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The DNSSEC master key securing DNS is about to change
- verandaguy 10y ago> `Should we be worried` I don't understand why that's in the headline outside of being clickbait. The article itself mentions that meetings of the DNSSEC key holders are quarterly and regular, and that the hardware involved in the actual key rollover complies to the highest level specified by FIPS-140 (presumably actually FIPS-140-2). I don't believe there's reason to be worried; the ICANN has historically taken reasonable precautions to ensure the safety of such meetings and exchanges.
- madeofpalk 10y ago...I think they mean 'should we be worried' that DNS will break due to the change. The article didn't really answer that though, instead just outlines the ceremony that takes place. Does the key change frequently?
- bluejekyll 10y agoNo, it doesn't change frequently. The article mentions that this is the first time it's changing.
- Karunamon 10y agoPerhaps slightly off topic, but I recall that the LibreSSL guys dropped FIPS entirely[1] due to technical and political concerns. With that in mind, shouldn't meeting those specifications be seen as an antipattern? [1]: http://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&m=139819485423701&w=2 http://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&m=139819485423701&w=2 And relevant HN thread: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7634964 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7634964
- bluejekyll 10y ago> I don't believe there's reason to be worried; The only thing I see as a potential concern is that many DNS implementations build the root public key into the server, either at installation or at compile time. The processes for rotating that key will be tested in the wild for the first time. I can only assume that some set of build/installation processes will have an undiscovered bug during this procedure. Is it a big deal? Not really, I bet it would be fixed within a few hours.
- btown 10y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Betteridge%27s_law_of_headlines https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Betteridge%27s_law_of_headline...
- CiPHPerCoder 10y ago> that the hardware involved in the actual key rollover complies to the highest level specified by FIPS-140 (presumably actually FIPS-140-2). Eww, FIPS-140-2. FIPS-140 compliance isn't a selling point. It's more of a genetic marker than anything. Most of the time, it signals to hackers, "we value standards compliance over security." Did you know that ECB mode is FIPS-140-2 approved, but AEAD modes (i.e. what you should be using to encrypt) such as GCM and OCB are not? Yes, that ECB mode. https://blog.filippo.io/the-ecb-penguin/ https://blog.filippo.io/the-ecb-penguin/
- kijeda 10y agoThe keys are stored in a FIPS 140-2 Level 4 HSM.
- colmmacc 10y agoThe very word "Ceremony" is a hint to the theatrics and purpose of the DNSSEC root key procedures. It's more about incanting a sense of authority in the integrity of DNS and creating the impression that DNSSEC provides some kind of transitive trust; if the procedures at the top are this robust, then that security and sense of legitimacy must flow down. But in reality lookups to the root DNS zone are very uncommon; resolvers perform them only when occasionally boot-strapping the name-servers for the TLDs. An attacker using a poisoned root zone to take over your traffic would have to wait between two days and a week for it to work, so it's not very interesting for a direct attack. A mass poisoning is even less useful: there is a relatively small number of TLDs and any false answers would be detected very quickly (the occasional operational mismatch is reported within minutes on DNS operations mailing lists). And if your goal is to block some DNS names, as happened in Turkey a few years ago, it's easier to simply drop the queries and responses for the domains you don't like; signing doesn't provide any help at all. Bottom line: the root zone is not very security sensitive, there aren't interesting attacks to mitigate in the first place, and none that TLS/SSL don't take care of. Queries against the TLDs on the other hand are much more common; but what are the procedures for the .com/.net roll-over? or .ly? where are the live-video feeds for that zone signing ceremony? are there people walking around with Shamir-split copies of those keys around their necks and wearing them as if they were the guardian of the internet?
