3 ms·
> Wouldn't validity and principals be best left to something like LDAP? Yes and no. Even with easier access to caching etc, ldap can still be rather fragile (n
by e12e 10y ago
> Wouldn't validity and principals be best left to something like LDAP?
Yes and no. Even with easier access to caching etc, ldap can still be rather fragile (no (readable) ldap; no login)[1]
In general certificates need to be (proof of) principals (the entity that can prove ownership of the secret key X' corresponding to public key X" is X - where X is a uid (eg: e12e) Or a machine or service (login.example.com).
But if your use case is simple, and some meta-data can be readily attached to the certificate, it's easy to add limits on where key X is valid from (source ip/host), have access to (services) and when (time of day) -- and adding an expiry. If policy is max lifetime of a week except for CA keys, then that greatly simplifies revocation lists.
Generally "trust only this one CA" is simple, and allows moving capability (largely) to certificates. Centralised, on-line catalogs like LDAP make some things simpler.
And there might be a balance: perhaps some basic group info is in the cert - and each service can base policy on that (email login ok 24/7 - certain other services only 8-16 -- although I can't think of a compelling need for the latter right now).
[1] Of course one should check for revocations, but with an automated system to mint certificates, one can trade off with hour/day/week lifetimes. There was a recentish show hn: sharkey:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12097992 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12097992