeon.co/essays/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-is-a-distraction-from-the-real-one https://aeon.co/essays/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-is-.... On the other hand, if consciousness indeed is a fundamental attribute of reality, we should extend the 'engineering' to cover also the 'mind' part of reality. This is exactly what meditation is - to train the mind so that it can see more and more clearly all the components of conscious experience until it reaches the bottom. As a result you come up with a number of 'edge cases' - interesting states that can be used to reason about this reality conceptually. There are eg. 'experience of space itself', experience of consciousness (so called immaterial Jhanas) or finally experience caused by calming the unconscious mind to the extent that it stops projecting any content into conscious mind, while the latter is still operating. This (supposedly) leads to realisation by the mind itself that the 'experienced world' is nothing but its creation. Of course we all can understand it conceptually, but this experience leads to permanent change in perception (you can't "unsee it") which becomes as objective as the human mind can possibly be. Meaning, that it realises in every moment that each experience is its own creation. It may all seem mystical, exotic or plain crazy, but there's no other way to understand the mind than through the mind itself, if the discussed hypothesis is true.
lomnakkus 10y ago
> One of the most promising theories (discussed in the podcast) assumes that consciousness is a fundamental attribute of reality Did you really mean to say "assumes" there? (As in assumes as aximoatic.) Because that's one hell of an an assumption.
- aaimnr 10y ago
  Indeed, it definitely is one hell of an assumption. Just as "matter is fundamental and consciousness is an emergent phenomena" is. Until we find a way to test it in any way (which may not be possible at all) the only thing we're left with is to play with the axioms and get a feel of what the resulting theory can and cannot explain. However when we accept the 'panpsychist' axiom, we're free to come up with more detailed theories (as Integrated Information Theor) that eg. predict under what conditions physical systems and consciousness coincide in a way we can experience. And indeed they claim they can explain eg. why brain, as opposed to silicon circuits, coincides with it. To be clear, I'm not saying this theory is correct - I've no idea. I'm just saying that this whole approach is as valid as the physicalist one.
  - lomnakkus 10y ago
    > Indeed, it definitely is one hell of an assumption. Just as "matter is fundamental and consciousness is an emergent phenomena" is. Well, except you snuck two assumptions in there. I'm certainly not assuming, nor claiming to know definitively whether consciousness is an emergent phenomenon. > However when we accept the 'panpsychist' axiom, we're free to come up with more detailed theorie If you assume a false premise you can come up with literally anything, so this is not particularly surprising or illuminating. > I'm just saying that this whole approach is as valid as the physicalist one. One is grounded in what can be observed objectively[1] and the other is not. ... and to believe your explanation, I'm going to need evidence that it's as valid as the "physicalist"[2] one. [1] Well, at least as far as others can confirm that they observe roughly the same things, e.g. "red" or "consciousness". [2] I think you're thinking of "materialist"?
Florin_Andrei 10y ago
