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Is HTTP Public Key Pinning Dead?
- eganist 10y agoI figured interesting words would probably start to trickle out about HPKP after the last month or so of talks. Opinions are split on how much damage RansomPKP and other hostile pinning attacks can do. I'm inclined to believe that it's a big enough risk to warrant some action (such as more diligence by free certificate authorities -- the crux of the talk was rekeying at up to 20x per week enabling the attack). Others, notably Mozilla, are taking the wait-and-see approach. Google and Let's Encrypt were the most resistant to changing anything at all. Anyway, Scott Helme's writeup did a quick and solid job of summarizing a lot of it. It's linked from the Qualys piece, but here it is if you'd rather get to it directly: https://scotthelme.co.uk/using-security-features-to-do-bad-things/ https://scotthelme.co.uk/using-security-features-to-do-bad-t... Full Disclosure: I and buu700 (https://news.ycombinator.com/user?id=buu700 https://news.ycombinator.com/user?id=buu700) did the AppSec Glory talk at Black Hat / DEF CON and developed the RansomPKP attack pattern. Edit for Fuller Disclosure plus added thoughts: I'd rather not see HPKP die because we've done some cool stuff with it over at Cyph. I'd rather see HPKP be refined with extra requirements, possibly some sort of tie-in with CAA (that little-known standard for enforcing which CAs can issue certs for your domain). Speaking of CAA, we did a show of hands in both the BlackHat and DEF CON versions of the AppSec Glory talk. Five hands across thousands of attendees. That's it.
- pfg 10y agoI don't think blocking rapid re-keying on the CA side is going to do much good to prevent this kind of thing. It would help with the pattern described in RansomPKP, but that's not the only option available to attackers. The web server does not need direct access to the (maliciously added) private key - a separate service under the attacker's control that holds the private key and signs stuff for the web server would be sufficient (this is basically what CloudFlare does with Keyless SSL[1]). I see some potential for CAA to help prevent these attacks. Limiting issuance to a small number of CAs would help, especially if those CAs are ones you have a business relationship with and have agreed to some sort of out-of-band confirmation process for all certificate requests (I believe this is fairly common for high-risk domains). There's been some discussion about account key pinning via CAA in the ACME WG. Account keys could be kept separate from the web server (possibly even in a HSM), so this could also help mitigate this problem. That being said, none of that is going to do any good while checking CAA records is optional for CAs, not to mention that just about no one knows it even exists (even in the infosec community, as you have demonstrated). Hopefully we'll see some movement on that front in light of recent mis-issuance reports. [1]: https://blog.cloudflare.com/keyless-ssl-the-nitty-gritty-technical-details/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/keyless-ssl-the-nitty-gritty-tec...
- nathanaldensr 10y agoJust curious: What did you mean by you "did a show of hands?" Do you mean that's the number of people that had heard of or understood CAA?
- eganist 10y agoLiterally: 1) raise your hand if you've heard of CSP (more than half the room at both talks) 2) raise your hand if you've heard of HPKP (half at def con. Probably a third at black hat) 3) raise your hand if you've heard of CAA (I gave this one something like 15 seconds for people to think. The number of hands v. attendees was a rounding error.)
- JoshTriplett 10y agoNext time you're testing that, you might also include Certificate Transparency. Mandatory CT seems like it solves the same problems HPKP does, without the risk. Now if we can just finish getting to mandatory CT...
- pfg 10y agoCertificate Transparency (especially if mandatory) guarantees detection after the fact (if we assume the domain owner is properly monitoring known logs). It also adds a certain chilling effect that will probably cause attackers to look for other methods of compromising the target rather than risk sacrificing one of the CAs under the attacker's control (which, arguably, is what intelligence agencies are already doing as many high-profile sites have deployed HPKP). It's not a real-time protection mechanism for targeted attacks and such - the mis-issuance event won't be noticed immediately, and revocation is both slow and, well, broken in general. The existence of HPKP is still a good thing for the Gmail's of this world, but I agree that mandatory CT is probably good enough for 99 out of 100 sites out there.
