5 ms·
- we don't have access to the source code, so who knows what they have implemented? - even if they have implemented it faithfully, you should compare fingerpri
by FabHK 10y ago
- we don't have access to the source code, so who knows what they have implemented?
- even if they have implemented it faithfully, you should compare fingerprints. If they don't line up, you might be subject to a MITM attack
- tptacek 10y ago1. Anyone who can read a control flow graph. 2. Yes.
- ChoHag 10y agoI just love reading post-optimisation machine code.
- tptacek 10y agoPretty much everyone who's job involves using IDA Pro does this every day.
- stouset 10y agoThe point was you don't, but plenty of people do. And those people haven't sounded the alarm on any red flags.
- Retr0spectrum 10y agoBut do they? It's a slightly dangerous assumption to make. If everyone assumes that, nobody will bother to check at all.
- pbhjpbhj 10y agoSo if they implemented a small extra procedure to copy text and send on a side-channel when a flag was set externally, if such a thing was done then this would be obvious to many people despite it being closed source? Aren't these apps developed modularly? Or indeed if it were a patch that could be initiated as forced update at will from the server-side, again that would be clear to "people" based on the client side binary? These are the ways I imagine I'd snoop on supposed end-to-end encrypted communication channels; there's probably something much cleverer, but again, we're saying that can be detected easily? Genuine questions, not a programmer, not familiar with the state-of-the-art of reading machine code/interpreting network traffic, nor indeed with which watchdogs are guarding against abuse by the TLAs.
- tptacek 10y agoThat's not really what "side channel" means. You mean "covert channel", a related but different concept.
- WhitneyLand 10y agoThe bigger point he's making is that your comment "Anyone who can read a control flow graph" can be taken to mean everything is fine here when it's really not. Its not hard to imagine how WA could be compromised without anyone knowing for many years.
- tptacek 10y ago
- conradev 10y agoWhen the difference between correct code and a pretty bad bug can be one instruction[1], I'm not sure if "anyone who can read a control flow graph" is going to be able to find implementation flaws (intentional or not). [1] https://youtu.be/5pAen7beYNc?t=13m51s https://youtu.be/5pAen7beYNc?t=13m51s
- tedunangst 10y agoAnd how are things any different reading source code? The disassembled binary CFG is either going to branch on greater than or greater or equal, exactly like the source code. If you won't see the bug in the CFG, you won't see the bug in the source.
- conradev 10y agoThis is a valid point. Both the source code and the CFG can hide bugs pretty easily. I would argue that reading source code is much easier, though. For example, if you are auditing code written in a memory-safe language, you don't need to look for memory corruption bugs. You also have an audit trail for all source code changes.
- tptacek 10y agoIt's not like this code was originally written in Haskell. Come on.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- lisper 10y agoEven if you had access to the source code, how would you verify that the app you are running was compiled from that source?
- conradev 10y agoThey'd need to be building reproducibly[1], which is somewhat difficult to do on iOS thanks to code signing and App Store encryption[2]. Android is definitely closer[3]. [1] https://reproducible-builds.org https://reproducible-builds.org [2] https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-iOS/issues/641 https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-iOS/issues/641 [3] https://f-droid.org/wiki/page/Deterministic,_Reproducible_Builds https://f-droid.org/wiki/page/Deterministic,_Reproducible_Bu...