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This 1993 article definitely reads like the Mind/Brain concept in the era of Gofai (good old fashioned AI). It's quite interesting just for its historical outl
by joe_the_user 10y ago
This 1993 article definitely reads like the Mind/Brain concept in the era of Gofai (good old fashioned AI).
It's quite interesting just for its historical outline, even if the outline is pretty sparse (you gotta start somewhere). The main thing that I think modern AI/Machine-learning has discarded is the concept that intelligence is based on logical specification.
And I think it's entirely reasonable to say that a mind isn't "like software" if you mean human-constructed, top-down, logical-intentions based software.
The thing is, though, that neural networks and similar advances haven't left us with any alternative analogies for the mind/brain relationship. Should we come up with a new one?
- goatlover 10y agoAlso, the mind isn't like software in that it doesn't get copied to other minds or mediums. Yeah, there are sci fi scenarios or futuristic predictions for this sort of thing, but it's not a reality at this point. Another difference is that there is no machine code for the brain. There isn't some set of primitive instructions programmers could target to instruct the connectome.
- wsgeorge 10y agoDefinitely. The metaphor breaks down at some point. > Another difference is that there is no machine code for the brain. There isn't some set of primitive instructions programmers could target to instruct the connectome. We don't know this yet. But what we do know is, by directly stimulating certain parts of the brain, we can recreate certain sensations. I looks to me like this is close as close to some "primitive instruction set" as we've come.
- titzer 10y ago> There isn't some set of primitive instructions programmers could target to instruct the connectome. I wouldn't be so quick to rule that out. Think about the difference between short term memory and long term memory. Short term memory is on timescales far shorter than synaptic formation, so it stands to reason that it might take the form of electric patterns held in buffers in the brain (i.e. it is not encoded using synapses). If that is true, then why can't buffers that hold electric patterns also hold a set of instructions that can be retrieved from storage? E.g. maybe short term memory is more like an FPGA (easily reprogrammable circuits) and long term memory is more like an ASIC (hardwired synaptic connetions that are far more dense and long-lasting).
- themgt 10y agoOdd though, the author just recently reviewed another mechanistic consciousness book and recommended this old essay [1] in the review. There seems to be a real resistance towards accepting what's hard about the hard problem. http://www.massline.org/ScienceGrp/ConsciousnessAndBrain.pdf http://www.massline.org/ScienceGrp/ConsciousnessAndBrain.pdf
- eli_gottlieb 10y ago>There seems to be a real resistance towards accepting what's hard about the hard problem. Well, there also seems to be a real resistance to even phrasing the "Hard Problem" in terms that both admit a nontrivial role for functional cognition (for "mere brains") and also don't presuppose dualism.
- titzer 10y agoI'm in the camp (following somewhat Daniel Dennett) that the hard problem just simply doesn't exist. It's invented. Some have objected to Dennett in that he just wishes the "hard problem" away. I submit that dualistic philosophers, crystallized by David Chalmers, just "wished" the hard problem into existence. It's a made-up question, the same as "why are fairies so hard to get on camera?" It's made-up by philosophers who just want dualism to be true. There is zero evidence that dualism is true. Consciousness and the brain boils down to this: if we reject dualism, then we implicitly accept some form of materialism. Materialism means that the brain and whatever physical processes that it carries out must give rise to consciousness, must give rise to subjective experience, even if that involves nonlocal quantum mechanics or whatever cutting edge physics you care to imagine. If it's physics, it's materialism. From the other angle, we keep asking ourselves "what is it like to be a bat?" or what is it like to be this or that. Well therein lies the answer. There probably is something it's like to be a bat, or a fish. But this is what it feels like to be a human consciousness, with all those processes going on in the brain, feeding that consciousness information. Is that really so hard to believe? Consciousness is just one of many programs running in the human brain. This is what it feels like to be that program running inside your brain.
- 10y ago
- visarga 10y ago> a mind isn't "like software" The mind is like a state automaton. It has states and it transitions between them.
- mannykannot 10y agoTrue, as far as it goes, but it tells us literally next to nothing about what a mind is and how it works. Unless the analogy is more specific than this, it does not advance our understanding much.
- xg15 10y agoThe thing is, though, that neural networks and similar advances haven't left us with any alternative analogies for the mind/brain relationship. Should we come up with a new one? Then again, artificial neural network are written in programming languages and executed on computers. So you could turn this around and say that as AI becomes more sophisticated, software becomes more like the mind.
- joe_the_user 10y agoWhile most neural net experts have discarded the idea that neural nets simulate the brain, you may be correct in the long run. The thing is that software in the absolute, arbitrary abstract can be like just about anything. But the arbitrariness means it stop being a human-comprehensible analogy - in contrast to the way some of the original AI schools thought of software as being a collection of rules.
- mannykannot 10y ago>...Should we come up with a new one? To me, the history of mind analogies, and of how they tend to be reflections of the then-current technology, suggests that making analogies is not particularly useful (and perhaps harmful, if doing so leads us to over-estimate our level of understanding.)