- JoshTriplett 10y agoI can imagine extensions to CT that would make it better at combating real-time attacks before they can affect anyone. For instance, suppose a new certificate didn't become valid for a certain amount of time after the publication of the corresponding CT log, to give the domain owner (or rather, automated processing working on their behalf) time to shoot it down somehow? You could choose how much of a delay you wanted, trading off between security and potential downtime (if you lose all access to your existing certificates, can't revoke them, and have to issue entirely new ones). If you use any non-automated CA, you should know when renewing your certificates, so you could open up a window to renew; in the absence of that, a fully automated process could notice a new certificate for your domain and automatically shoot it down. If you use an automated CA, you (or the automated process) should similarly know the window of time you will renew in, though in that case someone could learn that and take advantage of that window. On the other hand, given sufficient confidence in the automated CA you could use CAA with it.
- Strilanc 10y agoServer software might be able to help with some of the foot-gunning mentioned in Scott Helme's writeup. For example, web servers that were just configured to do cert pinning for the first time could default to giving a 5-hour grace period where the max-age was clamped below a day, followed by a 2-day grace period where the max-age was clamped below a week. Problems are likely to show up immediately, so starting with a low max-age makes sense. This wouldn't help with malicious scenarios though; attackers would just disable the grace period.
- zrm 10y agoYou could do that on the client side too though. Have the clients refuse to long-term pin anything until they've seen it multiple times over multiple days.
- Strilanc 10y agoDoing it client-side defeats the purpose of certificate pinning. Three years after you rolled out pinning, new users would still be using max ages that were clamped too low.
- agwa 10y ago> such as more diligence by free certificate authorities -- the crux of the talk was rekeying at up to 20x per week enabling the attack You are wrong if you think this is the crux of the attack. Let's Encrypt is unique in rate limiting issuance to 20 a week. Other CAs will happily give you unlimited reissues once you pay a small amount for the initial cert (e.g. $15), and they have an API for it too!
- eganist 10y agoWell aware, but not having to pay for it makes it more widely accessible. Any nation-state attacker or attacker with the will to also compromise an identity or two will have no problems either compromising a CA or swiping an owned credit card respectively, but will either of these actors really go out of their way to ransom a site for up to a five figure sum? The former has no incentive to make money, and the latter makes money through identity theft as-is. For what it's worth, we're aware of rapid rekeying with other CAs because Cyph uses rapid key rotation with DigiCert right now and has since before Let's Encrypt entered open beta.
- agwa 10y ago> Well aware, but not having to pay for it makes it more widely accessible. Any nation-state attacker or attacker with the will to also compromise an identity or two will have no problems either compromising a CA or swiping an owned credit card respectively, but will either of these actors really go out of their way to ransom a site for up to a five figure sum? The former has no incentive to make money, and the latter makes money through identity theft as-is. These CAs have resellers that sell certs anonymously, accepting Bitcoin as payment. If the upside is a five-figure sum, $15 is nothing. > For what it's worth, we're aware of rapid rekeying with other CAs because Cyph uses rapid key rotation with DigiCert right now and has since before Let's Encrypt entered open beta. Odd then that you mentioned Let's Encrypt 5 times in your Chrome security report (and reported this to the Let's Encrypt security team, as if it's their problem), but didn't mention DigiCert once: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=620776 https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=620776
- jb613 10y ago> CAA (that little-known standard for enforcing which CAs can issue certs for your domain) I'm sure the CA's absolutely LOVE this - customers are signaling that they will stay with CA 'X'. Given 'vendor lockin' or 'guaranteed recurring revenue', cert prices would drop thru the floor for 1st year only for renewals to increase.
- pfg 10y agoCAA is just a DNS record that can be changed at any time, so there's no vendor lock-in. CAs that implement CAA request that record and check whether they're permitted to issue the certificate; if they're not, they should refuse issuance.
- jb613 10y ago1) CAA tries to address the threat of attacker getting a cert issued for your domain - to carry out such an attack inherently requires taking over your DNS record or your domain account - if they can do this then they can also reconfigure your CAA record. 2) CAA requires the CA to perform additional operation (retrieve and check that DNS record) - not all of the 300-600+ CA's will do this - all it takes is 1 CA and the attacker will get his fraudulent cert from that CA.
- ivanr 10y agoFor what it's worth, my impression is that CAA will be mandated by the CA/Browser forum at some point. But, indeed, that's the main weakness of CAA—it requires that substantially all CAs support it.
