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The insurance files are public. They just have to release the keys. 3.6GB - http://wlstorage.net/torrent/wlinsurance-20130815-A.aes256.torrent http://wlstorage
by mbreedlove 10y ago
The insurance files are public. They just have to release the keys.
3.6GB - http://wlstorage.net/torrent/wlinsurance-20130815-A.aes256.torrent http://wlstorage.net/torrent/wlinsurance-20130815-A.aes256.t...
49GB - http://wlstorage.net/torrent/wlinsurance-20130815-B.aes256.torrent http://wlstorage.net/torrent/wlinsurance-20130815-B.aes256.t...
349GB - http://wlstorage.net/torrent/wlinsurance-20130815-C.aes256.torrent http://wlstorage.net/torrent/wlinsurance-20130815-C.aes256.t...
94GB - https://file.wikileaks.org/torrent/2016-06-03_insurance.aes256.torrent https://file.wikileaks.org/torrent/2016-06-03_insurance.aes2...
I don't know why they would put out a few hundred gigabytes of fake files. The contents might not be as interesting as people hope, though.
- countingteeth 10y ago"Bluffing." It takes zero effort to distribute a a few hundred gigabytes of encrypted random data, relative to the amount of investigation and speculation as to what if anything is in those files. They are called "insurance." Assange/Wikileaks wanted to deter actions being taken against him. Seems to me as likely as not that there is nothing really there.
- appleflaxen 10y agothe good news is that you don't even need to encrypt your data, if they are random to start with.
- amelius 10y agoThat might be tricky. An encrypted file may have some properties a random file does not have in general.
- Ao7bei3s 10y agoNo, unless the algorithm is broken. Ciphertext indistiguishability[1] is a basic requirement for any encryption scheme. All modern ciphers are designed to make that hard. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distinguishing_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distinguishing_attack
- amelius 10y agoYes, but you remove that attack vector simply by encrypting a random file instead.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- Solinoid 10y agoThere was a link on HN not too long ago to a quote from Assange, stating that part of the strategy is to sow uncertainty and doubt among the players to increase the secrecy tax. A multigig encrypted dump could have that effect. That said he can't really play that card too often.
- astn 10y ago>I don't know why they would put out a few hundred gigabytes of fake files. Looks like you can check it now. The keys went public: pre-commitment 3: UK FCO f33a6de5c627e3270ed3e02f62cd0c857467a780cf6123d2172d80d02a072f74 pre-commitment 2: Ecuador eae5c9b064ed649ba468f0800abf8b56ae5cfe355b93b1ce90a1b92a48a9ab72 pre-commitment 1: John Kerry 4bb96075acadc3d80b5ac872874c3037a386f4f595fe99e687439aabd0219809 https://twitter.com/wikileaks https://twitter.com/wikileaks
- labster 10y agoThose tweets came out 7 hours before the Internet link message.
- Kenji 10y agoI speculate that these are only SHA256 hashes of keys or documents that will be released in the future. It's pre-commitment. I didn't try decrypting one of the files with a key yet, though. I'm busy with other things (like browsing HN, aaah).
- the_duke 10y agoThe tweets are just hashes of the insurance files to confirm their validity, not the decryption keys (yet).
- dllthomas 10y ago> I don't know why they would put out a few hundred gigabytes of fake files. To trick people like you? `dd if=/dev/urandom` is much easier than finding a comparable quantity of actual info. I don't know enough to have much opinion on the odds that's the case, vs them being real, though.
- dragonwriter 10y ago> I don't know why they would put out a few hundred gigabytes of fake files. The same reason a stick-up man might put their hand in their pocket to mimic the shape of a gun. If you have no weapon, it's still often useful to make people think you have one.