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This is not true. Quantum cryptography is frequently conflated with concepts that are not possible and don't make sense, but quantum key distribution is a legit

by dsacco 10y ago

This is not true. Quantum cryptography is frequently conflated with concepts that are not possible and don't make sense, but quantum key distribution is a legitimate area of research. In fact, it has already been experimentally implemented (Los Alamos, UCambridge, UGeneva, etc). It might not be mature enough yet for widespread adoption, and it doesn't revolutionize all parts of a cryprosystem, but it is definitely progress in the narrower problems of key distribution and perfect forward secrecy for one-time pads. Unless I'm misunderstanding you and what you mean is that the field has many people opportunistically using the term for marketing things that are not really quantum cryptography; if that's the case, I agree with you.

marcosdumay 10y ago
> but quantum key distribution is a legitimate area of research If you used that with the meaning "we don't know how to do anything useful with it, but it is worth looking because there may be some use", I would grant you this point. But: > In fact, it has already been experimentally implemented (Los Alamos, UCambridge, UGeneva, etc). No. The existing protocol for quantum key distribution is insecure bullshit.
hannob 10y ago
Maybe it's a legitimate area of research. But I hear frequently obvious bullshit claims from these researchers, like that they want to build a quantum internet. And I don't see how quantum key distribution solves any problem. It's kinda circular - it requires an existing authenticated channel to work, which needs math-based crypto. At the same time the whole field is built on the claim that they're needed because they don't trust math-based crypto.
nickpsecurity 10y ago
"It might not be mature enough yet for widespread adoption, and it doesn't revolutionize all parts of a cryprosystem, but it is definitely progress in the narrower problems of key distribution and perfect forward secrecy for one-time pads" I'm not sure. The best minds I've talked to in high-assurance security don't believe it. One, Clive Robinson on Schneier's blog, predicted we'd see classical attacks on it. Something like that happened. I pointed out there would still be software, endpoints, interception, subversion, etc for bypass whereas the tech itself was little understood versus effects of regular electronics. Tried and true beats novel and new if it's high-security I always say. No, these devices are not trustworthy or even necessary that I can tell. High-assurance key exchange is a solved problem if the organization is the simpler, hierarchical designs likely to use QKD. Many solutions available with the most reliable being a courier and key-handling hardware you can trust that only has part of the secret + another transmitted over various medium with it all using several layers of symmetric to work (eg my polymorphic schemes). All on dedicated, low-TCB devices. I don't know what QKD costs today but I bet it's still cheaper to courier the pre-shared keys and use tamper-resistant hardware. Do you have numbers on it in terms of amount of keys negotiated over time and at what cost for hardware w/ HA setup?

by dsacco 10y ago

marcosdumay 10y ago

> but quantum key distribution is a legitimate area of research If you used that with the meaning "we don't know how to do anything useful with it, but it is worth looking because there may be some use", I would grant you this point. But: > In fact, it has already been experimentally implemented (Los Alamos, UCambridge, UGeneva, etc). No. The existing protocol for quantum key distribution is insecure bullshit.

hannob 10y ago

Maybe it's a legitimate area of research. But I hear frequently obvious bullshit claims from these researchers, like that they want to build a quantum internet. And I don't see how quantum key distribution solves any problem. It's kinda circular - it requires an existing authenticated channel to work, which needs math-based crypto. At the same time the whole field is built on the claim that they're needed because they don't trust math-based crypto.

nickpsecurity 10y ago

"It might not be mature enough yet for widespread adoption, and it doesn't revolutionize all parts of a cryprosystem, but it is definitely progress in the narrower problems of key distribution and perfect forward secrecy for one-time pads" I'm not sure. The best minds I've talked to in high-assurance security don't believe it. One, Clive Robinson on Schneier's blog, predicted we'd see classical attacks on it. Something like that happened. I pointed out there would still be software, endpoints, interception, subversion, etc for bypass whereas the tech itself was little understood versus effects of regular electronics. Tried and true beats novel and new if it's high-security I always say. No, these devices are not trustworthy or even necessary that I can tell. High-assurance key exchange is a solved problem if the organization is the simpler, hierarchical designs likely to use QKD. Many solutions available with the most reliable being a courier and key-handling hardware you can trust that only has part of the secret + another transmitted over various medium with it all using several layers of symmetric to work (eg my polymorphic schemes). All on dedicated, low-TCB devices. I don't know what QKD costs today but I bet it's still cheaper to courier the pre-shared keys and use tamper-resistant hardware. Do you have numbers on it in terms of amount of keys negotiated over time and at what cost for hardware w/ HA setup?