- jb613 10y agoThere's too many paying entities to appease - not just hundreds of CA's but various browser vendors as well. Either MUSTs will be changed to SHOULDs - or fragmentation of the CA/Browser body itself. Look no further than at some of the past transgressions browsers let CA's get away with.
- 10y ago
- DyslexicAtheist 10y agothe issue is that HPKP is as user friendly as GPG but without the same benefits. (learning-curve vs ROI) Also IMO the underlying problem is choosing a CA's in the first place. None of them have 'Skin in the Game'[0]. How do you actually decide on which CA is trustworthy?? Trust is measured by how long they have been in the business and how many trust related incidents[0] they had. And how is that confidence measured/created? (hint it isn't Math but whoever has the best marketing or lowest price - not the most trustworthy certs). CAs are a business model impatiently waiting to be replaced (with something decentralized). It's a self-serving quasi-monopoly that all other vendors that want to implement trust must use. [0] http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/SITG.html http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/SITG.html [1] https://www.schrauger.com/the-story-of-how-wosign-gave-me-an-ssl-certificate-for-github-com https://www.schrauger.com/the-story-of-how-wosign-gave-me-an...
- DyslexicAtheist 10y agoafterthought: I wouldn't actually call HPKP dead. It's a prerequisite if you want to do any PKI related functions on your site. E.g. <keygen> support was dropped by most browsers and the industry is heading towards native clients. Nevertheless WebCrypto[0] is supposed to offer the same type of quality and you need both HSTS/HPKP if you want to secure your implementation in any meaningful way. [0] https://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/ https://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- kelnage 10y agoThe problem is if you dull HPKP, you potentially weaken the benefit that the really high-profile targets gain and therefore make it less useful for them. Perhaps the answer is only a small number of websites actually need/want this functionality - and that's okay? Simply dulling it to broaden take-up may have a net negative affect.
- rocqua 10y agoDANE certificate pinning seems to like it solves most issues HPKP does, without the imminent danger. It won't stop a dedicated attacker from MITMing a connection if they can block DNSSEC. However, if someone uses false BGP route to hijack your IP, they can't reach your DNS queries. You'd still be fucked if you connect to a local wifi connection though.
- tptacek 10y agoThe downsides of DANE are substantial: * DANE is effectively a key escrow system. COM's keys would be held by the USG. * In the same vein: people with cosmetic TLDs like .LY would be forced to concede their TLS policy to governments like Libya. Similarly: the Internet would be conceding that protocols should work differently and be less trustworthy depending on what country you're in. * The "last mile" on DANE is spoofable, because DNSSEC doesn't protect the link between browsers and DNS servers; it's a "server-to-server" protocol. In particular: your ISP could still override pins! * DANE doesn't actually work in practice, because of all the networks that block odd-looking DNS lookups; this is Adam Langley's point from "Why Not DANE In Browsers". * Stale or misconfigured DNSSEC signatures knock whole sites off the Internet with no diagnostics. Unlike a broken HPKP pin, there's no UX saying something's wrong with the site; it just doesn't exist anymore. This is what happened to HBO Now on Comcast, and why Comcast users occasionally can't reach .GOV sites (which mandate DNSSEC). * DNSSEC is far, far more expensive to deploy than HPKP (HPKP is just a header you add to your web server configuration). * The cryptography behind DANE is 1990s-grade. The DNSSEC roots are still RSA-1024! (Don't worry! They've got the upgrade to RSA-2048 on the calendar!)
- teddyh 10y agoIf you don’t trust the DNS, you’re pretty much screwed anyhow. The solution to the “last mile” problem is to run a private resolver on each machine. The DNSSEC root KSK (master) key is 2048 bits, and the ZSK is due to change to 2048 bits this year, after careful consideration of all the factors.
- tptacek 10y ago
- jnky 10y agoI recently had an idea to make HTTPS more secure for the average user: What if Google were to check the certificates when crawling a site, ensuring that its keys did not change in a malicious way. Now, sites could present a different cert to Google IPs and to users. To solve this problem, the html anchor element could be augmented with the certificates fingerprint. The users browser would make note of the fingerprint and alert the user if something is off. I think embedding information about a certs finger print or its root CA in links makes a lot of sense, as it would allow a sort of "web of trust" between linked sites.
