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Like a lot of crypto-puritanism it is rather mixed up. He says he recommended Signal because it was easy to use (more consumer friendly I guess) and secure, the

Like a lot of crypto-puritanism it is rather mixed up. He says he recommended Signal because it was easy to use (more consumer friendly I guess) and secure, then says he wouldn't have gone in the direction of making it easier to use and criticises the things that make it user friendly, like using phone numbers instead of usernames. He says he thinks the protocol is secure, then says he doesn't want it to use GCM because it routes messages via Google who he doesn't trust (fixing that is the point of the encryption) and then talks about an attack that'd apply to any app regardless of whether it used GCM or not. He finishes with a call to action: "We as a community need to come up with a viable solution and alternative to Signal that is easy to use and that does in fact respect people’s choices ... this tool should not have dependencies on corporate infrastructure" But like a lot of armchair moralising, he isn't willing to debate the hard choices that go into building successful software. He says it should "respect people's choices" as if Signal is built by people who are disrespectful, he says it should not have dependencies on "corporate infrastructure" as if volunteer run datacenters actually exist, and then says his motivation is avoided paywalls, ignoring that both Signal and WhatsApp are free. It reads like a collection of talking points rather than a coherent argument. Signal is unusual because it combines cutting edge cryptography with consumer friendliness and is actually successful. It's pragmatic, not ideological. Crypto-warriors have a long history of producing secure software that nobody uses and then blaming the general public for not getting it; this sort of blog post is just a continuation of this decades long trend.

api 10y ago
People need to get the fact that all traffic across the Internet traverses lots of people's systems. There is no difference between it relaying off Google vs Verizon, AT&T, Amazon, OVH, or dozens of other carriers and cloud providers. Like you say that is the point of end to end crypto.
- throwaway101416 10y ago
  There is a difference, because these people in the middle don't have your contacts and don't have root on your phone.
  - api 10y ago
    This is a common problem with nearly all software, especially on phones.
    - throwaway101416 10y ago
      A common problem that is mostly solved by other services (like the black phone).
      - api 10y ago
        At some point you have to trust someone unless you refine you own silicon, make your own chips, audit every line of code they run, etc.
tptacek 10y ago
I agree overwhelmingly with what you wrote, except that I want to point out that this isn't "crypto-puritanism". It's just hipsterism. The author isn't a cryptographer, and if you asked a panel of 10 cryptographic engineers what messaging system they'd recommend, 9 of them would say "Signal". The 10th wants you to use something else because they're working on an attack for that "something else", and want their paper to be splashier when it's released. :) When reading critiques of messaging software, keep in mind that messaging is a fucking midnight back-alley knife fight of a market. For whatever reason --- I think because (a) basic chat software is pretty easy to write, with a near- hello- world payoff similar to, say, blog software for Ruby on Rails and (b) because there have been multi-billion-dollar acquisitions of messaging tools --- there are a lot of different messaging products. Messaging is a network-effect market, so all the different vendors are fighting for users. I don't think Signal has sockpuppets (it's just not their style), but I know several other "secure" messaging applications do.
- zigzigzag 10y ago
  Good points. Perhaps crypto-hipsterism, then: crypterism.
  - deleted 10y ago
    [deleted]
  - aeonphox 10y ago
    Cryppled-ism
  - SomeStupidPoint 10y ago
    As an aside, I like "crypsterism" as a portmanteau for people who advocate hipster cryptography/security policy.
- mst 10y ago
  Plus the complaint about giphy seems to completely miss the point that the more 'random messaging users' Signal attracts the better from a POV of deniability/etc.
antocv 10y ago
There is a coherent argument which you just refuse to see. Signal was marketed as anti mass surveillance secure messaging system. It is but a mere user friendly email+gpg alternative. It actively avoid anti-mass surveillance methods and does the opposite - encourages centralization and collection of user statistics. Even Telegram is better, as people arent fooled by what it is. A better alternative is Ring.cx or Tox.im with for example Antox client.
- tptacek 10y ago
  I don't think you can reasonably post a top-level comment on a thread suggesting that Signal is a "honey pot", and then reply to a different comment on the same thread saying its author "refuses to see a coherent argument". https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12881018 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12881018
- zigzigzag 10y ago
  How does it actively avoid anti-mass surveillance methods? There are no metadata obfuscation mechanisms that work at scale against all adversaries. Using GCM is without a doubt a big win for privacy because adversaries that have backbone taps (like your friendly local intelligence agency) just see SSL to google.com which tells them nothing of any use, not even that you use Signal. A big encrypted packet from google.com might be a Signal message or it might be an email or a Play Store update or whatever. People always overlook the fact that the world is full of adversaries and 99% of them can't get access to Google's datacenters. Those adversaries matter too. Look at Turkey!
  - throwaway101416 10y ago
    There are such mechanisms. Wire for example, doesn't require you to sign up with a phone number. You don't even have to have a phone. How is it not an obfuscation mechanism that works at scale? Also, what if google has a rogue employee who works for one of the surveillance agencies? Trusting all your private data to an advertising company that has root access on your device in an app that is explicitly built around security and privacy is insane.
darklajid 10y ago
I'm not a cryptographer. I .. am reasonably sure that no one would take me for a hipster. But two issues - or call it 'differences in opinion' - in that article are relevant for me: The inability to use the service without a mobile number and federation. I understand the rationale behind the former ("It's easier"), but I don't understand why it is mandatory. I could've been 1283783127356128531312 on Signal and optionally add my phone number to that identity for others to find me (and optionally let Signal use my contacts to search for someone). That could even be the default, opt-out during registration. But right now, I'm basically using my phone number, which I really hate to do. Federation is probably hard to get right, and looking at Eric Lippert's "Every feature idea starts with -100 points" rationale I guess it is understandable that this isn't a thing. But I don't want to join another silo, even if it's the best of the crop so far. For users like me, Signal, WhatsApp and yes, Telegram are basically the same thing, come with the same set of limitations and I feel that it is worth pointing them out from time to time. Just as the article did (I'm not agreeing with everything in there btw.) People jump in to defend Signal whenever this comes up, but maybe that isn't necessary. Signal is a great project and most criticism I've seen here so far is not 'Signal sucks', it is usually more a long the line of 'Signal is not for me' and I have a hard time understanding why that is debatable or why this shouldn't be a valid position.
- sandervenema 10y ago
  Agree. I'm not a cryptographer and never claimed to be either. -- and I think it would be difficult to mistake me for a hipster. For one, I don't have that snazzy majestic beard.. Anyway, on to the point. :) Yes, the phone number thing is a policy decision by the Signal people. As I write in my article, it's maybe marginally easier to get connected using phone numbers, but I may want to communicate via Signal with someone I don't want to give my phone number to. Handing out personal phone numbers on the willy nilly is not something I'm comfortable with. There's no reason why we couldn't have some other identifier, possibly easy to remember to connect us to via Signal. So this was a policy decision by the Signal people. Federation is indeed hard to get right, but I think with proper versioning, and various teams keeping their software up-to-date and close to the reference paper/the Signal protocol, I see no reason why it cannot be overcome. For XMPP/Jabber it also works quite well.
aisofteng 10y ago
I disagree with your criticisms entirely and I think you are conflating things. First, ease of use: the distinction you miss is ease of use from a UX point of view. Managing your own security is hard for the vast majority of people. It is an advantage that there is ease of use with respect to the security aspects - no command line commands to generate keys, for example - and ease of use from a UX point of view is completely different. Making a decision to to ease the UX can indeed negatively affect privacy elements, and there is no contradiction there. Which brings me to the second point, which is that there is no contradiction in the discussion of security. The service could be using insecure protocols or algorithms, but the author says it isn't - from the point of view of cryptography, those choices are said to be sound. On the other hand, having your communication routed through a PRISM partner is a different concern. There is no contradiction in saying that the part of security under their control is sound, but that the part routed through Google may not be. Cryptography is complex and rigorous. What you call puratinism is actually rigor with respect to sound practices. The points the article makes are, in fact, coherent; where you call puratinism and hipsterism on the article, I call cynicism and likely uninformed reasoning on your comment.
xenobioticants 10y ago
> Signal is unusual because it combines cutting edge cryptography with consumer friendliness and is actually successful. You do realize that since last year WhatsApp actually uses the Signal protocol?