EDIT: fixed stupid brain bug Dennett's approach is absurd. Consciousness is the only thing in the Universe that is self-evident in the strict sense. Everything else is at least second-hand stuff - see the brain in a vat hypothesis. To say that consciousness is an illusion is ridiculous; I can see how he gets there, but the conclusion is absurd. Somewhere along the way there's a mistake; no, I don't know where the mistake is, and I could not even begin to hypothesize. OP's article points out this predicament very well. It is a hard problem indeed. > One of the most promising theories (discussed in the podcast) assumes that consciousness is a fundamental attribute of reality, the other side of the coin (matter being the first one). I can hear the objections being raised already, but it's a neat promising step towards solving the hard problem. Suddenly the reducibility paradox vanishes. It would also relieve another problem. If you can't trivially reduce consciousness to neural activity, then how is it coupled with perception? There would appear to be a gap between the sensory chain and the fact of awareness. And then for consciousness to work, it would already have to be everywhere (in a sense, possibly even a somewhat metaphorical one, or at least non-trivial). The assumption you mention solves this problem. > here's a talk by Culadasa, very experienced meditator and a neuroscience professor It's very, very hard to agree with Dennett, and it's getting harder the more you advance in the practice of meditation. As soon as you realize that you can peel off and disconnect layers upon layers of perception (external at first, then the many internal layers too), and also greatly reduce the waves of what is commonly called "thinking", while consciousness does not diminish but instead becomes at once more vivid and more stable, more calm and more intense, less connected to external factors but more broad - all that talk about "the illusion of consciousness" starts to look extremely suspicious. It's not perception, and it's not thinking; it can relate to these things, but it's fundamentally different. It can ultimately exist completely independent of inputs, either external (sensory) or internal (thoughts, mind activity in the trivial sense, even memory). Don't just read about it. Go ahead and have the experience yourself. It changes a lot of perspectives. You don't even have to go all the way to the highest levels described in the literature - the intermediate stuff is revelatory enough already.
- aaimnr 10y ago
  Did you mean Dennett, instead of Chalmers? I agree that the Dennett's conclusions seems to be false almost on a logical level. The self is an illusion for sure, the consciousness for sure isn't (EDIT: not saying here that there exists 'pure consciousness without content'). > Don't just read about it. Go ahead and have the experience yourself. It changes a lot of perspectives. You don't even have to go all the way to the highest levels described in the literature - the intermediate stuff is revelatory enough already. It is indeed. The more you meditate, the more you see that most of the things that you do 'outside' are meaningless, just playing with your representations of the world and pretending they are real. Of course we can't do anything to somehow reach the 'real' world, but at least we can drop the pretending part. The title of this book may seem both scary and beautiful in this regard: http://www.buddha-heute.de/downloads/treeriver.pdf http://www.buddha-heute.de/downloads/treeriver.pdf Not sure I'd recommend it for beginners, but I just love the title.
deleted 10y ago
[deleted]
titzer 10y ago
I find reading Chalmers to be irritating. His first premise is dualism. If you read his original paper on the hard problem you'll find basically every statement presupposes this fact and then concludes this fact. It's maddening. Dualism cannot be assumed apriori. There are several good rebuttals to Chalmers in this collection of essays: Explaing Consciousness: The Hard Problem: https://www.amazon.com/Explaining-Consciousness-Problem-Jonathan-Shear/dp/026269221X https://www.amazon.com/Explaining-Consciousness-Problem-Jona... One of the best IMO is Thomas W. Clark's functional identity hypothesis that says that experience is _equivalent_ to the processing system. Basically, this is what it feels like to be a human brain. http://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/consciousness/the-explanatory-gap http://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/consciousness/the-expla...

