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DANE certificate pinning seems to like it solves most issues HPKP does, without the imminent danger. It won't stop a dedicated attacker from MITMing a connecti
by rocqua 10y ago
DANE certificate pinning seems to like it solves most issues HPKP does, without the imminent danger.
It won't stop a dedicated attacker from MITMing a connection if they can block DNSSEC. However, if someone uses false BGP route to hijack your IP, they can't reach your DNS queries.
You'd still be fucked if you connect to a local wifi connection though.
- tptacek 10y agoThe downsides of DANE are substantial: * DANE is effectively a key escrow system. COM's keys would be held by the USG. * In the same vein: people with cosmetic TLDs like .LY would be forced to concede their TLS policy to governments like Libya. Similarly: the Internet would be conceding that protocols should work differently and be less trustworthy depending on what country you're in. * The "last mile" on DANE is spoofable, because DNSSEC doesn't protect the link between browsers and DNS servers; it's a "server-to-server" protocol. In particular: your ISP could still override pins! * DANE doesn't actually work in practice, because of all the networks that block odd-looking DNS lookups; this is Adam Langley's point from "Why Not DANE In Browsers". * Stale or misconfigured DNSSEC signatures knock whole sites off the Internet with no diagnostics. Unlike a broken HPKP pin, there's no UX saying something's wrong with the site; it just doesn't exist anymore. This is what happened to HBO Now on Comcast, and why Comcast users occasionally can't reach .GOV sites (which mandate DNSSEC). * DNSSEC is far, far more expensive to deploy than HPKP (HPKP is just a header you add to your web server configuration). * The cryptography behind DANE is 1990s-grade. The DNSSEC roots are still RSA-1024! (Don't worry! They've got the upgrade to RSA-2048 on the calendar!)
- teddyh 10y agoIf you don’t trust the DNS, you’re pretty much screwed anyhow. The solution to the “last mile” problem is to run a private resolver on each machine. The DNSSEC root KSK (master) key is 2048 bits, and the ZSK is due to change to 2048 bits this year, after careful consideration of all the factors.
- tptacek 10y agoFirst: no, not only is it not true that we must trust the DNS, but not having to trust the DNS is literally part of the thesis statement of SSL/TLS. Second: you only need to break the weakest of the keys to attack the system. It's 2016, and we're talking about deploying a system that aspires to RSA-2048 or ECDSA, both of which are outmoded. It actually gets worse. DNSSEC was designed in the mid-1990s with the assumption that cryptography was too expensive to deploy at scale. It's for this reason that DNSSEC uses signing-only constructions and requires support for offline signers: that is, support for people who will sign once, offline, and then never touch cryptography again. All sorts of badness flows from support for offline signers. In particular: DNSSEC responses themselves are not encrypted. Despite relying on the most expensive cryptography primitive (public key signatures), the protocol offers no privacy at all. This would be funny if it weren't for the fact that it turns out you need online signers anyways. Without online signers, there's no way to simultaneously (a) authenticate negative responses (ie: prevent someone from spoofing an NXDOMAIN response) and (b) not reveal all the names in a DNS zone. Surprisingly (at least to the people on the working group), pretty much everyone demands (b), and so pretty much every real-world DNSSEC deployment is an online-signer, so that it can synthesize NSEC records to trick out people trying to dump zones. It's an incoherent protocol that deliberately handicaps itself in an attempt to achieve a design objective that turns out not to be possible to achieve. Moreover: the more DNSSEC gets deployed today, the harder it will get to deploy fast, modern, misuse-resistant curve signature schemes. That's because anything you try to deploy on DNSSSEC needs to be supported by pretty much all the DNSSEC resolvers, because DNS is an infrastructure protocol, not an application-layer protocol. It's for the same reason that DNSSEC failures cause sites to vanish completely from the Internet rather than generating pop-up warnings.
- garaetjjte 10y ago> First: no, not only is it not true that we must trust the DNS, but not having to trust the DNS is literally part of the thesis statement of SSL/TLS. Uh. Certificates are issued by checking DNS entries, and you are saying that we don't have to trust it.