api 10y ago

People need to get the fact that all traffic across the Internet traverses lots of people's systems. There is no difference between it relaying off Google vs Verizon, AT&T, Amazon, OVH, or dozens of other carriers and cloud providers. Like you say that is the point of end to end crypto.

throwaway101416 10y ago
There is a difference, because these people in the middle don't have your contacts and don't have root on your phone.
- api 10y ago
  This is a common problem with nearly all software, especially on phones.
  - throwaway101416 10y ago
    A common problem that is mostly solved by other services (like the black phone).
    - api 10y ago
      At some point you have to trust someone unless you refine you own silicon, make your own chips, audit every line of code they run, etc.

tptacek 10y ago

I agree overwhelmingly with what you wrote, except that I want to point out that this isn't "crypto-puritanism". It's just hipsterism. The author isn't a cryptographer, and if you asked a panel of 10 cryptographic engineers what messaging system they'd recommend, 9 of them would say "Signal". The 10th wants you to use something else because they're working on an attack for that "something else", and want their paper to be splashier when it's released. :) When reading critiques of messaging software, keep in mind that messaging is a fucking midnight back-alley knife fight of a market. For whatever reason --- I think because (a) basic chat software is pretty easy to write, with a near- hello- world payoff similar to, say, blog software for Ruby on Rails and (b) because there have been multi-billion-dollar acquisitions of messaging tools --- there are a lot of different messaging products. Messaging is a network-effect market, so all the different vendors are fighting for users. I don't think Signal has sockpuppets (it's just not their style), but I know several other "secure" messaging applications do.