- misterpigs 10y ago'No'
- tptacek 10y agoNothing about DNSSEC should concern you other than the prospect that it might someday actually be deployed. http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/ http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/
- _jomo 10y agoI wonder why moxie's Convergence [0] didn't take off. To me it sounds near-perfect. It could handle multiple layers of authenticity, including DNS. The project has been inactive on GitHub for 5 years [1], however the Namecoin project picked it up [2] as "FreeSpeechMe" and added support for IPv6, and .bit, .onion, .b32.i2p domains. Now this, too, has been discontinued "because Mozilla removed the relevant API's as of Firefox 33". They "intend to release a replacement soon". According to Jeremy Rand [3] "A replacement is in the works (and is mostly working already)", but the source doesn't seem to be public or I can't find it. Are there any downsides of Convergence? 0: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Wl2FW2TcA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Wl2FW2TcA 1: https://github.com/moxie0/Convergence/ https://github.com/moxie0/Convergence/ 2: https://github.com/namecoin/Convergence/ https://github.com/namecoin/Convergence/ 3: https://twitter.com/biolizard89/status/712525859194798080 https://twitter.com/biolizard89/status/712525859194798080
- CiPHPerCoder 10y ago> Are there any downsides of Convergence? Your web browser grinds to a halt because almost no one runs a notary. I tried using it for a while.
- StavrosK 10y agoIIRC, Google didn't want to run it because they'd end up running all the notaries themselves, which they didn't want to do.
- _jomo 10y agoSo according to this and CiPHPerCoder's comment, the only reason it didn't take off is that it didn't take off? Edit: found the comment from Adam Langley [0]. They didn't want to add it to Chrome because it wouldn't meet standards for the preferences UI inclusion, practically everyone would just rely on the default notaries, so Google would have to guarantee notary uptime, thus being forced to run them on their own. He doesn't really point out why they don't include it as an optional alternative without any notaries pre-configured. He does however say that running it as an extension would be fine, but the required APIs weren't available at the time of writing. 0: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/09/07/convergence.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/09/07/convergence.html
- ryanlol 10y agoI'm not sure if the author really understands just how irrelevant DNSSEC is as of right now.
- runjake 10y agoI don't know why you're being downvoted into oblivion. This is a legitimate observation. When I saw the submission title, I momentarily thought "Huh? Did DNSSEC finally take off?". Spoiler: The answer is no. There are more effective ways to deal with security at the higher layers of the OSI model (such as relying on TLS encryption/identity).
- bluejekyll 10y agoWhile this is true, what DNSSec solves is the distribution of trusted identity. It's one of the lowest layers in the Internet, if you can hijack DNS, then all connections the client is routed to can be used to exploit higher level security features like TLS. Yes, things like pinning of certificates can reduce this, but all a bad actor needs to do is get access to a poorly managed x509 trusted cert. DNSSec does offer a layer of trust that most people lack today.
- CiPHPerCoder 10y ago> While this is true, what DNSSec solves is the distribution of trusted identity. Attempts to solve. I don't trust identities just because the US government tells me to do so. I believe certificate transparency + ubiquitous TLS + RFC 7858 (or DNSCurve/DNSCrypt) is a better cocktail.
- ryanlol 10y ago>DNSSec does offer a layer of trust that most people lack today. A comforting 1024bit RSA blanket.
- marcosdumay 10y agoLooks like this is about to change.
- jmartinpetersen 10y agoYet another site that confuses an ad blocker with a privacy guard. Is there some kind of pre-canned explanation or site I can point them at?
- hannob 10y ago"The DNSSEC master key securing DNS is about to change. Should we be worried?" No. Why should we be worried about anything in a protocol which has a deployment status close to zero on the client side?
- bluejekyll 10y agoExactly. Does anyone know of any standard deployments that actually have the clients verify the DNS key chain?
- kijeda 10y agoThat depends on how you define a client. If you're a Comcast customer, for example, they are performing DNSSEC validation for you transparently. Recursive resolvers on most Linux distributions have DNSSEC validation by default. One school of thought is to migrate DNSSEC from relying on validating resolvers sitting within the network provider, and moving it closer to the edge, in web browsers and so forth. Not much of that has happened to date.