- blowski 10y agoI get the idea, but it sounds like it would make the problem of link-rot 100x worse, and the number of broken links would quickly desensitise users to the warning.
- lallysingh 10y agoObviously it'd be optional, and it'd only make sense for dynamically-serving systems like a web search engine. And a multi-domain'ed serving system. Like a blog host. It could serve links to other blogs it hosts (on completely different domains) with cert hashes, and suddenly make it very hard to MITM any of the served sites without MITM'ing all of them.
- eganist 10y agoI'm not sure how reliable this would be. E.g. an attacker with sufficient capability to launch an attack like RansomPKP (which requires a web server compromise or equivalent) would—on first glance, anyway—also be able to undermine these mitigations. Technion's point about certificate transparency is probably the closest to solving what you're aiming for.
- technion 10y agoThe most practical attack for the average MiTM is going to be the coffee shop wifi scenario. That scenario will never end up seen by Google. On a related note, Google's crawler submits to Certificate Transparency logs any certificates it's never seen. Given you can monitor transparency logs, we have a similar situation to that you describe available to us.
- mieko 10y agoHere's an issue not mentioned in the article, which gives me the half-baked feeling about HPKP: Thought experiment: (just using companies I think HN will be familiar with, I'm not involved with these.) 1. You're Tumblr or Basecamp or Slack with thousands/millions of user.example.com user subdomains 2. You want to protect all of them with a root HPKP policy with includeSubdomains, because users will be bouncing between them, and with that many trust-on-first-use gaps, it'd be pointless otherwise. 3. And then you want status.example.com hosted at StatusPage, blog.example.com hosted at Medium, and someapp.example.com hosted via GitHub Pages with a CNAME. Assume there are long-lived links to all of these subdomain URLs. You can even assume that the third parties implement HPKP, and that they'll never have a hiccup. There's no way to make this work without either: A) Removing includeSubdomains, and no longer catch a large amount of cases as users traverse your site, barely solving a problem anymore B) Serving a concatenation of every third party pin, opening up gaps huge enough where suddenly every CA is now authorized again, not solving a problem at all. C) Noticing something I haven't. And note that there are security (not merely vanity) reasons for using subdomains instead of paths for hosting user-generated content. I don't think this is too crazy of a scenario.
- mseebach 10y agoThat's fairly easy to fix by putting your users on user.fooapp.com and your corporate pages on *.foo.com, just like you're already (for a different reason) putting static resources on foo-static.com.
- mieko 10y agoI think a plumbing-level security implementation detail should be a little less intrusive than having to move either the corporate domain or millions of user's addresses. I can't imagine Tumblr rolling out HPKP now with this workaround (though github did do the .com -> .io thing, so who knows). The spec should've just included excludeSubDomains=
- mseebach 10y agoFor security, especially at the plumbing-level, simplicity is a virtue.
- pfg 10y agoThe article makes some good points, but I don't believe the risk of malicious pins has any effect on adoption. It doesn't really matter whether your site currently uses HPKP or not - the attack works either way, as long as the user agent supports HPKP. Once an attacker has compromised your server in a way that allows them to add arbitrary HTTP headers, you're doomed. That's not to say that things like RansomPKP aren't problems worth thinking about, but when it comes to adoption, time would probably better be spent improving tooling and documentation.
- dorfsmay 10y agoWouldn't a new record in DNS a safe dynamic way to publish the certs signatures?
- KayEss 10y agoIt's too easy for the same attacker to MITM both the certificate and the DNS.
- tptacek 10y agoThis is going to sound glib, but here goes: 1. The fact that HPKP can create this kind of gigantic foot-gun is a pretty good sign that it actually works. So much of security technology turns out to be cosmetic. The stuff that isn't often is hazardous. 2. Don't HPKP your blog. Don't HPKP your cat-sharing starting. Key pinning is a good thing, but it doesn't need to be universally deployed. 3. In order to hijack your site with HPKP, an attacker needs to take control of your server; they probably need RCE. In other words: if you can't safely HPKP your secure messaging system (cough), you probably aren't yet qualified to be running it: something worse happened to your users than HPKP misconfiguration. If there's a capability we're missing right now, it's probably the ability for sites with low security requirements to opt out of HPKP. Remember, the threat model for HPKP isn't fraudsters or trolls; it's state-level adversaries.