zigzigzag 10y ago
Good points. Perhaps crypto-hipsterism, then: crypterism.
- deleted 10y ago
  [deleted]
- aeonphox 10y ago
  Cryppled-ism
- SomeStupidPoint 10y ago
  As an aside, I like "crypsterism" as a portmanteau for people who advocate hipster cryptography/security policy.
mst 10y ago
Plus the complaint about giphy seems to completely miss the point that the more 'random messaging users' Signal attracts the better from a POV of deniability/etc.

antocv 10y ago

There is a coherent argument which you just refuse to see. Signal was marketed as anti mass surveillance secure messaging system. It is but a mere user friendly email+gpg alternative. It actively avoid anti-mass surveillance methods and does the opposite - encourages centralization and collection of user statistics. Even Telegram is better, as people arent fooled by what it is. A better alternative is Ring.cx or Tox.im with for example Antox client.

tptacek 10y ago
I don't think you can reasonably post a top-level comment on a thread suggesting that Signal is a "honey pot", and then reply to a different comment on the same thread saying its author "refuses to see a coherent argument". https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12881018 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12881018
zigzigzag 10y ago
How does it actively avoid anti-mass surveillance methods? There are no metadata obfuscation mechanisms that work at scale against all adversaries. Using GCM is without a doubt a big win for privacy because adversaries that have backbone taps (like your friendly local intelligence agency) just see SSL to google.com which tells them nothing of any use, not even that you use Signal. A big encrypted packet from google.com might be a Signal message or it might be an email or a Play Store update or whatever. People always overlook the fact that the world is full of adversaries and 99% of them can't get access to Google's datacenters. Those adversaries matter too. Look at Turkey!
- throwaway101416 10y ago
  There are such mechanisms. Wire for example, doesn't require you to sign up with a phone number. You don't even have to have a phone. How is it not an obfuscation mechanism that works at scale? Also, what if google has a rogue employee who works for one of the surveillance agencies? Trusting all your private data to an advertising company that has root access on your device in an app that is explicitly built around security and privacy is insane.

darklajid 10y ago

I'm not a cryptographer. I .. am reasonably sure that no one would take me for a hipster. But two issues - or call it 'differences in opinion' - in that article are relevant for me: The inability to use the service without a mobile number and federation. I understand the rationale behind the former ("It's easier"), but I don't understand why it is mandatory. I could've been 1283783127356128531312 on Signal and optionally add my phone number to that identity for others to find me (and optionally let Signal use my contacts to search for someone). That could even be the default, opt-out during registration. But right now, I'm basically using my phone number, which I really hate to do. Federation is probably hard to get right, and looking at Eric Lippert's "Every feature idea starts with -100 points" rationale I guess it is understandable that this isn't a thing. But I don't want to join another silo, even if it's the best of the crop so far. For users like me, Signal, WhatsApp and yes, Telegram are basically the same thing, come with the same set of limitations and I feel that it is worth pointing them out from time to time. Just as the article did (I'm not agreeing with everything in there btw.) People jump in to defend Signal whenever this comes up, but maybe that isn't necessary. Signal is a great project and most criticism I've seen here so far is not 'Signal sucks', it is usually more a long the line of 'Signal is not for me' and I have a hard time understanding why that is debatable or why this shouldn't be a valid position.

sandervenema 10y ago
Agree. I'm not a cryptographer and never claimed to be either. -- and I think it would be difficult to mistake me for a hipster. For one, I don't have that snazzy majestic beard.. Anyway, on to the point. :) Yes, the phone number thing is a policy decision by the Signal people. As I write in my article, it's maybe marginally easier to get connected using phone numbers, but I may want to communicate via Signal with someone I don't want to give my phone number to. Handing out personal phone numbers on the willy nilly is not something I'm comfortable with. There's no reason why we couldn't have some other identifier, possibly easy to remember to connect us to via Signal. So this was a policy decision by the Signal people. Federation is indeed hard to get right, but I think with proper versioning, and various teams keeping their software up-to-date and close to the reference paper/the Signal protocol, I see no reason why it cannot be overcome. For XMPP/Jabber it also works quite well.

aisofteng 10y ago

I disagree with your criticisms entirely and I think you are conflating things. First, ease of use: the distinction you miss is ease of use from a UX point of view. Managing your own security is hard for the vast majority of people. It is an advantage that there is ease of use with respect to the security aspects - no command line commands to generate keys, for example - and ease of use from a UX point of view is completely different. Making a decision to to ease the UX can indeed negatively affect privacy elements, and there is no contradiction there. Which brings me to the second point, which is that there is no contradiction in the discussion of security. The service could be using insecure protocols or algorithms, but the author says it isn't - from the point of view of cryptography, those choices are said to be sound. On the other hand, having your communication routed through a PRISM partner is a different concern. There is no contradiction in saying that the part of security under their control is sound, but that the part routed through Google may not be. Cryptography is complex and rigorous. What you call puratinism is actually rigor with respect to sound practices. The points the article makes are, in fact, coherent; where you call puratinism and hipsterism on the article, I call cynicism and likely uninformed reasoning on your comment.

xenobioticants 10y ago

> Signal is unusual because it combines cutting edge cryptography with consumer friendliness and is actually successful. You do realize that since last year WhatsApp actually uses the Signal protocol?