- snuxoll 10y ago> One school of thought is to migrate DNSSEC from relying on validating resolvers sitting within the network provider, and moving it closer to the edge, in web browsers and so forth. Not much of that has happened to date. Fedora is actively working to including a system-local DNS resolver by default that will validate DNSSEC-signed zones. The change was originally slated for F24 but was deferred due to lack of resources, but I suspect it should make it in by F26/F27 if all goes well and some of the NAT64 issues that were discovered with Unbound are fixed.
- hannob 10y agoWhat Fedora plans to do is to use a local resolver with a fallback in case DNSSEC doesn't work. By this trick they try to prevent the inevitable deployment problems of DNSSEC. Of course they also make it completely insecure and it doesn't make any sense.
- guessmyname 10y agoWhat is the security like in these meetings? Is any security agency taking part on these ceremonies? What is preventing a terrorist group to launch an attack against this people considering the importance of all of them? I am probably exaggerating because all this reminds me of the not-so-old movies about hacking a la "Mission: Impossible" film series. Do they say that the meeting is going to take place in one place — like in the article it says El Segundo, CA — but actually meet elsewhere? Do the key holders have security 24/7 in their respective countries to prevent stolen keys? Again, I am misunderstanding the information here, but the keys are actually useless, even if you get your hands on all of them to attempt an incursion against the building where the KSK is, you would not be able to do anything because the security of that place is probably good enough to counter an attack like that, and supposing the attack takes place the other DNS servers would simply disconnect from the root and serve the information that they have until it gets outdated. So the only scenario that I can picture in my head is one where a terrorist attack goes against the building to disrupt the functionality of the whole system for anarchy reasons.
- bluejekyll 10y agoThis is the human equivalent of an HSM.
- mino 10y agoIANA's keeps this archive of all the proceedings, signed logs, and even multi-camera recordings of the signing ceremonies: https://www.iana.org/dnssec/ceremonies https://www.iana.org/dnssec/ceremonies CloudFlare has published an account: https://www.cloudflare.com/dnssec/root-signing-ceremony/ https://www.cloudflare.com/dnssec/root-signing-ceremony/
- kijeda 10y agoThe security is designed to guard against surreptitious access. Interested members of the public are welcome to attend ceremonies (availability on a first-come first-served basis). There are multiple redundant sites and backups of the keys, so an attack aimed at destroying a site should not alone be a problem. Even if all all sites and backups were destroyed, there is a window where a new key can be constructed (approximately between 3-6 months worth of operational zone-singing keys are prepared in advance for the root zone).
- noinsight 10y agoWhat type of key is it going to be, RSA or ECC? The article omits that detail. ECC would be a huge step forward...
- kijeda 10y agoIt is going to be 2048-bit RSA, same as the existing. It was considered rolling the key for the first time would be complex enough that tracking the effects of an algorithm change as well probably should wait for a future opportunity.
- bugmen0t 10y agoTLDR: No.
- ikeboy 10y ago>The same ceremony will be repeated at the secondary master key facility in early 2017 before being used in anger for the first time at a third get together in Q2. Is this a typo, or there some reason they're going to be angry?
- winthrowe 10y agoMy reading of this is that it is a colloquialism indicating that that the initial actions are preparatory and in the background, with the third action being the actual cause of visible changes downstream.
- kijeda 10y agoThe new root zone key signing key will be generated at the next key ceremony. At the ceremony after that, the "same" thing won't happen, rather, the key generated will be replicated to the second site. Operational changes using the key won't happen until the key is confidently stored at both locations.
- jloughry 10y ago"...used in anger" means used for the purpose it was intended for, not just in testing or rehearsal. The analogy is to a spear or a gun; when used in anger, it is used to hurt somebody.
- SubiculumCode 10y ago"This is only the beginning. The same ceremony will be repeated at the secondary master key facility in early 2017 before being used in anger for the first time at a third get together in Q2." ???
- ComodoHacker 10y agoInteresting but ridiculous approach to hiding content because of ad blocking: set the article's font to "redacted_scriptbold".
- hani13 10y agoEven more low tech, select all and paste it elsewhere.
- technofiend 10y agoParticularly when you have no control over the ad blocking.