by aaimnr 10y ago

elorant 10y ago

I first came upon the consciousness as reality theme when I read “The self-aware universe” [0] by Goswami which introduces the idea of monistic idealism. Penrose also contemplates with the idea in the “Emperor’s New Mind” [1]. I highly recommend both books to anyone interested in exploring alternate theories. [0]: https://www.amazon.com/Self-Aware-Universe-Consciousness-Creates-Material/dp/0874777984 https://www.amazon.com/Self-Aware-Universe-Consciousness-Cre... [1]: https://www.amazon.com/Emperors-New-Mind-Concerning-Computers/dp/0198784929 https://www.amazon.com/Emperors-New-Mind-Concerning-Computer...

aaimnr 10y ago
Just to be clear, what you are talking about is different to what Chalmers and others are talking about. The "idealistic" monism assumes that matter doesn't actually exists, while "neutral" monism assumes that matter and consciousness have similar ontological status as they are irreducible properties of the 'real stuff' [0]. BTW it may be appealing to the HN crowd that Bertrand Russell, the uber geek, subscribed to neutral monism as well. [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutral_monism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutral_monism

justinpombrio 10y ago

Scott Aaronson's take on the paper you linked to: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799 http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799

david-given 10y ago

If you believe consciousness exists, and that the universe is real, then it's pretty much tautological that the universe is a system which includes consciousness, which is a very, very tiny step away from stating that the universe itself is conscious --- not by way of mysticism, but simply by redefining your terms. In much the same way, my house can be considered a data processing device, because it contains a computer. (Well. Several computers. Many computers.) The problem is, what do we do with this now? There's never been any physical evidence that consciousness is a real thing or can effect the world in any way other than via the actions of people who believe they are conscious (which, speaking from my perspective of a person who believes they are conscious, is no small thing); the only real consequences of deciding that we are part of a greater conscious system are going to be philosophical. And there are plenty of existing philosophical systems which believe that already --- you mention Buddhism. And while I do think that believing that we're part of the world, rather than being somehow separate from it, is definitely a good idea, I'm an engineer. This seems dissatisfying. Is there anything else can we do with this idea?

aaimnr 10y ago
I agree that it doesn't have to be in any way mystical and that it comes to redefining what's fundamental and what's merely constructed or emergent (although it's a very tricky term). In the panpsychist approach neither matter nor consciousness can be reduced to the other one. For more engineering approach to the problem, there's lot we can do. One way would be to study in more and more details the correlates of consciousness to understand the "linking" mechanism better. Anil Seth describes this approach here: https://aeon.co/essays/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-is-a-distraction-from-the-real-one https://aeon.co/essays/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-is-.... On the other hand, if consciousness indeed is a fundamental attribute of reality, we should extend the 'engineering' to cover also the 'mind' part of reality. This is exactly what meditation is - to train the mind so that it can see more and more clearly all the components of conscious experience until it reaches the bottom. As a result you come up with a number of 'edge cases' - interesting states that can be used to reason about this reality conceptually. There are eg. 'experience of space itself', experience of consciousness (so called immaterial Jhanas) or finally experience caused by calming the unconscious mind to the extent that it stops projecting any content into conscious mind, while the latter is still operating. This (supposedly) leads to realisation by the mind itself that the 'experienced world' is nothing but its creation. Of course we all can understand it conceptually, but this experience leads to permanent change in perception (you can't "unsee it") which becomes as objective as the human mind can possibly be. Meaning, that it realises in every moment that each experience is its own creation. It may all seem mystical, exotic or plain crazy, but there's no other way to understand the mind than through the mind itself, if the discussed hypothesis is true.

lomnakkus 10y ago

> One of the most promising theories (discussed in the podcast) assumes that consciousness is a fundamental attribute of reality Did you really mean to say "assumes" there? (As in assumes as aximoatic.) Because that's one hell of an an assumption.

aaimnr 10y ago
Indeed, it definitely is one hell of an assumption. Just as "matter is fundamental and consciousness is an emergent phenomena" is. Until we find a way to test it in any way (which may not be possible at all) the only thing we're left with is to play with the axioms and get a feel of what the resulting theory can and cannot explain. However when we accept the 'panpsychist' axiom, we're free to come up with more detailed theories (as Integrated Information Theor) that eg. predict under what conditions physical systems and consciousness coincide in a way we can experience. And indeed they claim they can explain eg. why brain, as opposed to silicon circuits, coincides with it. To be clear, I'm not saying this theory is correct - I've no idea. I'm just saying that this whole approach is as valid as the physicalist one.
- lomnakkus 10y ago
  > Indeed, it definitely is one hell of an assumption. Just as "matter is fundamental and consciousness is an emergent phenomena" is. Well, except you snuck two assumptions in there. I'm certainly not assuming, nor claiming to know definitively whether consciousness is an emergent phenomenon. > However when we accept the 'panpsychist' axiom, we're free to come up with more detailed theorie If you assume a false premise you can come up with literally anything, so this is not particularly surprising or illuminating. > I'm just saying that this whole approach is as valid as the physicalist one. One is grounded in what can be observed objectively[1] and the other is not. ... and to believe your explanation, I'm going to need evidence that it's as valid as the "physicalist"[2] one. [1] Well, at least as far as others can confirm that they observe roughly the same things, e.g. "red" or "consciousness". [2] I think you're thinking of "materialist"?