- eganist 10y ago> In other words: if you can't safely HPKP your secure messaging system (cough), you probably aren't yet qualified to be running it And of course, if you do find a defect like this in a web based secure messaging system that relies on HPKP, it'd be great if you'd report it directly to the service and allow them to fix the defect, per responsible disclosure anyway.
- tptacek 10y agoWell, the real risk here is that it creates a new consequence for being hacked by a criminal, right. So I can't cop out and say "people should report instead of playing HPKP games". On the other hand, it's an internalized risk, which is kind of a beautiful thing: so many of the risks we create through poor security are externalized to end-users --- so much so that you can run a secure messaging site, get owned up, cost thousands of people their privacy, and still keep chugging along as if nothing happened. This particular risk though just wallops the owners of the site.
- eganist 10y ago> Well, the real risk here is that it creates a new consequence for being hacked by a criminal, right. No disagreement from me here, which was one reason we set out to talk about RansomPKP at BH/DC in the first place :) That said, I do think this can, and should, be reported to site owners. You're not going to see much innovation if people don't take time to futz around with technologies and see what they can do with them. HPKP has plenty of potential to hurt, but as you alluded to, it's generally just your own feet in harm's way. > This particular risk though just wallops the owners of the site. Yeah, that's what the (cough) team was going for.
- mkagenius 10y agoThe article did mention this but I will re-iterate that mobile apps can benefit a lot from key pinning. That's a huge chunk of total internet activity. So, not that dead if you ask me. The scenario of attacker having root(?) access to the machine warrants much bigger (or equal) concern than bricking your website in my opinion.
- ivanr 10y agoJust to clarify: in my article I discuss mostly HPKP as defined in RFC 7469. I think static pinning works great (and also has the benefit of being preloaded). Mobile and other types of pinning where you control both sides of a conversation also work well and are easier to get right.
- Tergmap 10y agoHe says "bricking your website" while he means "your website will appear as if it has an invalid certificate". Bricking means to crash something beyond repair.
- ivanr 10y agoNo, when HPKP breaks your site no longer works, period. The error page doesn't allow clicking through. Some browsers (e.g., Chrome) support manual editing of the HPKP configuration so some users might be able to get around the problem, but that's unlikely to work for many. Try it here: https://pinning-test.badssl.com https://pinning-test.badssl.com
- agrajag 10y agoMost users won't click through on a prompt that a website is insecure though. For that majority of users the website is well and truly "broken beyond repair". The only thing that matters is what your users experience, not what your server serves.
- wyldfire 10y ago> Or, if you’re lucky, they seek ransom, giving you a chance to get the backup pinning key from them and keep your business. That's a rough choice -- let the business stumble/fail by moving to a new domain or accept the keypair from an untrusted party who's shown themselves to be untrustworthy. What's to stop them from sharing the private key with other ne'er-do-wells?
- vbezhenar 10y agoYou can gradually migrate to another non-compromised key. Generate new key, add HPKP headers for both compromised and non-compromised key, keep it long enough so all users who got bad HPKP headers will get new ones, then replace certificate and set HPKP header to include only new keys.
- groue 10y agoMay I ask a stupid question? Last time I heard about HPKP was as a solution to prevent an attacker from installing a fake root CA certificate in the client system (a mobile device), so that it could observe the behavior of a mobile app, by posing as its API server (for any purpose of reverse-engineering). Is such an attack possible, and HPKP a reasonable solution to it?
- aianus 10y agoHPKP is ignored by browsers when the certificate chain presented by the website includes a user-installed root CA. This is so enterprises can continue to MITM their employees' connections on their work machines.
- ivanr 10y agoNo, it is not; locally-installed CAs (roots) bypass HPKP.
- hannob 10y agoThis happens, see Superfish and friends. HPKP does not protect against this, it's an entirely different set of problem. HPKP's only purpose is to protect against malicious or compromised CAs.
- groue 10y agoYes, like a rogue one installed through any jailbreaking technique, isn't it?
