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I used the term 'motivate' specifically because of the PR language intending for customers to evaluate the Apple product as something that could be used by thos

I used the term 'motivate' specifically because of the PR language intending for customers to evaluate the Apple product as something that could be used by those who need to use their phone for private and/or sensitive reasons. Apple of course backdoors their phones for government surveillance access. But they do motivate a threat model that includes government surveillance. I know parsing my comment in this way may seem difficult, but I used the terminology I did on purpose. There are no illusions that Apple achieved the security properties that it has motivated. Google Pixel does not even pretend to address the security concerns of journalists, politically active citizens, IT professionals, or individuals contacting attorneys.

dehugger 10y ago
Perhaps I am not following your logic correctly, but it sounds like you are saying "Apple says government threats are an issue, but then backdoors the phones for the government anyways." which, to me, paints Apple in a very poor light.
- jwtadvice 10y ago
  You are following my logic correctly. To be fair, the amount of leverage the US exerts on businesses for military purposes is astounding. This should be factored into the understanding.
  - deleted 10y ago
    [deleted]
willstrafach 10y ago
> Apple of course backdoors their phones for government surveillance access. Nice job slipping a completely unfounded lie into your response. Starting with iOS 10, you can actually just mount the root filesystem disk image from iOS restore images. You are able to reverse engineer and audit any application or daemon that the OS runs. You can use open source tools (Such as idevicerestore) to perform an OS restore on your device, and point it directly at the filesystem disk image that you just audited the binaries of. That way you can be sure of what is being flashed onto your device if you have any doubts that the OS you just audited is the one going onto your device. No "blackbox" at all in this process. I am looking forward to hearing any form of evidence regarding your claim.
- bitmapbrother 10y ago
  How can you say you're able to audit any application or daemon without viewing the actual source code? Case in point - if the sslKeyExchange.c code had not been published the "goto fail" bug would likely still be in the wild.
  - comex 10y ago
    Reverse engineering tools like IDA can be used to audit closed source code. However, this takes significantly longer than reading source code, and it's not exactly feasible to audit the entire operating system for something (hypothetically) intentionally hidden.
  - willstrafach 10y ago
    That is not true. In fact, the "goto fail" bug was only known because it was patched in iOS and then some folks dug into the SecureTransport sources. You may be thinking of the fact that, from what I understand, OS X was not yet patched at the time so this was considered big news (See here: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/02/24/anatomy-of-a-goto-fail-apples-ssl-bug-explained-plus-an-unofficial-patch/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/02/24/anatomy-of-a-got...). Definitely an issue, but seeing as it was patched in iOS (and thus discovered in the SecureTransport source code), it would most certainly not still be in the wild. With regards to auditing: The machine code is available for review, you just need to invest some time into learning the ARM instruction set. Most users of HN have invested time into learning various programming languages and that is why the trope of "open source == more secure" is often repeated, but the truth is that ARM assembly is just another programming language and is almost never obfuscated to a point in which you would not be able to read through it and understand what is happening once you understand the instruction set.
- jwtadvice 10y ago
  > Nice job slipping a completely unfounded lie into your response. Oh my. Yes Apple backdoors their phones for government surveillance access. There's no sneaking here. I'm saying it very clearly as a central tenet of my comment. ----------------------- Here's a list of things that Apple will provide from Apple's own Guide for Law Enforcement Access: - Device Registration (name, address, email address, telephone number, iCloud Apple ID) - Customer Service Records - iTunes (name, physical address, email address, and telephone number, purchase/download transactions and connections, update/re-download connections, and iTunes Match connections, iTunes subscriber information and connection logs with IP addresses, specific content purchased or downloaded). - Apple Retail Store Transactions (cash, credit/debit card, or gift card transactions, type of card, name of the purchaser, email address, date/time of the transaction, amount of the transaction, and store location, receipt number) - Apple Online Store Purchases (name, shipping address, telephone number, email address, product purchased, purchase amount) - iTunes Gift Cards (sixteen-digit alphanumeric code, nineteen-digit code, any purchases, name of the store, location, date, and time, user account - iCloud (music, photos, documents, iCloud email, encryption keys, Subscriber Information, iCloud feature connections, connection logs with IP addresses, Mail Logs, records of incoming and outgoing communications such as time, date, sender email addresses, and recipient email addresses, Email Content, Other iCloud Content, Photo Stream, Docs, Contacts, Calendars, Bookmarks, iOS Device Backups, stored photos, documents, contacts, calendars, bookmarks and iOS device backups, photos and videos in the users’ camera roll, device settings, app data, iMessage, SMS, and MMS messages and voicemail) - Find My iPhone (including connection logs) - Other Available Device Information (MAC Address for Bluetooth, Ethernet, WiFi, or FireWire) - Requests for Apple Retail Store Surveillance Videos - Game Center (Connection logs with IP addresses, specific game(s) played) - iOS Device Activation (including upgrades the software, IP addresses, ICCID numbers, and other device identifiers) - Sign-on Logs (iTunes, iCloud, My Apple ID, and Apple Discussions, Connection logs with IP addresses, Sign-on transactional records) - My Apple ID and iForgot Logs (password reset actions, Connection logs with IP addresses) - FaceTime (logs when a FaceTime call invitation is initiated, content protected by 15 bits of entropy if secure enclave baked key is obtained from manufacturer) And, from this thread on HN today (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12977612 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12977612): All call logs including contacts, timestamps, and durations including for third party applications on the phone like WhatsApp, Skype and Viber.