Florin_Andrei 10y ago

EDIT: fixed stupid brain bug Dennett's approach is absurd. Consciousness is the only thing in the Universe that is self-evident in the strict sense. Everything else is at least second-hand stuff - see the brain in a vat hypothesis. To say that consciousness is an illusion is ridiculous; I can see how he gets there, but the conclusion is absurd. Somewhere along the way there's a mistake; no, I don't know where the mistake is, and I could not even begin to hypothesize. OP's article points out this predicament very well. It is a hard problem indeed. > One of the most promising theories (discussed in the podcast) assumes that consciousness is a fundamental attribute of reality, the other side of the coin (matter being the first one). I can hear the objections being raised already, but it's a neat promising step towards solving the hard problem. Suddenly the reducibility paradox vanishes. It would also relieve another problem. If you can't trivially reduce consciousness to neural activity, then how is it coupled with perception? There would appear to be a gap between the sensory chain and the fact of awareness. And then for consciousness to work, it would already have to be everywhere (in a sense, possibly even a somewhat metaphorical one, or at least non-trivial). The assumption you mention solves this problem. > here's a talk by Culadasa, very experienced meditator and a neuroscience professor It's very, very hard to agree with Dennett, and it's getting harder the more you advance in the practice of meditation. As soon as you realize that you can peel off and disconnect layers upon layers of perception (external at first, then the many internal layers too), and also greatly reduce the waves of what is commonly called "thinking", while consciousness does not diminish but instead becomes at once more vivid and more stable, more calm and more intense, less connected to external factors but more broad - all that talk about "the illusion of consciousness" starts to look extremely suspicious. It's not perception, and it's not thinking; it can relate to these things, but it's fundamentally different. It can ultimately exist completely independent of inputs, either external (sensory) or internal (thoughts, mind activity in the trivial sense, even memory). Don't just read about it. Go ahead and have the experience yourself. It changes a lot of perspectives. You don't even have to go all the way to the highest levels described in the literature - the intermediate stuff is revelatory enough already.

aaimnr 10y ago
Did you mean Dennett, instead of Chalmers? I agree that the Dennett's conclusions seems to be false almost on a logical level. The self is an illusion for sure, the consciousness for sure isn't (EDIT: not saying here that there exists 'pure consciousness without content'). > Don't just read about it. Go ahead and have the experience yourself. It changes a lot of perspectives. You don't even have to go all the way to the highest levels described in the literature - the intermediate stuff is revelatory enough already. It is indeed. The more you meditate, the more you see that most of the things that you do 'outside' are meaningless, just playing with your representations of the world and pretending they are real. Of course we can't do anything to somehow reach the 'real' world, but at least we can drop the pretending part. The title of this book may seem both scary and beautiful in this regard: http://www.buddha-heute.de/downloads/treeriver.pdf http://www.buddha-heute.de/downloads/treeriver.pdf Not sure I'd recommend it for beginners, but I just love the title.

deleted 10y ago

[deleted]

titzer 10y ago

I find reading Chalmers to be irritating. His first premise is dualism. If you read his original paper on the hard problem you'll find basically every statement presupposes this fact and then concludes this fact. It's maddening. Dualism cannot be assumed apriori. There are several good rebuttals to Chalmers in this collection of essays: Explaing Consciousness: The Hard Problem: https://www.amazon.com/Explaining-Consciousness-Problem-Jonathan-Shear/dp/026269221X https://www.amazon.com/Explaining-Consciousness-Problem-Jona... One of the best IMO is Thomas W. Clark's functional identity hypothesis that says that experience is _equivalent_ to the processing system. Basically, this is what it feels like to be a human brain. http://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/consciousness/the-explanatory-gap http://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/consciousness/the-expla...