- vbezhenar 10y agoLocally trusted CA certificates circumvent HPKP protection, because many organisations use TLS MITM attack to spy on their staff and browsers must support it in order to work properly in those environments. But it makes sense for browser. If you are making your own application, you can implement it in any way. Simplest way would be to embed public key in the application and check it without HPKP. Though, probably, if your app is popular, you'll face that in some networks your connections are MITMed and you (or user) can't do anything about it, so it's choice about dropping security or not to work at all.
- zeveb 10y agoHPKP is a workaround, not a solution, to the problem of trusting every CA in the world to certify every site in the world — it's a symptom of the fact that the economics of CAs are completely, totally and fundamentally out-of-whack: relying parties have no relationship with the CAs they trust. There are two things a CA can do: it can a) certify that a key is associated with some real-world identity or b) certify that a key is associated with some DNS name. The first is actually pretty desirable, but … there is no global namespace of real-world identities, so there's nothing a CA CertCorp can certify other than 'public key 0x1234ABCD0987FEDB is associated with CertCorp identity X,' which is … not nearly as desirable, or useful. The second possibility is actually pretty useful, but also imperfect. To a huge extent, Amazon really is amazon.com; Google really is google.com. But, of course, .com could always decide to reallocate hostnames at will, regardless of its contracts (there may be contractual, civil or criminal remedies, of course). Where does HPKP come into all this? It really doesn't: it's a half-assed way for a site to say, 'you visited me once, and trusted CA X to verify my identity then; in the future, please trust CAs X & Y' — but it does nothing at all to actually ensure that CA X was reliable in the first place! After all, CA X could have issued a certificate to some malfactor, who served the HPKP instructions to only trust X & Y. It's smoke and mirrors, all the way down.
- pfg 10y agoThere's nothing stopping you from pinning exclusively to keys under your control. A pin counts as satisfied if the hash matches at least one of the keys in the certificate chain, including the end-entity certificate itself. In other words, if you do not trust any CA, HPKP can still help you. For most sites, pinning to a small set of CAs is sufficient and a vast improvement, but if you chose to trust no one, that's fine too.
- vbezhenar 10y agoI won't use or recommend HPKP until there'll be a way to recover domain with lost keys. I think of something like bit in the certificate which will override HPKP and this bit should be very thoroughly verified by issuer, something like EV. Risk of losing domain is unacceptable and overweight security gains.
- ivanr 10y agoWell, there's an idea: require a special certificate (via an extension) to enable pinning.
- ejcx 10y agoLike tptacek said, "Don't HPKP your blog". There's only a handful of sites that need HPKP and that's okay. That doesn't mean there is something wrong with HPKP. It's a useful tool for people with a specific threat model. If you are one of these sites then deploy HPKP and handle the operational responsibility that it comes with. If you aren't one of these handful of sites then do not deploy HPKP. HPKP is a huge footgun and the benefits are not super large on an average case.
- ivanr 10y agoI think high profile sites are better served by static pinning, which seems simpler to maintain and also comes with the benefit of preloading. Thus, if you have those sites at one end, and lots of small/no-large-risk sites who don't need any pinning on the other end, you're left with no one for HPKP to serve in the middle. But, if HPKP were easier to deploy, perhaps more sites would use it.
- niftich 10y agoEDIT: I was mistaken about something fundamental in how TLS operates. Unchanged question included below: I have an amateurish question. Please correct me with counterpoints if I'm mistaken. In an attempt to 'explain like I'm five', HPKP adds an additional checksum, so that the server can say, 'if you see any certs whose Subject-Public-Key-Info doesn't match this checksum, those aren't me, because I generated this checksum off of my cert's Subject-Public-Key-Info. But since the Subject-Public-Key-Info is (by definiton) public, a CA could issue an owner-unsolicited cert to the same site, containing the same Subject-Public-Key-Info, and which will pass pin validation and allow the site to be impersonated [1]. This may happen if the CA is rogue, or if the CA makes a mistake and issues a certificate to some bad actor other than the actual site operator. So if HPKP is designed to protect against CA errors (malicious or accidental), how can it do that when it can't protect against CA errors, malicious or accidental? [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7469#section-4.5 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7469#section-4.5
- yuubi 10y agoIf the attacker doesn't have the private key that matches the Subject-Public-Key-Info, then he won't be able to impersonate your server given such a cert. (If he has, then there's no need to produce a replacement cert; the official one is good enough).