dehugger 10y ago

Perhaps I am not following your logic correctly, but it sounds like you are saying "Apple says government threats are an issue, but then backdoors the phones for the government anyways." which, to me, paints Apple in a very poor light.

jwtadvice 10y ago
You are following my logic correctly. To be fair, the amount of leverage the US exerts on businesses for military purposes is astounding. This should be factored into the understanding.
- deleted 10y ago
  [deleted]

willstrafach 10y ago

> Apple of course backdoors their phones for government surveillance access. Nice job slipping a completely unfounded lie into your response. Starting with iOS 10, you can actually just mount the root filesystem disk image from iOS restore images. You are able to reverse engineer and audit any application or daemon that the OS runs. You can use open source tools (Such as idevicerestore) to perform an OS restore on your device, and point it directly at the filesystem disk image that you just audited the binaries of. That way you can be sure of what is being flashed onto your device if you have any doubts that the OS you just audited is the one going onto your device. No "blackbox" at all in this process. I am looking forward to hearing any form of evidence regarding your claim.

bitmapbrother 10y ago
How can you say you're able to audit any application or daemon without viewing the actual source code? Case in point - if the sslKeyExchange.c code had not been published the "goto fail" bug would likely still be in the wild.
- comex 10y ago
  Reverse engineering tools like IDA can be used to audit closed source code. However, this takes significantly longer than reading source code, and it's not exactly feasible to audit the entire operating system for something (hypothetically) intentionally hidden.
- willstrafach 10y ago
  That is not true. In fact, the "goto fail" bug was only known because it was patched in iOS and then some folks dug into the SecureTransport sources. You may be thinking of the fact that, from what I understand, OS X was not yet patched at the time so this was considered big news (See here: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/02/24/anatomy-of-a-goto-fail-apples-ssl-bug-explained-plus-an-unofficial-patch/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/02/24/anatomy-of-a-got...). Definitely an issue, but seeing as it was patched in iOS (and thus discovered in the SecureTransport source code), it would most certainly not still be in the wild. With regards to auditing: The machine code is available for review, you just need to invest some time into learning the ARM instruction set. Most users of HN have invested time into learning various programming languages and that is why the trope of "open source == more secure" is often repeated, but the truth is that ARM assembly is just another programming language and is almost never obfuscated to a point in which you would not be able to read through it and understand what is happening once you understand the instruction set.
jwtadvice 10y ago
> Nice job slipping a completely unfounded lie into your response. Oh my. Yes Apple backdoors their phones for government surveillance access. There's no sneaking here. I'm saying it very clearly as a central tenet of my comment. ----------------------- Here's a list of things that Apple will provide from Apple's own Guide for Law Enforcement Access: - Device Registration (name, address, email address, telephone number, iCloud Apple ID) - Customer Service Records - iTunes (name, physical address, email address, and telephone number, purchase/download transactions and connections, update/re-download connections, and iTunes Match connections, iTunes subscriber information and connection logs with IP addresses, specific content purchased or downloaded). - Apple Retail Store Transactions (cash, credit/debit card, or gift card transactions, type of card, name of the purchaser, email address, date/time of the transaction, amount of the transaction, and store location, receipt number) - Apple Online Store Purchases (name, shipping address, telephone number, email address, product purchased, purchase amount) - iTunes Gift Cards (sixteen-digit alphanumeric code, nineteen-digit code, any purchases, name of the store, location, date, and time, user account - iCloud (music, photos, documents, iCloud email, encryption keys, Subscriber Information, iCloud feature connections, connection logs with IP addresses, Mail Logs, records of incoming and outgoing communications such as time, date, sender email addresses, and recipient email addresses, Email Content, Other iCloud Content, Photo Stream, Docs, Contacts, Calendars, Bookmarks, iOS Device Backups, stored photos, documents, contacts, calendars, bookmarks and iOS device backups, photos and videos in the users’ camera roll, device settings, app data, iMessage, SMS, and MMS messages and voicemail) - Find My iPhone (including connection logs) - Other Available Device Information (MAC Address for Bluetooth, Ethernet, WiFi, or FireWire) - Requests for Apple Retail Store Surveillance Videos - Game Center (Connection logs with IP addresses, specific game(s) played) - iOS Device Activation (including upgrades the software, IP addresses, ICCID numbers, and other device identifiers) - Sign-on Logs (iTunes, iCloud, My Apple ID, and Apple Discussions, Connection logs with IP addresses, Sign-on transactional records) - My Apple ID and iForgot Logs (password reset actions, Connection logs with IP addresses) - FaceTime (logs when a FaceTime call invitation is initiated, content protected by 15 bits of entropy if secure enclave baked key is obtained from manufacturer) And, from this thread on HN today (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12977612 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12977612): All call logs including contacts, timestamps, and durations including for third party applications on the phone like WhatsApp, Skype and Viber.