- 10y ago
- okket 10y agoIf you find any of these points convincing, please have a look at this FAQ, esp. the DANE section: http://blog.easydns.org/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/ http://blog.easydns.org/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/
- tptacek 10y agoThis is the third time you've posted this link (and that's fine; it's far from the third time I've written an anti-DNSSEC comment --- though I do take the trouble to rewrite them each time). Each time, I'm going to point out that the author of that (a) there was an HN thread that addressed it: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10019029 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10019029 (b) the author of the post actually mailed and apologized for its tone. I don't know how much of it they continue to stand by, but I think they might write it differently now regardless. (I reserve the right to cut/paste this particular comment in the future).
- garaetjjte 10y ago> * DANE is effectively a key escrow system. COM's keys would be held by the USG. They can already temporarily change DNS records and get certificate from any legitimate CA. > * In the same vein: people with cosmetic TLDs like .LY would be forced to concede their TLS policy to governments like Libya. They already are doing this, see first point. > * The "last mile" on DANE is spoofable, because DNSSEC doesn't protect the link between browsers and DNS servers; it's a "server-to-server" protocol. In particular: your ISP could still override pins! Run a local resolver. If you have trusted server some you can use DNS over TLS. * DANE doesn't actually work in practice, because of all the networks that block odd-looking DNS lookups; this is Adam Langley's point from "Why Not DANE In Browsers". Then these networks are bad. For what reason network should be interested with more than UDP/TCP layer in DNS packet? Again, you can use DNS over TLS. For other readers, look at discussion in https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12382752 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12382752
- tptacek 10y agoRegarding your first point: no, they can't. See what happens if they try to exploit the DNS to get a Google certificate. (Notice the last several years of Google punishing CAs). It is very important to DNSSEC advocates to convince people that our security can't be any better than the security of the .COM zone, which is controlled by the US Government through Verisign. But nobody accepts that level of security today. Arguments that we can escrow all our security with Verisign are DOA, post Snowden. Move on. Regarding the rest: you can't persuasively rebut arguments by conceding they're correct.
- garaetjjte 10y ago> Regarding your first point: no, they can't. See what happens if they try to exploit the DNS to get a Google certificate. (Notice the last several years of Google punishing CAs). What? Article about it on HN? They won't punish CAs for that, because that won't be CA fault that USG modified DNS zone. > It is very important to DNSSEC advocates to convince people that our security can't be any better than the security of the .COM zone, which is controlled by the US Government through Verisign. But nobody accepts that level of security today. Arguments that we can escrow all our security with Verisign are DOA, post Snowden. Move on. Because it can't be better with DNS, which is by design hierarchical. You would have to create own domains as TLD in root zone. Oops, you now have to trust root zone owners! So you can create blockchain based domain system. But, it won't be DNS. And you will argue that implementing blockchain name system is even more expensive to implement than DNSSEC, because it is slow and requires big storage space. > Regarding the rest: you can't persuasively rebut arguments by conceding they're correct. Last mile problems aren't covered with DNSSEC, there is other RFC for that.
- rocqua 10y ago> DANE is effectively a key escrow system. COM's keys would > be held by the USG. That is one mode of DANE. There is also a pinning mode of DANE, where you restrict what certificates can be used to sign yours. This is then an add-on to the CA system, so you'd still need to convince a CA to give you a certificate to MITM. Besides, as others have said. Those same DNS servers can already break the current systems as they can simply rebind and get a certificate through any CA. > The "last mile" on DANE is spoofable The last mile is only spoofable if you don't locally run a DNSSEC validating resolver. This is easy enough to set up. > DNSSEC is far, far more expensive to deploy than HPKP (HPKP is just a header you add to your web server configuration). Does that hold when you take into account the safeguards required to sanely setup HPKP? I'd say the article explains quite well the issues with deploying HPKP. Sure, DANE and DNSSEC aren't going to replace the CA system. They can certainly complement it though.
- marcosdumay 10y agoHum, no. DANE is centralized, so it solves the same problem the CA system solves, just slightly better. Key pinning is a peer-to-peer form of key distribution, it is touching the same problem the PGP network touches, but solves a different subset of it.
- rocqua 10y agoYes, DANE is centralized, but note I was talking about DANE pinning. This means you also still need a CA to break a DANE pinning secured certificate. So DANE pinning adds significant security as compared to base CA's.
- marcosdumay 10y agoOps, yes. I've missread it.